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Abstract
Over the past five years, a multitude of cases that have made their ways through the U.S.
judicial system dealing with the question of how to adjudicate laws discriminating against
individuals based on their sexual orientation. The common theme among them is a reliance on
the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, which states that no State may “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” While discrimination of
individuals on their sexual orientation would appear to violate it, the way that the courts have
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause has posed many problems in achieving both a clear legal
doctrine and a wider expansion of gay rights. Given these issues, this thesis seeks to remedy the
constitutional quandary of how the courts should interpret laws discriminating against sexual
orientation by finding an alternative constitutional justification for overturning said
discrimination. The theory that I advance focuses instead on the well-established right to intimate
association, which derives from analysis of the First Amendment rights to free speech and
assembly and the 14th Amendment right to substantive due process. This right states that the
government cannot, without a compelling and narrowly tailored purpose, infringe upon the right
of individuals to form and cultivate meaningful intimate relationships. My goal in writing this
thesis is to articulate a theory that can provide a clear model for how courts should interpret
sexual orientation discrimination in future cases.
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Introduction
The nature of social movements really is rather fickle. It was only about 30 years ago that
those active in the gay rights movement were trying to change generally held views about the
source of homosexuality. In response to a public and Supreme Court that believed that
homosexuality was not an orientation, but merely a choice one made to advance their own sexual
desires. When framed in this way, it is easier to have contempt and less understanding about
those who take part in this conduct. Gay rights activists saw these perceptions as the fundamental
barriers to gaining widespread equality. It was more difficult to gain far-reaching support for
people that were seen to be making conscious, constant immoral decisions regarding their sexual
conduct. Alternatively, if it could be proven that all of those who engaged in gay sexual conduct
are all acting upon a common identity that dictates their sexual preference outside of their
control, then activists could shift the optics of gay sexual conduct to persecution of a minority
group unable to change the motivations for their actions. Such was the goal of those in the gay
rights movements, who sought to change the perceptions of homosexuality by showing that all
gays are not acting in rebellion to norms. They are merely realizing a fundamental element of
their identity. This fundamental element happens to be shared by many others like individuals.
Discrimination upon this group then becomes shifted from targeting persons’ immoral choices to
targeting people’s fixed identity that beyond their choosing.
It was this perspective that dictated the way that advocates argued for gay rights through
the courts, relying on Equal Protection justification. In order for gays to earn the safeguards of
the Equal Protection Clause, they would have to prove that homosexuality was an immutable
characteristic that individuals possess that has led to discrimination they have no opportunity to
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remedy or change. 1 This required the gay rights movement to argue for one overarching
definition of sexuality for the Court in order to receive judicial protection. This was seen as not
only preferable, but necessary, in order to change the widely-held perceptions that reduced
sexuality to one’s sexual conduct.
The fickleness of social movements is apparent through a look into how gay rights are
understood today, and how that understanding differs from 30 years ago. Nowadays, there is
much less of a concern with demonstrating how all gays are unified. Rather, there is actually a
concerted effort to show how sexuality and gender identity is very fluid, and can’t be defined
through one umbrella concept of sexual orientation, because those perceptions can differ
depending on the individual’s perspective. This change effectively highlights the issue that I seek
to explore in this thesis: that as a constitutional doctrine, Equal Protection is rather problematic
and not the silver bullet gay rights advocates originally saw it to be in terms of gaining judicial
recognition and protection for gays. In order to have their rights recognized through an Equal
Protection doctrine, the Court must define homosexuality through one, narrow understanding.
This would go against much of the changing shifts in discourse around sexuality, and potentially
misrepresent an entire minority group. Another result of an Equal Protection decision relying on
one understanding of homosexuality that could eventually become obsolete renders the impact of
the Court’s rights analysis weakened.
This is only one facet of the problems that exist in Equal Protection jurisprudence. An
appeal to the Equal Protection Clause has other issues, such as difficulty in applying clear
precedents that are easy for lower courts to follow. Given these two issues, along with others that
1

There are many other factors that are necessary to establishing if a group earns heightened protections under the
Equal Protection Clause that I will go into great depth in explaining throughout this thesis. In a very basic sense, the
Supreme Court requires that groups prove that they are discriminated on qualities outside of their control, and that
the individuals are unified as a distinct minority group.
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I will develop throughout this thesis, I believe that the most proper constitutional theory to
understand and frame gay rights is not through Equal Protection. The burdens placed on the
minority group, combined with the ambiguities inherent to the precedents, signal a need to find
an alternative approach to gaining equal rights. My alternative is an appeal to the right to
intimate association, which is found in the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Stating that
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,” the right to intimate association was found to be essential to the liberty exercised by all
humans in their lives. The right to intimate association protects individuals and the relationships
that they form that are of an intimate nature, such as romance, friendship, or family. Being in an
intimate association allows for individuals to fulfill basic psychological desires, such as the need
to be social, the need for love, and the need for stimulation, be it mental, intellectual or physical.
These, along with other benefits I will discuss in greater depth later on, make up the basis as to
why intimate associations are essential to liberty and therefore are strongly protected by the
Court.
The right to intimate association can be rather clearly applied to same-sex relationships,
and the individuals who are either in such a relationship or desire to be in one. Same-sex
relationships can provide many benefits to the individual of other protected intimate associations,
such as opposite-sex romantic relationships. This right also does not require gays to give one
broad definition of human sexuality, and instead only seeks to recognize whether there are
meaningful relationships existing between individuals. If there are meaningful relationships
existing between individuals of the same sex that can be considered intimate associations, then it
does not matter why those individuals have found their bond. All that matters is that they have a
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meaningful relationship that allows them to exercise the liberty endowed by the Due Process
Clause.
To shed doubt that gay rights advocates should pursue Equal Protection arguments in
order to achieve gay rights, I have taken a bifurcated approach to proving this. Chapters OneThree cast doubt about Equal Protection precedents as a viable constitutional approach. More
specifically, Chapter One explains the history of Equal Protection jurisprudence, including the
first interpretations of the Clause and the way that courts now interpret claims made under the
clause. Employing a system called tiered scrutiny, the courts rely upon a number of factors in
order to determine which minority groups are entitled to the protection of the clause, and how
strong those protections should be.
I then critique the use of tiered scrutiny over the course of Chapter Two. Many of the
factors that the Court relies upon are difficult to understand and measure, misrepresentative of
many different minority groups, or allow for judicial arbitrariness and subjectivity. When dealing
with law and the rights of individuals to cultivate their own identity and relationships, the Court
should not allow itself to be vulnerable to charges of arbitrariness. Chapter Three then applies the
factors used in Equal Protection litigation to gays, highlighting the inherent problems of the
tiered scrutiny used by the Court to weigh the claims of groups petitioning for equal protection.
The reason that I differentiate Chapters Two and Three is to show the depth of the issues
with Equal Protection jurisprudence. It is not just that the law is unfavorable to gays. Rather, the
law is problematic regardless of the group petitioning for recognition of their rights. The
problems are further elucidated when specifically applied to gays. Analysis about how broken
the law is just heightens the need to find an alternative approach to substantiate gay rights.
Finding an alternative approach is in the interests of both gay rights activists and the Court, as
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they can find a clearer, more easily-applied and understandable theory to recognize for the
onslaught of gay rights cases that will continue to flood the dockets of Courts across the country.
Chapter Four articulates the case law for my original contribution, that gays should be
protected under the right to intimate association. While there have been fewer cases argued over
the right to intimate association, the case law still provides a basis strong enough to have a clear
understanding of the scope of the law and how it could be applied to those in same-sex
relationships. Chapter Five encompasses the bulk of my original contribution, in which I argue
that same-sex relationships should be considered intimate associations, based on the benefits
derived from being in such relationships and the fit that these relationships have within the
precedent. I then weigh the arguments for finding gay relationships as intimate association
against views opposed to this recognition, and demonstrate that the arguments against
recognition of same-sex relationships are not as strong as those in favor of recognition. I then
discuss why this approach was not pursued by gay rights activists in past cases, which I believe
was not due to any inadequacy in the legal justification. As litigation was only one facet of the
wider movement seeking equal treatment under the law for gays, the constitutional approaches
needed to align with the platform of the movement on the whole, and any constitutional theory
could not undermine the national message. That national message was that gays are a
distinguishable minority unified by their shared, fixed orientation that defined their identity. An
argument focusing on the relationship and the benefits of the relationship distracted from the
identity of the individual.
In conclusion, I consider the merits and flaws of Equal Protection and Due Process right
to intimate association arguments when applied to gays, and conclude that the net benefits of the
right to intimate association outweigh the net benefits of Equal Protection argument. An
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argument appealing to the right to intimate association both reflects the interests of the Court and
of gay rights activists in a more complete way. Given the Court’s preference for consistency and
objectivity, this theory provides that in a much more substantial way than does Equal Protection.
For gay rights activists, the shifts in discourse on how to understand sexuality can still exist
without interference by the Court, as the Court would offer no definition or clarification on the
nature of identity because it is not relevant to find protection for the rights of those in same-sex
relationships under the right to intimate association.
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Chapter 1 – The History and Development of the Equal Protection Clause
Over the past 40 years, a multitude of cases have been filed, argued, and decided at the
state and federal level in the United States concerning a range of discriminatory practices against
gay citizens, including but not limited to employment discrimination, criminalization, speech and
press protections, parental custody and adoption rights, and access to state-sanction marriage.
While these cases have targeted different forms of discrimination and have had myriad different
results, one of the primary commonalities among all of them is the basic guidelines of the
parameters that each side has argued within and each judge has decided on. Those arguments fall
within the judicial construct of tiered scrutiny, which is a system used by the courts to weigh
Equal Protection rights claims for individuals who are discriminated on based on some
characteristic of their personhood against government laws passed that have a discriminatory
effect. (Holder 2011)2 With regard to cases involving the marginalization of gay individuals, an
approach appealing to the levels of scrutiny is not the best jurisprudential doctrine to establish
for a plethora of reasons.
This chapter describes how the doctrine of tiers of scrutiny developed, the judicial intent
that motivated their creation, and how they have become the backbone of equal protection
jurisprudence today. It evaluates how different identity categories, e.g., race, sex, sexual
orientation, fit within this jurisprudential architecture, identifying the various qualifications of
identity that the Supreme Court has held must be met if the highest level of judicial scrutiny is to

2

While tiered scrutiny is most commonly associated with racial and gender discrimination, as I will get into more
depth later on, this is not the limit of all arguments put forth in trying to have other persons granted equal protection.
Some examples include alienage, education level, poverty, illegitimacy, medical practitioners, even lawyers. Many
of these groups have gained traction in the courts for their minority, while others have not seen even the slightest
affirmation by the courts in being granted protected status as a minority in need of judicial intervention to ensure
equal protection. The main point is that the tiers of scrutiny have been applied by many different parties in many
different cases, all with the intent on showing how a certain minority fits the framework established.
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be applied to laws that classify on the basis of identify. Finally, this chapter explains the distinct
factors that the Court has carved out and is intended to be applied when making determinations
on whether to award heightened scrutiny3 to new minority groups.

The Tiered System Introduced
In 1868, following the Civil War and marking the beginning of the reconstruction era,
Congress passed the 14th Amendment. Of particular note for this thesis is the amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, which says that, “No State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” (14th Amendment) The original intention of the amendment
was to extend political and economic equality to black citizens who had been enslaved and to
provide a conscious dedication towards righting the wrongs provoked by slavery. (Strauder v.
West Virginia, 1879)4
While the initial intent of the Equal Protection Clause was to be used to limit
discriminatory legislation upon black citizens, the courts did not embrace the full scope and
potential of the clause until much later. It wasn’t until the 20th Century when the Supreme Court
interpreted the 14th Amendment as providing a check against discriminatory majoritarian views
that disenfranchised blacks. (Sunstein 1994, 12) While the first cases judged under the Equal
Protections Clause were based on racial classifications, the scope of the clause soon grew to
3

Throughout this thesis, I will refer to ‘heightened scrutiny’ frequently. As will become clear of the course of this
chapter, there are three different levels of scrutiny, called strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis
review. While many interchange intermediate scrutiny with heightened scrutiny, for the purposes of this thesis I will
not be doing so. When I refer to heightened scrutiny, I mean both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny. For
example, if a group is petitioning for heightened scrutiny, then I am saying that they are trying to become recognized
under either strict of intermediate scrutiny. The analysis about the tiers of scrutiny will become further elucidated
throughout this thesis. What is important to take away at this point is the broader definition that I use for heightened
scrutiny.
4
Throughout this thesis, there will be many references to different courts and court decisions. So it is clear, when
Court is capitalized, then I am referring specifically to the United States Supreme Court. If it is in the singular and
lowercase (court) or in the plural (courts), then I am referring to the institution of the justice system and the legal
decision makers on the whole. As an example, my stating “the courts have applied x law in y way, I am referencing
the entire system, while if I stated “the Court has applied x in y way”, then I am referencing the Supreme Court.
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include other groups experiencing discriminated that deserved judicial protection of their right to
equality.
Today, in order to determine how to weigh Equal Protection claims made by
complainants, the Court employs a system to weigh the competing interests in Equal Protection
Cases, which has come to be called “tiered scrutiny”. In theory,5 tiered scrutiny is intended to
give courts a standardized weighing mechanism to decide whose claim is most compelling:
minority groups seeking equal protection or the government. This judicial doctrine is intended to
articulate the extent of protections afforded to those who claim their right to equal treatment has
been violated, and provide clarity for lower courts on how to weigh those competing interests.
The fundamental premise of tiered scrutiny is that there are different levels. What this
means is that the court weighs the interests of each side in a specific way depending on the level
of scrutiny applied in the case. The reason that the different levels are necessary is because the
Court has determined that different minority groups need their rights protected more ardently
than others. In order to determine what minorities are protected by what standard, the Court
employs a number of different factors that are intended to provide guidance in applying the
correct amount of judicial protection to the specific minority. The three different levels are called
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.
Strict scrutiny requires that in order for the government to facially infringe on an
individual’s right, they must provide a compelling purpose that is narrowly tailored and one that
is necessary to achieve that purpose. (Loving v. Virginia, 1967) 6 This is the highest tier of
scrutiny, meaning that it is the greatest form of protection the court offers individuals that are
5

I say “in theory” because it is my position that there are many flaws to employing the doctrine of tiered scrutiny to
Equal Protection claims. Those issues will be discussed later in this chapter.
6
The precedent was further established in Palmore v. Sidoti (1984) and Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke (1978), among other cases
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deemed worthy of receiving protection by the Court. While commonly linked with 14th
Amendment analysis, strict scrutiny is used for more than just Equal Protection cases. Some
examples include 1st Amendment claims, such as the right to free speech, and 14 th Amendment
Due Process Claims, such as the right to vote, (Dunn v. Blumstein, 1972) right to interstate
travel, (Shapiro v. Thompson, 1969) or right to privacy. (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965) 7 8
Within Equal Protection cases, the Court has determined that individuals cannot be discriminated
on the basis of their race, religion, and national origin. (Wilkinson 1975, 979) Groups that are
protected under strict scrutiny are called suspect classes. So, if an individual is discriminated
against on the basis of race, the government has discriminated against a suspect class. 9
The second tier the Court articulated is intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny states
that laws will be upheld that appear to discriminate against individuals protected by this standard
if they are substantially related to an important government purpose. (Craig v. Boren, 1976)
What this means is that the burden of importance in instituting and enforcing a discriminatory
law is lower. (Strauss 2011, 137) The reason for this is that the Court has determined that the
group being discriminated against does not deserve the same level of protection as individuals
protected under strict scrutiny due to a number of reasons, which I will articulate throughout the
course of this chapter. Members who are protected under this class are considered to be quasisuspect, meaning that they are entitled to some protection, but not all that are afforded to
individuals protected by the higher standard of strict scrutiny. Those protected under
7

The precedent was further established in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003), among other
cases.
8
Fundamental rights, as defined by the Court, are rights that are essential to upholding the liberty of each individual.
They are not specifically written in the constitution, but are rights that the Court has found to be essential to
actualizing the liberty guaranteed in the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which states that “ nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”. (14th Amendment).
9
How this determination is made will be addressed later on in this chapter. It is this determination where the
doctrine of the tiers of scrutiny is most rife with problems, thereby leading me to search for other constitutionally
grounded principles.
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intermediate scrutiny are currently limited to gender (Craig) and illegitimacy. (Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 1974) It is this standard that some courts have determined is the proper standard to
adjudicate laws discriminating gays 10 , although there is far from a conclusive determination
affirming this principle. (Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 2008; Windsor v. U.S.,
2012)
The final tier the Court relies upon is rational basis review. This standard is the most
deferential to legislative bodies, in that the burden of importance for passing discriminatory laws
is very low and allows lawmakers much more leeway in accomplishing legislative action.
Because this standard is more deferential to the government, as opposed to the individual
claiming discrimination, the burden is shifted to the party making a rights violation. The
individual filing suit must be able to prove that the law passed is not rationally related to any
legitimate government purpose. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 1955) In other words,
all the government must establish is that there is some rational purpose for passing a law. If they
can demonstrate that they do have a purpose that achieves a legitimate government aim, then the
law ought to be upheld under this standard. Any persons that are claiming a form of
discrimination on the basis of some characteristic the Court has not determined to be a suspect or
quasi-suspect class has their claim adjudicated under this standard.(Wilkinson 1975, 951) Some
notable examples of minority groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-suspect class status

10

Throughout this thesis, I will be referring to gay, lesbian, and bisexual citizens as ‘gay’ simply for ease of
readership. I am not claiming that protections would be extended only to gay men, but those who would identify
with having same sex attraction and that this attraction is a part of their identity. I am purposefully not including
transgendered individuals in my theory. This is not done out of any animus, but rather it is out of constitutional
necessity. It is my contention that those that identify as transgendered face different issues and should be considered
differently by the Court based on those different experiences. I would even contend that those who are
transgendered are being discriminated on their gender identity, which is a settled area of law, in that gender
classifications have already been formally protected by the Court. Gays, on the other hand, cannot claim that they
have been protected. As such, it is for logical purposes that I separate the different identities that are commonly
linked in social movements under the LGBT umbrella.
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are the poor, the mentally handicapped and felons. (Strauss 2011, 141) The reasoning for doing
so is varied, as the criteria for fulfilling suspect of quasi suspect class status is rather subjective.
However, the Court ultimately determined that these groups did not merit the application of any
form of heightened scrutiny, establishing a definitive precedence regarding the fate of these
groups.11
Among legal scholars and court watchers, there are commonly held beliefs about how
judges adjudicate equal protection claims under these tiers. Preeminent legal scholar Gerald
Gunther famously stated that strict scrutiny was “strict in theory, fatal in application.” What he
meant by this was that the burden established by strict scrutiny was so high that it was almost
impossible for the Court to find the government justification for a law that discriminates against
a suspect class constitutional. While later studies have shown that the burden is not
insurmountable for the government,12 it is clear that the majority of laws adjudicated under the
standard of strict scrutiny are struck down.
On the complete opposite end of the spectrum, the perception is that the government has
a very low burden to prove the legitimacy of the law passed. For groups claiming an equal
protection violation, it is very difficult to prove that the government acted wrongly in
discriminating against a group protected only by this standard, as all that is required is that the
government demonstrates that they have some rational purpose for instituting that law. The

11

While the Court has made it very clear that such examples, among many others, do not deserve a form of
heightened scrutiny, and have substantiated such claims through some form of precedent, the way that the Court
chose to weigh the different aspects that qualify a group for heightened scrutiny was highly subjective. It is this
aspect that I take great issue with, as it is the Court’s burden to resolve ambiguity in the law, both for the purpose of
making the law clear for the general public and for providing an understanding for how legislatures can and cannot
act. When the doctrines in place provide for more ambiguity and less clarity, then that is where I see a need to fill a
void in the Court’s jurisprudential decision making.
12
In actuality, through empirical study, laws are upheld about 30% of the time when adjudicated under the theory of
strict scrutiny. (Winkler 2006). The perception comes from high profile race-based cases, which are frequently
struck down due to the Court’s wariness of justifying discrimination (Loving)
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rational purpose either must be independent of discriminatory intentions or it must fulfill a
government objective. (Strauss 2011, Page 137) The example of education demonstrates just
how low the burden upon the government is under rational basis review. Currently, the majority
of funding for public schools is based on local property taxes. Even though this could be seen as
discriminatory towards those in poorer areas, the Court stated that doing so made the pragmatics
of education funding more efficient. (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
1973) By showing a purpose that was rational, the claim of discrimination does not continue to
stand, even if the group’s claim appeared more compelling. What is key is the existence of a
rational basis on the part of the government, not a countervailing purpose.
Unlike rational basis review or strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny is less defined in its
perceived outcomes. Because it seeks to strike a balance between the rigid burdens of the other
two standards, its results are less conclusive in terms of preference for the individual or the
government. Without demonstrated preference for one party in cases involving intermediate
scrutiny, there appears to be more subjectivity among judges in which side is more successful.
(Strauss 2011, 137)

History of Equal Protection Claims
While the Equal Protection clause was enacted in 1868, the notion that groups of
individuals were entitled to a specific form of higher protection by the courts was first conceived
as late as the 1930s.13 Rather, the initial decisions made by the Court were much less sweeping in

13

There is some literature that the ground work for the tiers of scrutiny began in FDR’s pre-New Deal Court. Some
political scientists, most notably George Mason University Law Professor David Bernstein, have argued that the
conservative courts of the 1910s and 1920s were much more amendable to exploring and instituting some policy that
required the government to provide some formal justification that proved that some law was especially worthy of
being upheld if it were to infringe on individual rights. David Bernstein, The Conservative Origins of Strict Scrutiny.
While there is some credence to this belief that there were considerations for a system of heightened scrutiny, no
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the protections extended. In the famed 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases the Court adjudicated a claim
made under the 14th Amendment for the first time. In answering a question about the powers of
individual states to regulate economic enterprises, they held that the amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause, which stated that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”, (14th Amendment) was
restricted to claims that involved United States citizenship, and did not hold any authority over
state action. This had the initial effect of limiting the scope of cases covered under the 14 th
Amendment, as rights claims could initially only be brought against the federal government, and
infringements of rights at the hands of the states or other private individuals were not recognized
under the 14th Amendment. (Slaughterhouse Cases, 1872) This interpretation appeared to limit
the protections that were intended to assist newly-freed slaves in their integration to American
society. (Amar 2002, 26)
Because of the novelty of the 14th Amendment in American Constitutionalism at the time
of the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court sought to provide some clarity as to how the Amendment
ought to be read in its entirety. As such, they provided a definition of the Equal Protection
Clause to read that, “the existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated Negroes
resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the
evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.” (Slaughterhouse) The
intention of the Court at that time was to restrict the scope of Equal Protection to the political and
economic rights of newly freed blacks. While this scope was eventually widened through further

metric was devised to assess these claims. The first clear instance that demonstrated precedent of a tiered scrutiny
system was in Carolene.
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cases, 14 the importance of race being the first factor to receive heightened protection had many
great impacts for the direction of the law. By having race protected first, all other Equal
Protection claims in the future could be measured against the harms faced by blacks, as the Court
would try to develop a clear line of precedence.
By relying on such a narrow interpretation, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
effectively rendered obsolete. While the Slaughterhouse Cases could have interpreted to
substantially limited the scope of the 14th Amendment, the Court began to find protections
through other provisions within the Amendment, namely the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. It was through these clauses that reinvigorated the 14th Amendment by expanding its
scope that led to the system of tiered scrutiny in use today. In 1880, the Court decided in
Strauder v. West Virginia that individuals could not be excluded from serving on a jury on the
basis of race. (Strauder v. West Virginia, 1879)15 In making this determination, the Court relied
upon the Equal Protection Clause, stating that, “the 14th Amendment… denied to any state the
power to withhold from them the equal protection of the laws.” (Strauder) Even though it did not
formally recognize it as such, the Court relied upon a balancing mechanism between the
protection of equal rights and deference to government legislation. At its core, the tiers of
scrutiny are intended to clearly delineate how to balance individual rights against government
objectives. Strauder was the first case to do so when deciding on the grounds of Equal
Protection.

14

Cases highlighting this expansion include the expansion of social equality recognition under the 14th Amendment
in Brown v. Board of Education (1972), and the creation of intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications in Craig
v. Boren (1976), among other examples.
15
The case was brought by an African-American defendant who claimed that he was not given the opportunity to a
fair trial because of a law that stated blacks could not serve on juries, which deprived him of his right to a jury of his
peers.
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While cases such as Strauder served as foundation for what would become the tiers of
scrutiny, the idea that specific minorities would need extra judicial protection was not introduced
until the 1930s. Unlike Strauder, this notion was first formally introduced in a case that had no
specific relevance to Equal Protection of minority rights. Rather, this idea was first broached in
United States v. Carolene Products, a case about the powers of government to regulate interstate
commerce. (Siegal 2006, 356) Carolene Products Co. had begun to replace milk fat with a
skimmed milk combined with some other fat intended to replicate the milk fat, as the milk fat
could be sold at a higher profit for use in other dairy products. Called filled milk, it was proven
to cause adverse health effects. In response to the proliferation of the sale of filled milk, the
federal government passed legislation banning the shipping of filled milk across state borders.
(U.S. v. Carolene Products Co. 1938) The government claimed it was within its powers to
regulate interstate commerce, and as the filled milk was being shipped and sold in states outside
of its production location, the federal government was acting within its enumerated powers.
Fearing a great loss in profits, Carolene Products sued, claiming infringement of the Commerce
Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 16 Writing for an 8-1 majority siding
with the government, Associate Justice Harlan Stone held that the government was operating
within the bounds of their powers in regulating interstate commerce. More importantly, he
determined that Congress had demonstrated a rational basis for passing this law, and
subsequently outweighing any Due Process claim by the proponent, stating that the law sought to
protect public health, as filled milk was substantially proven to pose significant health risks.
(Carolene)
16

The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment states that “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” Found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, the Commerce Clause states that
“[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes.”
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What makes this seemingly mundane case so important is one footnote that Justice Stone
added that has since been unofficially anointed as the most influential footnote in the history of
American constitutional law. (Powell 1982, 1088) In discussing why rational basis review was
utilized in finding that there was no due process violation, Stone included a passage stating how
this standard cannot necessarily be applied for all due process and equal protection claims. In this
famed footnote, Stone claimed there are groups of individuals who may require greater judicial
protections of their rights than rational basis review accorded. Specifically, Footnote Four of the
majority opinion states that:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types
of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities, whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry. (Carolene)
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This footnote does two very important things. First, it delineates that economic legislation should
be adjudicated under rational basis review. Second, and more importantly for the purpose of this
thesis, it claims that not all legislation impacting different individuals can be judged in the same
way, which “may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry,” meaning a greater
protection of minority rights. In stating that minorities needed extra judicial protection, Stone
broached questions outside the scope of the case by introducing an outside approach to a separate
issue.
Of particular importance is the intention of the way the footnote would be applied by
future courts. It is unclear which groups would be protected by this greater form of scrutiny
being proposed. The language of the passage suggests that the definitions of groups needing
protection put forth were merely suggestions of areas of law that needed to be further scrutinized
through future cases. Claims that the Court “may call for a… more searching judicial inquiry”
and that they do not need to “consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes… is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment” do not appear to be establishing a clear precedent as to how
minority Equal Protection suits ought to be decided. (Carolene) Rather, they are merely
suggesting that there is a deficiency in an important area of law that should be explored further.
(Strauss 2011, 144) Louis Lusky, Justice Stone’s clerk who was the original author of the quote,
confirms this as such. He claims that the purpose of the footnote was merely to highlight salient
examples of discrimination that would demonstrate the difference between social rights of
minorities and economic legislation affecting corporations. The specific wording chosen was not
carefully crafted with the intention of becoming the bedrock of equal protection law. He even
goes to say that discrete and insular are not even commonly defined in the way that they are used
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in the footnote, further highlighting the intention to merely suggest an idea for the Court to
consider in the future, not a binding precedent made in that opinion.(Lusky 1982, 1105)
What is important to remember about footnote four is which minorities were being
treated unequally and how they were being marginalized. The group most discriminated against,
African Americans, had their rights greatly infringed upon by local, state, and federal legislative
means. (Ackerman 1985, 717) This was also during a time when the U.S. saw a mass influx in
European immigrants, which led to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiments. Such sentiments were
codified into law that targeted the country’s new immigrant population, highlighting a need for
greater protection of immigrant rights. Given the prominence of those particular minority groups
and the rampant discrimination upon them by the majority, it is easy to understand how the
philosophy advocated for by Justice Stone was directed at protection for these groups.
(Ackerman 1985, 741) The fundamental problem, however, is that this was a philosophy written
as a commentary on the state of society at the time of writing. It was not drafted to establish a
clear precedent of how courts should interpret future discriminatory laws against other minority
groups, such as gender, sexual orientation, or disability.
Even though footnote four of the Carolene Products decision was not intended to become
the jurisprudential bedrock for Equal Protection law, such was the outcome. The examples
provided by Justice Stone (individuals of religious, nation of origin, or racial minorities) all
became suspect classes and adjudicated under the doctrine of strict scrutiny. In deciding if
members of these groups should be considered a suspect classification, the Court relied on the
factors articulated in footnote four. Great reliance in determining suspect class status was placed
upon the language of footnote four, in weighing “whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition… to a more searching judicial inquiry.” This definition has
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become fundamental to equal protection litigation. It is this definition, however, that has created
both additional ambiguity of the law and misrepresentation of different minority groups.
(Ackerman 1985, 717-718)
Following the enumeration of footnote four into the Court’s line of precedents, there was
not a great rush of underrepresented groups seeking judicial protection to provide redress for the
wrongs committed against them in society. Rather, Carolene was initially only sighted sparingly.
The most notable citation of the footnote, prior to the Warren and Burger Courts of the 1960s70s, was in Korematsu v. United States, in which the Court was presented the question as to
whether Japanese internment during World War II was allowed under the Equal Protection
Clause. While the Court found that the internment of all Japanese citizens constitutional on the
grounds that the Executive was correctly exercising his constitutionally enumerated war powers,
Associate Justice Hugo Black used the standard of strict scrutiny to weigh whether members of
the Japanese race had been unjustly discriminated against, (Korematsu v. U.S., 1944) marking
the first time the standard had been used in practice. (Robinson and Robinson 2005, 30) In his
decision, Black claimed that the president’s goal of internment was compelling and was as
narrowly tailored as possible, which are the requirements for upholding a law that infringes a
suspect class’s right to equality. It has subsequently been debated at length whether this was
actually compelling or narrowly tailored. Regardless, the lasting impact was the reliance on strict
scrutiny for discrimination of racial classification.
Korematsu also had the effect of protecting all citizens from discrimination based on their
race. It formalized that the protections were not only extended to blacks, which contradicted the
belief that the 14th Amendment was only to be applied to blacks, as the Amendment was passed
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in response to the ending of enslavement of African Americans. Justice Black articulated this
distinction by saying that:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of
a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions
are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can. (Korematsu)
What is important about this distinction (that racial classifications were protected, not just
African Americans) was that all individuals were protected from discrimination on the basis of
their race. Thus, it is a specific quality that all individuals possess that can’t be discriminated, as
opposed to one specific group (blacks). This created the precedent that a fundamental element of
one’s personhood and identity could not be discriminated against. This particular distinction
opened the door for other groups to petition that a fundamental element of their personhood that
similarly bore little to no relation to their contributions to society was also discriminated against.
Over the next 30 years, the tiers of scrutiny became further entrenched into the
understanding of Equal Protection adjudication. Through cases such as McLaughlin v. Florida
(1964)17, Loving v. Virginia (1967)18, and Bakke v. Regents of University of California (1978)19,
the Court continued to reaffirm that racial classifications were examine through the lens of strict
scrutiny. The Court also began to expand the scope of the Equal Protection Clause by hearing
many cases of sex discrimination, primarily led by then-attorney and current Supreme Court
17

Held that Florida’s ban of interracial cohabitation was unconstitutional on the basis that discriminated against
individuals based on their racial classification.
18
Followed McLaughlin’s precedent in finding that Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage was unconstitutional on
the basis that discriminated against individuals based on their racial classification.
19
Held that affirmative action in college admissions was constitutional, yet quota systems stating exactly how many
minorities could be admitted was unconstitutional
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justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg. Through a series of cases, Ginsberg advanced a race-sex analogy
that sought to demonstrate the parallels between race and gender. It was Ginsberg’s belief that
race and gender were similar both in the way they contributed to one’s conception of their
identity and in how the government has discriminated against this trait. Developing the analogy,
Ginsberg presumed, would force the Court to find gender classifications as protected in the same
way as racial classifications. (Hoyt v. Florida, 1961; Reed v. Reed, 1971; Taylor v. Louisiana,
1975)
Ginsberg achieved a minor victory in Frontiero v. Richardson, which weighed the
constitutionality of a provision that did not give equal military benefits for husbands of enlisted
women as it did for wives of enlisted men. (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973) The Court decided
that the provision was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. However, no binding
majority opinion was written, as the justices finding the statute unconstitutional could not agree
upon a rationale. The majority was divided over whether or not to apply strict scrutiny to gender
classifications, which prevented a clear majority around one rationale to apply and establish a
precedent around. (Frontiero) Arguing for awarding suspect class status for gender
classifications, Justice William Brennan attempted to clarify the necessary factors that would
trigger the application of strict scrutiny. Any group that has experienced a history of
discrimination or have had their political power marginalized on account of the trait being
discriminated against were relevant factors in the decision to award heightened scrutiny.
Additionally, the Court takes into account whether the trait being discriminated against does not
rationally relate to their contributions to society, and if the trait is biologically determined.
(Frontiero) It was Brennan’s view, shared by three other justices, that gender classifications
fulfilled these prongs, yet he could not generate a majority of the Court to endorse this
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viewpoint. Absent a majority, the question about which tier to apply to gender classification was
left unanswered.
As the ultimate determination of what tier gender classifications fell under remained in
flux after Frontiero, the Court revisited the issue in later cases, most notably in Craig v. Boren.
Deciding whether a law that restricted the sale of beer to men over 21 but to women over 18
discriminated against men, the Court officially established the new tier now known as
intermediate scrutiny, which found a middle ground between the strength of strict scrutiny and
the leniency of rational basis review. (Craig) Finding that gender was immutable and not
relevant to one’s ability to contribute to society, the Court determined that there should be some
extra protection. However, even though women had historically faced prejudice, the
discrimination faced by women was not as great as the discrimination of those marginalized on
the basis of their race. Additionally, the intent of discrimination against women was not to
oppress, but to protect them, which was based on a social construct that women were more
fragile than men. Even though the protection of women was offensive and still led to
marginalization that required some judicial intervention, the intentions behind gender
discrimination were not as malicious as the intentions of lawmakers discriminating against
blacks.
Since Craig v. Boren, the only other group to receive some form of heightened scrutiny
was illegitimate children, meaning individuals who were born out of wedlock. (Mathews v.
Lucas, 1976; Trimble v. Gordon, 1977) Other minority groups, such as the mentally retarded
(City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 1985) and the elderly (Gregory v. Ashcroft, 1991;
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 2000), have petitioned the Court to hear their claims of
deserved heightened scrutiny to no avail. The question of sexual orientation and where it fits
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within this jurisprudential model is the latest, and most highly publicized, group to petition for
heightened scrutiny. However, even though the Court has had the opportunity numerous times to
render an opinion that would definitively formalize the tier to be applied to gays, they have not
taken those opportunities, and the law remains in the ambiguous limbo that we see today.

Explaining the Factors Used in Equal Protection Cases
There are many different factors that the Court refers to in order for a group to receive
heightened class status.20 They must be considered a discrete and insular minority, meaning the
quality being discriminated against must be visually apparent and such minority must be insular
within itself. The Court has placed an emphasis on protecting those who are discriminated
against based on a trait that is immutable, meaning the individual does not decide if they are
possessed with the characteristic, such as one’s race. (Frontiero) The group must have faced an
amount of prejudice inflicted by others in society, primarily the majority. (Carolene) This
prejudice takes form in two different ways: historical discrimination faced by the group (Loving)
and the political powerlessness of the minority group that would impact the ability the group has
to affect change through legislative avenues. (Frontiero) The trait that is discriminated against
must not be relevant to the individual’s ability to actualize within society, be it politically,
economically, or socially. (Craig) For example, an individual’s race does not affect their ability
to perform their job, and as such the legislature should not codify law that discriminates against
traits that have no rational relation to the individual’s contribution to society. The final factor that
the Court has considered is the intent of the lawmakers in passing discriminatory laws, and

20

When I say “factors”, I mean different elements that would support an application of a tier of scrutiny upon a
distinct group petitioning for heightened class status. Such elements all are relevant reasons that would signal that
such protection is necessary. Throughout this note, I will continue to refer to the different reasons primarily as
factors or elements, and will use them interchangeably.
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whether or not such intent is necessary for finding laws to be discriminatory and thereby in
violation of the 14th amendment. (Ely 1980, 151)
The way in which the factors have been applied has been far from clear. This lack of
clarity has created many issues for the Court and produced contradictory decisions. In short, the
Court has stated that these different factors can be employed in order to determine if a group is
entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect class status. They are to be used as guidelines for the Court
when presented with a new group. While they are fairly well delineated and must be considered,
not all must be consulted and weighed equally. It is within the judge’s discretion as to how
strongly each factor ought to be employed in awarding heightened protection to new groups.
(Bakke) It is this subjectivity in how judges weigh the factors, combined with the perniciousness
of the factors to be considered, that contribute to the fundamental problems with Equal
Protection precedents. It is due to these issues that I advocate for a break from such strong
reliance on this doctrine, which is the basis of the subsequent chapter.
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Chapter 2 – Vulnerabilities of Equal Protection Jurisprudence
Throughout the 20th century, the Court frequently relied upon the Equal Protection Clause
to extend the protection of rights to many different classifications, most prominently race and
gender. To establish the protections in place today, the Court substantiated its newly formed tiers
of scrutiny though the use of different factors to be used exclusively for Equal Protection
analysis. While the intentions of the Court were good, the reliance on factors is, by nature,
problematic because in order to grant rights to different classifications, judges must apply the
different standards that are vulnerable to charges of subjectivity. Over the course of this chapter,
I will explain each of the different factors that use in order to determine whether or not a group is
entitled to heightened scrutiny, as well as the reasons behind recognizing each factor as
necessary for Equal Protection jurisprudence. I will also highlight the many issues that exist in
each factor. This chapter will show how the Court’s methodology for Equal Protection cases is
rather flawed. In the next chapter, I will explain how the flaws inherent to this line of precedents
affect the claims made by gay rights groups in their petitions for heightened scrutiny.

The Factors in Deciding Suspect Class Status
Since Justice Stone’s seminal footnote in Carolene Products, the Court has continued to
refine how they decide which minority groups deserve suspect class and quasi-suspect class
status, and which groups deserve no extra judicial protection at all. The factor suggested in
Carolene of protecting discrete and insular minorities has stood with surprising strength. An
element of prejudice against the discrete and insular minority must also be present in order to
receive heightened class status. Through later cases, the Court determined that if the
characteristic being discriminated against had no rational relation to their ability to function in
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society, then it suggested a need for protection. They also placed an increased importance on the
immutability of the characteristic that was being discriminated against.

Classifying a Minority
In determining who is entitled to suspect classification, the Court determined that groups
that consist of a minority of the populace need extra judicial supervision to protect their rights.
This idea was first broached in Carolene, presumably due to widespread vitriol and
marginalization of blacks. As is clear by looking at census data, black citizens consisted of a
notable subset of the population, yet clearly made up a minority subset of the population. 21 The
reason as to why the Court determined there was a need to protect groups of minority status was
fairly simple. Blacks consisted of a substantial portion of the population, yet were greatly
outnumbered by their white counterparts, whose power allowed them to infringe the rights and
opportunities of blacks. So, if a substantial portion of the population was greatly affected by the
majority, and the marginalized group could not create the political change they desired because
of their lack of numbers, then it is the role of the judicial authorities to try to foster opportunity
that does not occur through typical political avenues. (Ackerman 1985, 722) The argument
boiled down to the fact that minorities were notably present groups in society, yet they were not
powerful enough to affect change without judicial protection of discrimination.
There are two main problems with considering whether or not a discriminated group
consists of a minority in society. First, the Court weighs the importance of protecting a minority
group’s rights in part based on the size of the minority group’s population. The issue with this is
21

In 1938, citizens identifying as black made up about 10% of the population. This number has gradually increased,
albeit not that substantially, as today only 12.5% of the United States’ population is black. (Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 2003)
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that the Court never directly says how big the minority should be within society, yet it clearly has
an effect in their decision making. The minority group must be a substantial portion of the
populace. (Ackerman 1985, 720) For instance, blacks consisted of approximately 11 percent of
the population during the 1960s, when the levels of scrutiny were first being formulated and
applied to equal protection cases. (Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003) More than one
in ten of all citizens were experiencing great political and social marginalization. However,
blacks were not a large enough population that they could have a real impact upon normal
legislative processes to combat discriminatory policies. The Court prefers to not involve itself in
deciding constitutional issues when the people can exercise their will and have laws passed that
achieve the same end. 22 But when a large portion of the population has those avenues blocked to
them because of discrimination, then it justifies Court intervention.
The issue is that this analysis is premised upon the size of the minority. If blacks had
comprised 35-40 percent of the population, but still were discriminated against in the same way,
would they be less entitled to protection?23 They would in theory have more agency to change
the laws, because they comprised a larger voting bloc. At best, this logic appears odd for the
Court to pursue, considering how the Court tends to view individual rights. The Court is
extending rights to individuals based on the size of the group they are a part of. This represents a
clear break from the common way of extending rights to individuals, which are allocated based

22

The purposes for this run deep. As the only unelected branch of the government, the Court does not like to act
contrary to the widely held social sentiments of society. That is not to say they won’t decide cases that have a large
impact upon the country (Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade to name a couple), but if avenues on certain
issues can be taken that involve bodies that were elected by the people, and better reflect the will of the people, then
the Court prefers to allow those to be taken given that similar ends would be achieved.
23
I understand the expected objection to this. If they had comprised that much of the population, then they would
have been able to better change laws that were discriminatory. However, this point is not just rooted in this example.
As I will discuss in greater length, women comprised a majority, yet were still discriminated against.
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on the simple fact that one is a citizen of the country. 24 It begs the question: is an individual
more entitled to judicial protection of their basic individual rights because of the size of the
population that that individual identifies with? This principle would seem to make individual
rights premised on the existence of other like individuals, instead of on the basis of the upholding
the interest of protecting each citizen from majoritarian discrimination. (Ely 1980, 165)
When looking at how minorities are viewed by the Court, we must also recognize the
other side to the size argument: that if a group is too small, they are not as entitled to judicial
protection. (Ackerman 1985, 720) The Court is much less likely to come to the defense of
individuals who consist of a very small portion of the electorate. For the sake of argument, let’s
look at a time in which a minority group was marginalized prior to the application of Equal
Protection safeguards. If American Indians, who represent a much smaller subset of the
population than blacks do, were the first minority group to claim that their right to Equal
Protection was bring infringed due to discriminatory laws, it is likely that the Court would have
less concern for their plight because of their size and lack of potential to impact the political
system through other avenues. (Ackerman 1985, 720) American Indians are such a small
percentage of the population that they have little impact on wielding political influence. Because
they are not like blacks, who are a larger voice that is being suppressed, the Court would be less
likely to grant Equal Protection.
This only further illustrates how the Court’s duty of weighing the protection of individual
rights versus governmental interests is premised on a fact that is out of the control of the
individual or the government, yet wields a great amount of influence in deciding the scope of

24

You can look to almost any other example of a rights claim. While one person has been affected, the right is
extended to all.
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rights. The rights of the individual are only to be protected if that individual was arbitrarily born
into a group that is large enough to have a realistic expectation of political influence if they had
not been discriminated against, yet is not too large that they wouldn’t need judicial protection.
This will prove to be especially problematic for the adjudication of cases involving gay rights,
which I will discuss further in Chapter Three, because it is unclear exactly how what percentage
of the country is gay. Overall, however, the notion of what constitutes a minority, and how
individuals are protected based on how many people are also of that group, poses many problems
of judicial arbitrariness.

Understanding Discreteness
Another aspect of footnote four of Carolene that has become a foundation of Equal
Protection precedence is the reliance on the discreteness and insularity of the minority.
Currently, there is no set definition of what constitutes discreteness and insularity. (Hoffman
2003, 1235) While some scholars have argued that these concepts ought to be defined together
(Strauss 2011, 149), there is a large contingency who see them as being distinct factors,
(Ackerman 19985, 721) with the most notable individual seeing them in this way being Louis
Lusky, the clerk for Justice Stone who wrote the first draft of footnote four in Carolene.(Lusky
1982, 1105) Given that we know the drafter of the footnote intended for these two qualities to be
considered separately, I am choosing to proceed by analyzing them as distinct, and that the Court
takes each into account separately when deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to different
groups.
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Since Carolene, the Courts have lacked a clear definition as to what discreteness actually
is. 25 One clear definition that has been provided and cited many times is provided by Bruce
Ackerman in his piece Beyond Carolene Products. He states that a minority is discrete “when its
members are marked out in ways that make it relatively easy for others to identify them.”
(Ackerman 1985, 730) This definition is important because it attempts to provide a clear way of
trying to understand how this factor has been understood, and does an effective job in doing so.
Discreteness was originally used as a factor in awarding heightened class status to groups
because this was prevalent in discrimination in 1938. Blacks were being discriminated solely on
the basis of a discrete characteristic. It was this public characteristic that was easily identifiable
that created bigotry and subsequent legislation enacting this bigotry into law. (Wilkinson 1975,
981)
For many different politically disadvantaged groups, it was important to recognize how
the discreteness of a characteristic led to discrimination. The public nature of race and gender
was the basis for legislative marginalization. In this respect, the trait’s discreteness was directly
correlated with the purpose for discrimination.(Ackerman, 730) However, the reliance on
discreteness as a standard for granting suspect classification, or even quasi-suspect classification,
creates a premium on demonstrating a quality that may not apply to all citizens who have been
discriminated against. By focusing so intently on discreteness, the Court has overlooked the
possibility of prejudice on the basis of an anonymous trait. (Ackerman 1985, 729) Traits not
visually apparent are considered to be not as worthy of protection as traits that are publicly
displayed. The best example is sexual orientation. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter
25

This is one of the primary reasons why it has been so difficult to distinguish whether or not discreteness and
insularity are inextricably linked definitionally or not. The only sources that we can rely upon are the interpretations
different courts have taken of this written precedent, and the understanding of the writer. This ambiguity is yet
another element that shows the shoddiness of the tiered scrutiny doctrine.

Binder 37

Three, sexual orientation is not public to others in the way that gender or race is. To illustrate this
point, if you were to see a child being born, you would know both the gender and the race of the
child. 26 However, you would not be able to determine the orientation of that child just by
appearances.
Anonymity is important to recognize because people possessing these traits should not be
less entitled to judicial protection simply because the fact about themselves that is discriminated
against happens to not be visually apparent. There are many examples of individuals being
discriminated due to non-discrete traits, such as sexual orientation or mental illness. Persons
possessing anonymous traits that are discriminated against can easily hide that aspect of who
they are. (Ackerman 1985, 729) This has the effect of both misrepresenting how many people
possess that trait, which as discussed earlier is an important consideration in the Court’s
determination of who to extend protection to. Gays, for example, can hide their orientation from
the public, which skews the total population of homosexual citizens. When persons choose to
hide a trait about themselves that can be discriminated against, this choice also demonstrates the
depth of that discrimination, as individuals are made so afraid that their rights and privileges will
be taken away due to prejudicial laws that they hide that aspect of themselves. This has the effect
of making it even more difficult for regular political avenues to be taken to extend rights for
groups possessing anonymous characteristics, because those who could be active in gaining
rights for themselves are afraid to publicly affirm that they are a part of a group subject to
animus.

26

I recognize that there are some abnormalities that affect this from being a fool-proof test. Things like being born
intersex or albinism would cloud the clarity of the gender or race. However, these extreme examples don’t nullify
the point that characteristics like race and gender are, for the vast majority of individuals, easily discernible upon
appearance.
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Understanding Insularity
Insularity refers to the bonds of persons among a discriminated group and the strength of
those bonds. A group is insular if its members are unified together through many different
political and social bonds, such as political affiliation, church membership, and residential
communities. (Ackerman 1985, 726) The Court determined that insularity of a group was
something to be protected due to the rampant segregation that bred insularity among those who
were disenfranchised. The thought was that it was the discrimination that caused the insularity.
(Carolene, 1938) Given the realities that resulted from this insularity, it made it that much
harder to break from the bonds and communities that were imposed upon minority groups. This
is apparent through all three examples of discriminated groups provided in footnote four.
Immigrants tended to live among fellow immigrants from the same nation of origin, racial
communities were highly segregated, and members of minority religions tended to exist within
the same social sphere.
The issues with insularity are similar to those arising from discreteness. Insularity may
have been a product of the inequality imposed upon restricted groups. However, like
discreteness, insularity is not an aspect that applies to all groups who have found themselves
discriminated against. The counter to insularity, diffuseness, is an aspect of discriminated groups
that can impede the group from gaining political influence to advocate for equal treatment.
Members of diffuse groups, such as women, do not experience the benefits of insularity,
including ease of political organization, common shared experiences, and unified social bonds.
(Wilkinson 1975, 982) They consequently have a more difficult time in creating these bonds, and
thereby have a more difficult time in creating lasting political change. By this logic, it seems that
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the Court protects individuals who are more likely to be able to use the political channels that the
Court is seeking to open up through extra judicial protection, while overlooking the groups that
do not have the natural advantages of insularity. (Ackerman 1985, 726-28)

Prejudice as a Metric
An individual who is a discrete and insular minority is not automatically entitled to strict
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny. If that were the case, then bald CEOs would be a protected
class, as they would fulfill all of the necessary components of being a discrete and insular
minority. Essential to finding a group to be worthy of heightened scrutiny is the existence of
prejudice against members of a group. Among all protected groups under the Equal Protection
Clause, all have faced some form of societal prejudice. 27 This realization is reflected in footnote
four of Carolene, and has been consistently cited as a necessary factor in order to grant suspect
or quasi-suspect class status. (Ackerman 1985, 731) However, even though there is consistency
about the importance of societal prejudice, the way in which to measure such prejudice has been
a source of great ambiguity. (Strauss 2011, 150) The Court has analyzed prejudice in two
different ways: analysis of historical discrimination against the group, and analysis of the
political power the group currently wields to combat discrimination. (Frontiero, 1973)
There are many different ways the Court could interpret historical discrimination. The
Court could look to past legislation that intentionally or unintentionally yet disproportionately
discriminated against a minority. The Court could look to the social stigmas against certain
groups, and how those stigmas prevented individuals of the affected group from being able to
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Adarand Constructors Inc v. Pena (racial minorities); Frontiero v. Richardson (women); Graham v. Richardson
(aliens); Jimenez v. Weinberger (illegitimacy of birth);
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actualize many of the rights and privileges that have been afforded to those who have not been
discriminated against. (Wilkinson 1975, 981) As such, it is the duty of the Court to recognize the
de facto discrimination and provide redress for this historical marginalization. Historical
discrimination could also be seen through inadequate governmental representation. For instance,
women consisted of a large subset of the population. 28 However, the cultural expectations for
women did not allow them the same opportunities in government as it did men. 29 When a group
of individual cannot gain political representation for themselves due to widespread societal
bigotry, judiciary intervention is consequently necessary.
Current political participation, or the lack thereof due to prejudice, is the other way in
which Courts have interpreted the effects of prejudice and their role in determining judicial class
status in equal protection cases. 30 Legal theorist Marcy Strauss has effectively condensed the
approaches judges have taken to understanding political strength and the factors that restrict the
exercise of political will. She writes that the four factors are the group’s ability to vote, the
numbers of individual of that minority, the existence of favorable legislative enactments that
might demonstrate political power, and whether members of the group have achieved positions
of power and authority. (Strauss 2011, 154) Each one of these different modes of analysis have
been used at various points throughout the Court’s jurisprudential history, with some being more
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Depending on the year, women actually were a majority, and men were the minority.
Justice Brennan emphasized this point through many gender discrimination cases, when he was advocating for
suspect class status for women. He claimed that even though women were actually the majority, they had such little
representation to show for their demographical presence. He cited the fact that, up until the 1970s, no women had
been elected president (which remains true today), no woman had sat on the Supreme Court, no woman had served
in the Senate, and only 14 women had been elected to the House of Representatives.
30
By judicial class status, I mean how the group is classified with regard to the tier of scrutiny that their claims are
adjudicated under. For example, race would have a judicial class status of suspect class, while gender would be
considered quasi-suspect class status. Another term for this is heightened class status.
29
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relevant to today’s debate than others. 31 Strauss highlights the issues of trying to measure
political power, because the different elements of political power can all be manipulated to fit the
intended decision of a judge. For example, a judge can point to a few select examples of women
in power, and claim that women therefore have political capital and do not need judicial
protection. This does not mean that women are properly represented or that this instance
correlates to the existence of meaningful political power. It merely means that there is great
power in the hands of the judge, and there is no clear way that a judge should act when presented
with these questions.
Like the many other aspects of Equal Protection precedence, the analysis about prejudice
is not without error. The problem with measuring prejudice is that there is a real lack of
consistency among courts in analyzing prejudice. Without a proper metric to measure prejudice,
there is no direction for lower courts as to how they should understand the history of prejudice
and how that relates to the opportunities for members of that group today. (Bhagwat 1997, 307)
One primary example of this schism in how to best weigh the two different elements of prejudice
comes from the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision legalizing gay marriage, Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health. Writing for the majority, Justice Richard Palmer emphasized the
history of political and social discrimination against gays that has greatly contributed to the
stigma that sees them as second-class citizens. However, for the dissent, Justice David Borden
claimed that judicial intervention on behalf of gays and lesbians was not necessary, as they were
a politically powerful group who, at that time, had the capital and the influence to take advantage
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The point that I believe is of less concern is the right to vote, as everyone in society has the right to vote, with the
exception of some individuals who are restricted given a greater government interest in restricting their ability to
vote (most notably children, felons, and illegal aliens). With regard to the sheer size of the group, I have adequately
addressed both the importance the courts place on the size of the group, as well as the problems associated with this
emphasis. To do so again in this section would be simply redundant.
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of other political avenues. Instead of focusing on how gays had been historically marginalized,
he analyzed the rise of influence that gays were continuing to gain at a rapid rate. As such, he
believed that the political system was not marginalizing these groups, but rather was adapting to
their increasing political capital, which lessens the need for judicial intervention. (Kerrigan,
2008)
Kerrigan provides a great example for when two judges can each follow the same
precedents yet come to drastically different results. Both recognized the prejudice leveled against
gays. They each placed greater weight on differing elements of this principle, leading to the
opposing viewpoints. What this shows is how there is no way to clearly incorporate these
separate ideals into one cogent understanding of prejudice that can be applied in future cases.
The result is less opportunity for judicial objectivity, and it allows judges the opening to justify
decisions with their own self-selecting history.
This leads us to another important question about prejudice: How would we ideally
measure past prejudice? Can it even be done at all? (Wilkinson 1975, 981) These are both valid
criticisms, ones that may we may never be able to answer. The primary issue is that the levels of
scrutiny are trying to fit different groups with different histories and forms of marginalization
under one model of interpretation. What this does is makes the actual prejudice even harder to
understand, because it is not being interpreted for its own sake. (Ackerman 1985, 737)
Having recognized that there is no objective way to measure history, and seeking to
minimalize their own subjectivity, judges have tried to find clearer ways to understand prejudice
of new groups petitioning for equal protection by looking to the groups that the tiers were based
around. For strict scrutiny, that would be race, while for intermediate scrutiny, the archetype is
gender. Judges and legal advocates have tried to understand the history of these two groups that
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led to those courts deciding which standard to implement, and then analogize others groups to
these two archetypes. For strict scrutiny, judges have tried to understand the history of different
groups based on a comparison to the history of discrimination on the basis of race. (Graham v.
Richardson, 1971) When looking at the history of blacks in the U.S., they were enslaved on the
basis of race, and restricted to living and interacting only with members of their own race. While
being greatly under represented and marginalized, women never experienced the level of
hardship that blacks did. Additionally, the intent to oppress women was not nearly as vitriolic as
the intent to restrict the autonomy and basic political rights of blacks. The comparison of
respective past discrimination was a basis for establishing intermediate scrutiny for gender
discrimination, because the history of discrimination women faced was not equal to the
discrimination of blacks. (Craig v. Boren, 1976) The process of comparison became an unwritten
precedent, in that later courts have used this strategy of analogy to understand other group’s
place with equal protection precedent.
The issues of analogizing are exactly the same as trying to measure prejudice without any
sort of metric. It allows judges to subjectivity determine the nature of a group’s history of
discrimination, due to their being no proper way to understand the history of discrimination. The
only difference is that subjective comparisons are drawn between groups, instead of just
subjective assessments being made about the marginalization of the group for their own sake.
What this does is cloud the understanding of prejudice for individual groups because they are
being understood only by comparison to another groups’ hardships. (Ackerman 1985, 744) This
has the effect of misrepresentation and a lack of clarity. For example, women were restricted
from voting for over 100 years, they had much less ability to effect political change, and were
expected to remain subservient to men in intellectual, physical, social, and economic ways. It
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would be very hard to claim that women have not been marginalized when compared to the
opportunities extended to men. Now, assume for the sake of argument that there never was any
racial discrimination and subsequent issues stemming from this discrimination. Would women
then have a stronger claim to greater protection, because they would appear to be the group most
greatly oppressed? The rights of women, and the judicial protection of those rights, were
dependent on greater rights atrocities inflicted upon a completely independent group, instead of
being interpreted for their own sake.
There is general agreement that blacks have been one of the groups experiencing the
greatest form of prejudice.32 But let’s look at another hypothetical, one that would call this line
of thought into question. Let’s say our country, at one point, had a nationwide policy, greatly
supported by the vast majority of people, stating that any child born with red hair should be
instantly executed. They have no right to life whatsoever. Now, if this were to have happened,
we would probably see the plight of blacks as less severe than that of redheads, who never even
got to experience the pleasures of life at all. Does this then mean that blacks, based on their
history of discrimination, would have less of a need for judicial protection? I contend that it
should have no bearing, because when looking at the prejudice simply for blacks, there was a
need for judicial oversight in protection of basic rights that had been stripped. However, in the
approach that some courts have taken in trying to understand history of prejudice, blacks would
presumably receive a lesser form of scrutiny than redheads because their history of
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I refrain from saying definitively that they have experienced the greatest form of prejudice because I would be
falling into the exact trap that I criticize the courts for falling into. I cannot say that the courts are misrepresenting
and misunderstanding history by making these subjective classifications while then making one myself. There are
valid arguments to be made that other groups have suffered greater rights infringements, such as Native Americans.
I am not making a value judgment one way or another. That being said, I don’t believe that I am going too far out on
a limb to recognize the atrocities committed against blacks on the basis of their race was one of the strongest forms
of prejudice.
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discrimination was less severe, even if they did not deserve protection of a lower tier. This
highlights the fundamental issue with drawing parallels that shouldn’t be drawn. It does not
allow for understanding prejudice in its own right, and only seeks to compare that prejudice to
the animus faced by other groups in different times and social contexts.

Relevance of Trait in Discrimination
Another factor in determining the level of scrutiny for groups is whether or not the trait
being discriminated against is related to the individual’s ability to participate and contribute in
society. It is the test of the relevancy of the characteristic being discriminated against. For
example, education opportunities could not be restricted to whites only, because one’s race was
not relevant to whether that individual should or should not receive an education. If the trait does
not reflect the person’s abilities or capabilities, then it could be considered irrelevant, and
thereby not a justified reason by the government to impose a law with this discriminatory impact.
(Goldberg 2004, 481) The Court has used this logic to reject age as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class, as they claim that legislative actions that facially restrict the opportunities of some based
on their age are not discriminatory because the trait bears a direct relation to a government
interest, most notably that of workplace productivity. (Kimel v. Board of Regents, 2000)
However, there is no relevant reason for capping the number of female workers, as one’s gender
does not have a rational relationship with the ability to work productively.
Similarly to many of the other factors, relevancy suffers from the same ambiguity that
does not provide clear precedents. Firstly, how can relevancy really be determined? This
question again gets left up to the interpretation of the judges. Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly, does the trait have to be highly irrelevant to a government purpose for a group to
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accrue judicial protection?(Aukerman 2005, 37) Many have argued that the poor deserve
heightened protection of some sort, instead of having their cases of discrimination only
adjudicated under rational basis review. There are many different factors that contribute to this
line of thinking, with the chief among them being that poor individuals are at a greater
disadvantage for many different opportunities compared to their wealthier counterparts. 33
However, the fact that persons are poorer can be directly related to their marginalization and not
being afforded equal protection. (Strauss 2011, 167) The best example of such was in the case
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, when the Supreme Court determined that
education could be funded by local property taxes, even though persons living in poorer
neighborhoods were guaranteed to have schooling of much lesser quality. Because schooling is
funded through property taxes, poorer citizens have less valuable pieces of property and
therefore pay less in property taxes, which then results in less money going into the school
system. With less money in the school system, the quality suffers greatly compared to districts
with higher property values. In this case, the fact that the individuals affected were poor was
directly relevant to the case at hand. (Rodriguez, 1973) Their economic status directly led to
worse education and the harms that are associated with this worse education. Does that mean,
because a lack of wealth was the cause of the problem and the cause of the discrimination, that
we should not recognize it?
This example of the poor elucidates the need to call into question whether or not this is a
constitutionally responsible principle to uphold as one of the bedrock of equal protection cases.
Individuals can be discriminated against for things within their control, and which have
33

Examples of such include ability to influence the political process through campaign donations, restrictions on the
right to vote through tougher voter ID laws and shorter voting hours, poorer education, lack of social mobility, lower
quality of property ownership, among many other issues.
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relevance to government measures. That does not mean that they do not deserve heightened
protection in any form.

Immutability
The concept of immutability is one that has slowly developed to become arguably the
single greatest consideration in the court’s determination of who receives suspect classification.
It is this concept that has been the primary justification for heightened classification for race and
gender, while it was one of the reasons that prevented social class or age from gaining similar
recognition. It is also a very large point of contention, both among scholars and the courts, as to
whether one’s sexual orientation fulfills these factors.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, the landmark case that first introduced the idea of some form
of heightened scrutiny for women, Justice Brennan attempted to try to clarify the factors of equal
protection cases, including immutability. In doing so, he claimed that immutability was a trait
that one was born with and was biologically determined. (Frontiero, 1973) Over time, this
definition has shifted a bit, and there is some dispute about the true definition of immutability.
Some courts have claimed that immutability is simply a characteristic about oneself that is
essential to their existence and trying to change it would provide for so much strife and difficulty
that it cannot be reasonably expected that they would change of alter its existence. (Watkins v.
United States Army, 1989) 34 Others continue to rely upon the Frontiero precedent that
immutability is biologically determined.
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This line of argumentation was advanced for two reasons. First, it provided justification for providing suspect or
quasi suspect class status for gays, as it was proving difficult to prove orientation was linked to biological processes.
The second reason was that even immutable characteristics determined by biology could still be altered through
advances in medical capabilities, such as gender reassignment or racial transformation surgery (in which one
undergoes treatment to change their skin tone). Additionally it is important to be clear that this definition has been
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When looking at either of these two definitions, they both rely on a quality that can’t be
changed, regardless of the why this quality exists in individuals. If somebody possesses some
trait that cannot be changed, and the government discriminates against this trait, then the
government has passed law that an individual has no method of recourse in which to remedy the
situation. (Strauss 2011, 163) Restrictions placed upon blacks in public places like restaurants or
bathrooms, for example, were commonplace. Because one cannot change their race, blacks had
no opportunity to earn the privileges of whites. By recognizing the immutability of a
characteristic, the Court is acknowledging the limitations upon people, and that the government
should recognize that these limitations exist. They should therefore protect the autonomy of such
people when they are restricted from doing so based on some immutable characteristic, because
they cannot provide the change that would be necessary for the full realization of privileges
afforded to the majority. (Frontiero, 1973)
There are two main objections to the use of immutability in determining suspect class
status. First, the premise of immutability confuses the effects of discrimination by placing a
premium on an individual being discriminated for the rest of their life, instead of simply
accepting the existence of discrimination for the point that they are at in their life.
Hypothetically, let’s say one’s gender switched every ten years, but men still held an inherent
and historical privilege that women did not experience. 35 Would women not be entitled to
heightened protection, because their gender was not immutable? The discrimination would still

used by certain courts, such as the deciders in Watkins. However, there is far from any conclusive agreement to use
this new definition of immutability, as many courts continue to place a premium upon a trait being biologically
determined.
35
I understand that if everyone experienced life as both genders, there would presumably be much more equality,
both procedurally and substantively. However, for the sake of argument, maintaining social constructs around
gender while manipulating immutability seeks to highlight the issue with immutability as a concept.
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exist for that individual, and at that point in time, they would not be able to exist equally to men.
However, the fact that they do not remain that gender would then determine that women should
not be entitled to benefits at that time, because they have the potential to not be subjected to that
harm in the future.
Now, apply this logic to a more tangible example: the poor. The Court has stated that
those in poverty are not members of a suspect class because they have the ability to progress and
develop greater wealth and experience class mobility. Because they have that ability, the Court
has said they are less entitled to heightened protection, because other protected minorities do not
have the ability to ever change the basis of why they are being discriminated against. However,
this overlooks the discrimination in the present that poor individuals experience. In the case of
education funding, the families negatively affected may in the future be prosperous enough to
move to a district where they can receive better schooling. However, in that moment they do not
have that opportunity. By placing a premium on immutability, what the Court is saying is that the
potential to change an aspect of oneself in the future is a greater consideration than the very real
and tangible forms of discrimination that poor individuals experience at that very time.
Another example that illustrates the problem with immutability is age discrimination.
Obviously, people who are old have not always been old. Rather, they grew up and developed as
people with qualities and capabilities that have evolved since they were of a younger age. Along
with this self-development, the individual becomes subjected to new feelings animus directed
towards them, due to the public’s treatment of the elderly. That individual had never had to
experience this form of prejudice before, but with their advanced age comes this new form of
discrimination. Does the fact that they were young once mean that they do not experience
discrimination? Or is the discrimination of these individuals less than that of other individuals
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discriminated against due to an immutable characteristic simply because they weren’t born with
it?
The second issue with immutability as a factor is the strength that it possesses when
weighed against other factors. All other protected classifications rely on the fact that the group
receiving suspect classification had some history of discrimination or was currently being
discriminated against. Even if the courts have not conceptualized how to measure prejudice
effectively, the mere existence of some form of prejudice has always been a primary factor in
whether or not to grant suspect or quasi suspect classification to a distinct group. However,
through the rise in importance of immutability, the courts have decided that laws discriminating
against anyone on the basis of race, gender, religion, or any other protected class are subject to
the level of scrutiny determined by the Court. (Strauss 2011, 170) What this means is that whites
are entitled to strict scrutiny to protect their interests, even though they have suffered none of the
harms that were used to justify greater judicial protection for blacks in the first place. The
immutability of race has overshadowed all of the other reasons for the tiers of scrutiny. The
same goes for gender, where men are given quasi-suspect classification. (Craig, 1976) The effect
is that it clouds the history of the precedents established. The reasons for establishing tiers of
scrutiny were the existence of a trait combined with other factors that led to marginalization,
such as prejudice experienced. By extending the same level of protection to the majorities who
were the oppressors, the factor of immutability becomes the only factor and the other factors that
were originally used to create the tiered system are rendered moot.
By this logic, all of the other factors in determining suspectness, with the possible
exception of relevancy, are either lessen in their importance or simply unnecessary. Therefore,
under this interpretation and reliance on immutability, anybody with any immutable
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characteristic would be entitled to judicial protection, even for things as trivial as eye color or
amount of freckles. The easiness of looking at whether or not a trait is immutable has superseded
the other considerations that the Court must take to the point that the original purposes of judicial
supervision over rights claims are completely misappropriated.

Weighing all of the Different Factors
Among all of the different factors used by courts in equal protection cases, there is one
common problem that affects the application of each of these factors. Each of these factors, in
their own right, require a great amount of weighing of the different considerations on the part of
the judge. The judge must weigh whether a group has been made politically powerless, or if they
have been marginalized through social spheres, and how to weigh the importance of those
different aspects. She must weigh how relevant the trait of the individual is to their ability to
function in society, or how relevant that trait is to the government purpose aimed to be fulfilled
in the legislation passed. Within each of these factors, there are many considerations that could
be interpreted very differently depending on the judge.
Now, take that analysis about weighing different aspects of singular factors, and expand
it to consider all in conjunction with, or competing against, one another. There are so many
factors that are necessary to review and analyze under the tiered scrutiny doctrine. As such, there
are so many different ways in which judges can interpret and weigh the importance of the
different factors. Coupled with the many different factors that judges must weigh is the lack of
precedent or guidance that would convey how to value the different factors. Individual judges are
then left to both determine how to properly define each of these factors, and then judge the merit
of each of them in comparison to the others.

Binder 52

At this point, it may seem as if I am merely articulating the duties of judges, and am
criticizing the ways in which jurisprudential models and precedents are established. However,
the potential harms amplify the caution that should be taken within this line of constitutional
development. In no other area of law are there so many factors that judges must both individually
measure and simultaneously weigh against each other in the way that has been enumerated for
these cases. The reason we have not seen such multifaceted judicial doctrines is because it
prevents clarity for how judges ought follow and apply the law. This consideration has not been
properly met, and serves to provide the opposite harms that result from a lack of such clarity.
Relying on so many subjective factors gives judges a license to make decisions based on
personal feelings while giving the illusion of grounding that decision in the precedents. The
system in place has so many different elements that can be taken into account, that it frequently
goes unnoticed when judges don’t consciously take into account every factor that previous courts
have deemed necessary. The purpose of strongly following precedent is to provide a check upon
judges from being able to “legislate from the bench” by effectively making policy decisions from
their position on the court. However, when the precedent to follow is so extensive and as
muddled as it is within this area of law, it does precisely the opposite of what it intends to do.
(Ackerman 1985, 744) By having so many different factors all supported by precedent, then
almost any justification can be drawn for any decision. A prime example involves laws of gender
discrimination. There have been many cases in which various judges have all come to
completely different outcomes, with some finding gender discrimination worthy of strict
scrutiny, (Frontiero, 1973 others determining that it deserves the lesser form of intermediate
scrutiny (which it is currently adjudicated under), (Craig, 1976) and some even saying that
women should not receive any heightened protection at all. (Geduldig v. Aiello dissent, 1974)
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That is not to say that any of these judges are categorically wrong; actually, it shows quite the
opposite. This example shows how each judge can come to sound decisions based on the
available precedent, yet seriously diverge from their colleagues.
Furthermore, the weighing of the different elements of equal protection raises issues of a
new tension of constitutional principles. There are questions as to whether the Court should be
extending rights to some individuals and not others, which is what judicial protection of
minorities effectively does, or if the Court should be concerned with rights that can be applied to
all citizens. The specific precedents enumerated create a tension between these principles. When
looking at the role of historical discrimination or political powerlessness, the Court seems to
prefer identity based rights analysis, focusing on the specific groups within society. However,
through the application of immutability, the Court extends Equal Protection considerations for
classifications on the whole, as opposed to specific groups, meaning that all are protected from
discrimination on the basis of their race or gender. This signals that the rights being extended are
extended to all. This schism in the direction in which the Court directs their rights analysis
highlights the lack of clarity and depth of understanding that those operating within the judicial
system genuinely have over the animal that has grown out of the haphazard assortment of cases
decided. It is due to unresolved issues such as these that I seek to move away from this line of
penumbra, rather than continue to prop up an ineffective understanding of the law simply
because others in the past have done so as well. 36

36

I recognize that this may come across as if I am seeking to just disregard all precedents the Court has developed
simply because I do not care for the way they have handled them. That cannot be further from the truth. As will be
developed throughout this paper, I am advocating for the search of other constitutional principles to see if there are
any other potential constitutional violations of homosexual discrimination. Presumably, these other avenues would
not have nearly as many issues with the penumbral line as does Equal Protection cases possess. I am not seeking to
change law. Rather I am seeking to find an avenue that provides the most clarity and ease of understanding, which is
not possible through the 14th Amendment given the way the law had been developed.
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My purpose in showing the issues of tiered scrutiny is not to propose an entirely different
alternative. At this point, I am trying to show how the system of tiered scrutiny is a precedent
that is inefficient and problematic, regardless of the group petitioning the Court seeking equal
protection. In the next chapter, I will analyze the different ways in which gays specifically have
tried to use the tiered approach to gain greater judicial protection, and by extension equal rights. I
will discuss further how the tiered system does not adequately represent gay citizens. Through
this analysis, I will show how the tiered system does not provide guidance for a clear
jurisprudential model to clarify the ambiguity about how gays should be protected in the face of
a discriminatory law. However, in order to show how the tiered system is flawed for gays
specifically, thus laying the necessary groundwork to introduce a new way to adjudicate such
laws, it is imperative to show that the entire line of precedence is flawed and should not be
pursued at all. Otherwise, it makes my arguments vulnerable to the claim that I am merely
seeking to gain the greatest amount of rights for gay citizens, instead of trying to provide the
clearest jurisprudential doctrine for judges to easily follow in future cases regarding laws with a
discriminatory impact upon gays. To effectively counter any potential claim that I am merely
forging my own unsubstantiated path, I must, and have, clearly articulate the reasons for
breaking from a precedent that has become strongly rooted but is not so fundamentally essential
to the decision making processes that it cannot ever be abandoned.
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Chapter 3 - Equal Protection Law Applied to Sexual Orientation
As I demonstrated throughout the course of the previous chapter, the precedents that have
been developed to elucidate the purpose and protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment have proven problematic. Even with the great multiplicity of issues that have
arisen, the strength of the precedents continues to grow, even if it does so haphazardly. It is my
contention that the entire structure of the interpretation of the 14 th Amendment is problematic.
These issues are especially apparent when trying to answer the question of which tier of scrutiny
should be applied to sexual orientation classifications. In the previous chapter, I sought to
demonstrate the extent to which this model is problematic. Throughout this chapter, I intend to
focus my analysis by looking at sexual orientation within this error-filled model, and highlight
how any tier applied to gays would be misrepresentative of sexual orientation and the way
society views this trait.
I will explain in detail the cases that the Supreme Court has decided involving the rights
of those identifying as gay. While the questions posed to the Court differed depending on the
circumstances of the cases, there was a common theme that ran throughout each of these cases.
Even though there was a clear need, the Court consistently ducked the question of which level of
scrutiny to apply to sexual orientation classification. The Court has given unclear precedents in a
haphazard manner without much direction in how to decide future cases, leaving in its wake a
plethora of lower court decisions, in which all can be seen as constitutionally legitimate yet are
highly contradictory. Additionally, I will explain how sexual orientation poses new dilemmas for
the Court, in that the hardships faced by gays in America do not align with the set of precedents
that are necessary to grant heightened scrutiny.
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Sexual Orientation and the Supreme Court
As the tiers of scrutiny became more firmly entrenched in the law, different groups were
formally given different class statuses. Along with many other overlooked minorities, interest
groups seeking gay rights pursued claims asserting that their right to Equal Protection had been
violated do to their sexual orientation in ways similar to that of blacks or women, two groups
who had earned classifications of higher protection (suspect class status for race, quasi-suspect
class status for gender). The first case pursued by gay rights activists seeking heightened scrutiny
was Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 1986, in which a Georgia resident, Michael Hardwick, was
arrested on the charge of sodomy, due to the police witnessing Hardwick and another male
engaging in consensual oral sex. 37 With the aid of notable interest groups, such as the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, (Anderson
2006, 37) Hardwick claimed that Georgia’s anti-sodomy law discriminated against him on the
basis of his sexual orientation, because the law was written so that any homosexual sodomy
would be prosecutable. Any sexual conduct borne out of the identity of one’s sexual orientation
was discriminating against the underlying identity, which would be a violation of the 14 th
Amendment, so Hardwick claimed. It was this identity that was similar to one’s race or one’s
gender, as it does not rationally relate to one’s ability to contribute to society.
However, in a 5-4 decision, the Court determined that it was the conduct that was at issue
in this case, not the underlying identity of the individuals engaged in the criminalized conduct.
What is especially notable about the majority opinion was how the ultimate constitutional
question at issue was whether or not there is a fundamental right allowing individuals to engage

37

Sodomy is defined as sexual conduct that does not serve to procreate. This means that individuals are not allowed
to conduct oral or anal sex under laws banning sodomy.
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in sodomy. 38 Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White stated that the “Federal Constitution
does not confer fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” (Bowers v.
Hardwick 1996) Never in the majority opinion are the Equal Protection claims asserted by
Hardwick given any consideration, demonstrating a clear lack of awareness or care for the
argument that gays possess an identity which has the effect of causing certain conduct. What
Hardwick sought was recognition of that identity and a heightened level of judicial protection
that came with it. With a higher level of protection, gay rights activists wanted for the Court to
weigh whether the government’s purpose of protecting morality by criminalizing sodomy was
either compelling (the standard for strict scrutiny) (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1995) or
important (the standard for intermediate scrutiny) (Craig), instead of whether or not it was
rational (the standard for rational basis review) (Williamson). While he never said so explicitly,
White’s opinion had strong implications that Georgia was rationally exercising its police power
in maintaining common standards of decency by enforcing this law. The rational exercise of this
enumerated power fulfilled a prima facie rational purpose, thereby justifying the constitutional
legitimacy of the law. (Sunstein 1994, 9)
In response to the Court’s holding in Bowers, gay rights activists began pursuing an
approach to satisfy a prong that they saw as being the key to triggering some form of heightened
scrutiny: proof of immutability of sexual orientation. (Halley 1994, 511) 14 years earlier, Justice
Brennan had claimed in Frontiero that immutable traits ought to be protected under a higher
38

The relevance of pursuing an answer as to whether or not there was a fundamental right resides within the 14 th
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the precedents stemming from this text. The Due Process Clause states that
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Among other
purposes, the Due Process Clause protects the substantive due process rights of citizens through protection of
unenumerated rights that are essential to functioning within and contributing to the democratic republic. The
definition of liberty has been interpreted to be viewed as a rational continuum of freedom through which every facet
of human behavior is safeguarded from arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints. (Griswold v. Connecticut).
It is through these grounds that the Court justifies its substantive due process holdings.
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standard because they are not chosen under one’s own volition, yet have been the basis of the
individual’s marginalization in society. (Frontiero) In trying to follow this precedent, gay rights
activists figured that the missing lynchpin that would guarantee heightened scrutiny was proof
that sexual orientation was biologically determined. Known as the search for the “gay gene”,
activists sought out to demonstrate the biological source of sexual orientation, with varying
degrees of success.(Halley 1994, 507,512) While some studies prove substantial differences
between gays and straights,(Balog 2005, 563) the research was far from conclusive in
definitively proving that orientation was immutable.(Halley 1994, 514) 39
The Bowers decision may have provided an initially unfavorable decision for gay rights
advocates. After Bowers, gay rights advocates were certainly hampered in their quest to gain
greater protection under the Equal Protection clause. However, this setback did not mean that the
legal movement was dead. It only meant new cases, combined with new legal strategies (such as
proving immutability), were needed to show different forms of discrimination that needed to be
argued in a court of law. Many cases were argued involving gay rights, both at the federal level
(Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 1997)40 as well as at the
state level. (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993) However, the Supreme Court didn’t take up the issue of
sexual orientation discrimination again until 1996, when they granted certiorari 41 to hear Romer
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I will discuss the search for and the importance of immutability later on within this chapter. In short, there are two
primary issues with the search for immutability. Firstly, there is no conclusive scientific evidence determining that
orientation is biologically immutable. Secondly, assuming for the sake of argument that orientation is immutable,
the established precedents provide a lack of clarity that would allow for heightened scrutiny to be automatically
applied if the trait were immutable. There must be other considerations taken into account in order to find for the
application of a heightened tier that work in tandem with immutability of a trait, as opposed to immutability simply
being a trump card that outweighs all other considerations needed to find for a higher tier of scrutiny
40
Other federal courts that have decided cases on gay rights include the decisions U.S. Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno (1973) and Watkins v. U.S. Army (1989)
41
The definition of granting certiorari means that the Court has agreed to hear and render a decision on a case. Cases
petition decisions made by lower Courts, yet the Supreme Court does not have to grant certiorari. (In fact, the vast
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v. Evans. Unlike Bowers, which specifically dealt with sexual conduct, the discrimination present
in Romer dealt specifically with the identity of sexual orientation. Throughout the early-mid
1990s, various municipalities across the State of Colorado passed city ordinances that protected
gays under existing employment discrimination protections. All employment protections
extended to racial, gender, and age classifications were now extended to sexual orientation. In
response to this proliferation of equal right expansion, the citizens of Colorado passed a
statewide referendum known as “Amendment 2” to be added to the State Constitution, which
prevented any legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government
that was designed to protect the status of persons based on their “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.” (Romer) Affirmed with 53% of the vote, the ban
overturned any local ordinance seeking to protect gays from employment discrimination.
(Romer)
While the facts differed greatly between Romer and Bowers, the ultimate question facing
the Supreme Court appeared to be fairly similar, as they both forced the Court to consider the
rights of homosexuals. However, the point at which they differed was in the way gays were
being targeted by their respective state governments. In Bowers, the Court could avoid the
question of whether being gay was an identity that one possessed and was fundamental to their
existence, which would raise larger questions about the discrimination they faced. In Romer, the
Court had no such avenue to avoid that quandary. There was no question of upholding public
morals, which was the foundation of the Bowers decision. (Bowers) Amendment 2 specifically
targeted those who identify as gay, and discriminated on this basis for an area of civic life that

majority of cases are not granted certiorari.) Hereinafter, any references to the term ‘cert’ simply mean certiorari, as
it is a common shortening in the legal profession.
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was not related to the way in which they actualized their sexual orientation. While Bowers
certainly affected the lives of gay citizens, Romer was the first case heard by the Supreme Court
that required a real analysis about whether sexual orientation was an element of one’s identity.
This question about the understandings of orientation naturally led to analysis about whether
discrimination on this identity was discrimination against a form of personhood, as opposed to
regulation of conduct, which was the ultimate issue in Bowers.
In reviewing the decision of the Colorado State Supreme Court, which found that
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional and that gays should be protected under strict scrutiny, 42
(Romer) the majority opinion, written by Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, came to the same
result but adopted a different rationale. Rather than determined that gays are protected by a
higher form of scrutiny, Kennedy found Amendment 2 unconstitutional under rational basis
review. Writing about a basic reading of the Equal Protection Clause, Kennedy stated that “if
constitutional conception of “equal protection of the laws” means anything, it must at the very
least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.” (Romer) Having made the determination that animus against a group of
persons cannot be considered a legitimate government interest, he determined that the State of
Colorado did not possess a rational motivation that achieved a legitimate state objective. Given a
lack of a legitimate purpose, the Court was given no reason to uphold the Amendment. (Romer)43

42

Romer v. Evans; stating that “the State Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny under
the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the
political process.”
43
The primary justification for the Amendment provided by the state was that it sought to maintain equality among
all citizens by not creating special privileges for certain individuals that were not extended to all. The provision
protecting gays, according to the state, served to give special protections that their straight counterparts would not
have access to. Therefore, the Amendment was passed to ensure that equality for all individuals, regardless of their
sexual orientation. The majority did not endorse this analysis, claiming that Amendment Two allowed for
discrimination to occur against gays (as gays would be exponentially more likely to be discriminated against on the
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Seven years later, the Court heard another homosexual sodomy case very similar to what
they heard in 1986 in Bowers when they granted cert in the case Lawrence v. Texas. After a night
of socializing, Michael Lawrence and Tyron Garner decided to spend the night together, during
which they engaged in consensual sexual activity, including oral and anal sex. Having received a
false notification alleging violence at Lawrence’s residence, the police arrived to find Lawrence
and Garner engaged in said consensual sexual activity. They were both arrested under the
“homosexual conduct” provision of the Texas anti-sodomy law. In response to their arrests, they
filed suit claiming their 14th Amendment rights had been violated, namely their Due Process
Right to liberty and their right to Equal Protection. (Lawrence) The case, both in the facts and the
legal questions being asked, was almost parallel to Bowers v. Hardwick. The only real difference
between the cases was that the Texas law was written to target gays, (Lawrence) while the
Georgia law was disproportionately enforced against gays, even though it criminalized all
sodomy, regardless of the genders of the participants. (Bowers)
In a 6-3 opinion, Justice Kennedy again wrote for the majority, finding that Texas’s law
criminalizing sodomy violated Lawrence’s privacy rights, enumerated under the liberty provision
of the Due Process Clause. Claiming that privacy had a well-established history as a fundamental
right,44 Kennedy wrote that “liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” (Lawrence) What the decision did not
do was establish a clear understanding about the way in which to adjudicate sexual orientation
under the tiers of scrutiny. Instead of making that determination, Justice Kennedy affirmed that

basis of their sexual orientation), as opposed to ensuring equality for all citizens and not allowing for preferences of
certain citizens over others.
44
Cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), Roe v. Wade (1973), and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters (1925), among others, have entrenched the right to privacy in the history of the Court’s decisions.
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the holding in Romer was correct, but did not apply in this case. 45 The questions posed to the
Court by Lawrence did not require a decision on Equal Protection grounds. Rather, the decision
could be made through another avenue, that of Due Process. Because all the Court needs is one
justification in order to come to some legitimate rationale, Kennedy decided that the fundamental
issue facing the Court was whether Lawrence’s privacy rights had been violated. This decision to
focus on privacy rendered questions about the tier to be applied to gays and equal protection
purposes moot. (Lawrence)
This past June, the Supreme Court heard and decided the famed marriage cases of the last
term, U.S. v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry. 46 In U.S. v. Windsor, female New York
resident Edie Windsor sued the federal government claiming discrimination on the basis of her
sexual orientation. Windsor had been married to Thea Spyer, another female New York resident,
and their marriage had been recognized as valid by the State of New York. (U.S. v. Windsor,
2013) The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which stated that “the word 'marriage' means only
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife,” prevented equal recognition of
their marriage. (H.R. 3396, 1006) Even though the states were entitled to create their own
definitions of what constituted marriage, DOMA prevented any federal recognition of the states’
definitions and instead relied upon its own definition of marriage. (H.R. 3396, 1006) As such,
lawfully wed same-sex couples did not receive many of the same financial benefits as their
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The circumstances of Romer that made the Equal Protection determination needed was due to the identity of
orientation needing protecting, as opposed to the conduct, which was at issue in Lawrence
46
While both cases had far reaching impacts, only U.S. v. Windsor is relevant to my research in this note.
Hollingsworth v. Perry reestablished gay marriage in California. However, it did so on standing grounds, meaning
that petitioners defending the law did not have standing to bring the suit because they had not been directly harmed.
While the ramifications going forward as to how standing is determined for laws passed by ballot initiative, it is an
area in which I am not concerned for the purposes of this thesis.
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straight counterparts. It was on this basis that Windsor filed suit, as she claimed she was forced
to pay estate taxes on her deceased wife’s estate that she would not have had to pay had she been
widowed by a husband instead of by a wife.
On the last day of the Court’s session, the Court announced it had found in favor of
Windsor, rendering section 3 of DOMA (the section creating a federal definition of marriage)
unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds. Once again, the Court refused to clearly establish
the level of scrutiny applied, and did not definitively state what tier other courts are bound to
when adjudicating cases with similar constitutional questions. All the Court did was reaffirm the
principle established in Romer, stating that “the Constitution's guarantee of equality ‘must at the
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’
justify disparate treatment of that group.” (Windsor) Furthermore, they reiterated the principle
that animus directed towards a certain group cannot be the basis for justifying a law’s legitimacy.
Like in Romer, the Court found the motivations of the legislature who passed DOMA to be borne
out of animus and not some other interest in achieving a legitimate state aim.
Again, similar to the criticisms of the Romer and Lawrence decisions, what is most
notable about Windsor is what was not addressed. It is not clear what standard lower courts
should follow going forward. This is especially problematic when considering that the lower
court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals came to the same ultimate result, yet it found that
gays were entitled to intermediate scrutiny. (Windsor v. U.S., 2012) The District Court decision
also came to the same ultimate result, but did so under rational basis review. (Windsor v. U.S.
Dis., 2012)47 Typically, when lower courts have split decisions or rationales, the Supreme Court
47

The three levels of judicial review are the District Court, The Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. Unless
granted special circumstances, all federal cases go through these three different Courts, assuming they are granted
cert.
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seeks to resolve the paradox that was created in the opposing decisions. Instead of seeking to
clarify exactly what standard was to be applied, the Court stated that rational basis review could
be applied. It did not say that it had to be applied. What is clear is that the Court did not claim
the Second Circuit was wrong in finding gays to be entitled to intermediate scrutiny. All that was
stated was that the law would be found unconstitutional under rational basis review. Without an
explicit rejection of the Second Circuit’s rationale, it is unclear if gays residing within the
Second Circuit’s jurisdiction are entitled to intermediate scrutiny while all other gays across the
country are still only protected by rational basis review, or if the Second Circuit was wrong in
their analysis. All that was said was that this case required rational basis review, not that gays
were entitled to rational basis review.
The problem with this is that until the Supreme Court decides to establish a standard, it
creates a precedent for lower courts to come to their own determinations without any recourse,.
This means that the federal government, through the judicial system, treats citizens with exactly
the same characteristics as fundamentally different based on their location of residence. 48 This is
problematic because the purpose of the federal court system is to make areas of law clearer for
the other branches of government and the general public. By allowing different federal courts to
make different determinations regarding the status of gays, instead of clearly laying out how
those lower courts should proceed, individuals are consistently left in a state of flux without clear
understanding of the law. This is especially problematic for Equal Protection precedence, as this

48

This is especially problematic for the federal government, as the federal government is one entity that is
advantaging and disadvantaging some citizens over others based purely on where they happen to live. While it
would appear that this is the exact same problem with maintaining states’ rights, there are larger interests in
protecting the rights of different states to act autonomously (greater forms of representation, ease of extending and
protecting rights due to a smaller scope of persons to represent, etc) that ultimately outweighs the need for equal
application of law to all citizens. The federal government, on the other hand, does not have a countervailing purpose
to allow for disparate treatment of citizens based on location of residence.
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area of law is already so reliant on judges’ subjectivity, as was discussed in chapter two. With so
many factors in determining level of scrutiny under the judge’s discretion, unequal application of
the law only serves to complicate the issue further, doing the exact opposite of what should be
occurring.
The Windsor decision left open the question about what tier should be applied for
discrimination of gays. However, even if one were to interpret that rational basis review must be
adhered to, it is also not clear whether or not rational basis review has been followed in the way
that it has been traditionally understood, or if Romer’s definition of rational basis review, which
is considerably different than traditional rational basis review ought to be applied. In theory and
practice, rational basis review has been highly deferential to the government. All that is needed is
for the government to prove that in order to be “valid under equal protection clause, a law must
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.” (Cleburne) What this has
meant is that all the government must do is prove that they have a rational purpose to achieve a
legitimate interest. As long as it does that, then any equal protection claim cannot outweigh the
government purpose. (Sunstein 1993, 4) However, with Kennedy stating that animus cannot be
the justification for any law, he is implying that a higher tier is in effect. Such can be rightfully
implied because animus for a group can have a rational purpose that achieves a legitimate
government end.(Smith 2005, 2806) When looking at the example of DOMA, animus against
gays was the motivator for the passage of the law. Yet the government could say that the law
raised tax revenues because fewer individuals receive tax breaks. Raising capital would appear to
be a legitimate interest of the government. (Windsor) Furthermore, if traditional rational basis
review is not to be followed and the Romer decision is to be followed, does that mean that the
analysis borne out of that decision holds precedent for future groups making equal protection
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claims? Are the old tiers and factors to determine tiers being rendered obsolete? Or has a new
tier been introduced similar to the way the Court introduced intermediate scrutiny to protect
gender? The complete lack of clarity about the direction the Court intends to pursue is glaring,
and continues to go unfixed. This has the effect of creating a strange hybridization of the
different tiers without delineating why certain elements of each tier are present in the
rationalization of the decision. Without this clarity, the precedent can be interpreted and applied
in so many different ways, resulting in decisions that are wholly contradictory. Even with
contradictory decisions, each can be seen as legitimate when understood within the context to the
guidance that the Court has provided.
These lower courts have understandably lacked a sense of direction on how to proceed in
cases calling upon similar questions. This claim about the lack of clarity is not one only rooted in
academia. It has already begun to happen to lower courts. Some courts have patterned their
decisions within the new form of rational basis review created specifically for gays (Kansas v.
Limon, 2005), claiming that there existed a level of animus directed at gays that violated the 14 th
Amendment. However, other courts read the decisions as holding gays to rational basis review in
the way it was previously understood, merely looking for a rational purpose to achieve a
legitimate government end. (Schroeder v. Hamilton School District, 2002) Without the Supreme
Court clarifying exactly how to interpret, lower courts have no definitive precedent to follow.
(Smith 2005, 2807)
In these conflicting forms of rational basis review, the issue of what becomes a rational
purpose for achieving a legitimate state interest becomes highly murky, to say the least. (Ludwig
2006, 519) For many judges, there are rational purposes for upholding laws with a discriminatory
impact against gays. More specifically, the consistent line of analysis defending forms of
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discrimination against gays is that the state is exercising its police power that allows it to uphold
public morals of decency. (Massey 2005, 961) 49 It was this argument of protecting morality that
was used to justify restrictions on pornography, even though those restrictions constituted a First
Amendment violation on the right to free speech. Traditionally, the Court has protected the
individual’s First Amendment rights much more fervently than they have for individuals who are
members of classes protected only by rational basis review for their equal protection claims.
Even with a greater awareness for protecting the right of the individual, protecting morality is
still seen as a legitimate government interest for First Amendment. If the Court is willing to find
morality to be a compelling enough point to restrict a basic right of individuals that has been
accorded very strong protection, then it is very reasonable to believe that upholding standards of
morality that discriminate against groups viewed under rational basis review would be allowed.
This point is not just a logical conclusion drawn through academic research. It was the
accepted justification in deciding Bowers, as Justice White claimed that the “presumed belief of
majority of Georgia electorate that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable provided
rational basis for Georgia's sodomy statute.” (Bowers) For many courts, protecting historical
norms that have been proven to allow for stability are justifiable reasons for upholding bans
against gay citizens, as there is no pattern demonstrating that society will remain stable in the
way in which it has when the only recognized relationships are of the heterosexual nature.
(Ludwig 2006, 534) The strength of the argument for protecting the morality of society varies
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Police power is a privilege extended to the states through the 10th Amendment that allows them to enforce laws
for the betterment of the health, safety, morality, and general welfare of the citizens of that state. The Court has used
this provision to justify a state’s decision to pass laws restricting certain actions that would harm the morality of the
community. The most notable example of the Court recognizing its police powers is through the Court’s analysis of
the state’s restrictions upon pornography, in which they weighed the autonomy states should have in protecting the
morals of the community in comparison to the rights of the individual to freely dispense a form of speech. (Roth v.
U.S (1957); Miller v. California (1973))
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greatly among courts. It is presumed that Kennedy and the Supreme Court’s majority did not
endorse this view of morality. (Ludwig 2006, 518) However, there are many courts that have
claimed that the protection of heteronormativity as a moral one is so strong, it would be reason
enough to uphold laws discriminating against gays even if gays were protected under
intermediate scrutiny. (Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 2008)

Problems within Precedents for Equal Protection
One of the primary reasons that the Court has been unwilling to assign a tier of scrutiny
to gays that are necessary to fulfill are highly problematic because gays do not fit many of the
qualifications previously implemented into the precedence, making it difficult to justify
heightened scrutiny when they are analyzed within the context of the precedents. Gays have also
experienced different forms of hardship than other minority groups that is not reflected in the
current model used for Equal Protection analysis. Much of this can be attributed to the nature of
sexual orientation. Due to the differences between sexual orientation and traits such as race or
gender, the understanding of the identity as well as the discrimination stemming from that
identity marginalizes gays in different ways than it marginalized women or blacks, for example.
Given these differences, the current factors are not established to represent these differences,
even if those differences have produced additional harms not experienced by other classifications
afforded a higher tier. In this section, I will articulate both where gays do not meet established
criteria, and how the law’s established criteria does not reflect the nature of being gay and the
hardships experienced by gays. The culmination of this will be to demonstrate that the way the
Equal Protection Clause has been understood and applied does not properly equip the Court to
render a sound decision on how to understand discrimination of sexual orientation.
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The Nature of Orientation
Since Justice Stone articulated in Carolene Products that in order to receive suspect class
status, a minority must be both discrete and insular, the Court has continued to adhere to these
qualifications. This is in spite of the fact that being discrete and insular does not provide any
clear causation for discrimination, or even a correlation of a pattern of discrimination. 50 When
attempting to understand

gays under this definition, two main problems arise. First, it is

incredibly difficult to determine whether gays are to be considered discrete and insular. Second,
the issue arises that being discrete and insular provides benefits that the opposite qualifications,
anonymity and diffuseness, do not. If this is true, then being discrete and insular is actually a
benefit, and not an impediment, to equality.
When examining the discreteness of homosexuality, there have been a multitude of
different interpretations regarding how gays should be understood in this context. Some courts
have claimed that gays are discrete. (Nabozny v. Podlesny, 1996) Consequently, there have been
many to say that because orientation is not visibly apparent, the trait should be considered
anonymous. It is not something that is easily discernible simply by looking at a person in the way
race or gender are easily discernible. (Ackerman 1985, 729) This debate elucidates the issue with
discreteness: how is it both measured and applied? In Nabozny v. Podlesny, which posed the
question whether a school’s lack of protection of a student who was bullied on the basis of his
sexual orientation was permissible, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals said that being gay is
clearly identifiable. This is demonstrated through discrimination passed in retaliation to the
50

I recognize that being discrete and insular can be the basis for discrimination, as it most certainly was for blacks,
as the basis of the discrimination was an obvious characteristic (skin tone) and the discrimination created segregated
communities that made it difficult to affect real change because of a lack of interaction with their oppressors.
(Balog, 556) However, simply because these characteristics were the basis of discrimination against blacks does not
mean they establish a clear model for all discriminated groups and the characteristics that caused the discrimination.
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visibility of gay citizens, and that the student (Nabozny) was discriminated against because his
orientation was identifiable. (Nabozny) While this analysis may be applicable for understanding
some discrimination against some individuals, it does not properly cover all who identify as
some orientation that faces discrimination. If Nabozny had chosen to hide his sexual orientation
and stayed within the metaphorical closet, would he no longer be seen as identifiable, and
therefore not entitled to protection?
The case of Nabozny v. Podlesny provides a perfect example of how orientation cannot
be considered discrete for all individuals. The discreteness of orientation relies on two basic
formulations that would demonstrate open expression of sexuality. One could publicly recognize
their sexual orientation and disseminate that information among their social and professional
communities, or one could demonstrate qualities that are commonly associated with being gay,
such as having a particular sense of fashion or possessing an inflection in one’s voice. 51 In these
instances, being gay can be seen as discrete, and the discreteness of these instances can indeed
lead to discrimination.
The issue here is not that gays can be discrete. It is that not all gays are discrete. Many
gays either hide their orientation from the rest of society or do not act in a way that would allow
for others to assume that they are gay. (Yoshino 1998, 509) Among gay persons, when the
individual recognizes this about themselves varies greatly depending on the person, with some
51

Through this point, I want to make it clear that I am not saying the reliance on stereotypes is legitimate, accurate,
or acceptable. The point I am trying to illustrate, however, is that when individuals in society make assumptions or
claims that an individual is gay without direct confirmation from that person or a trusted source who definitively
confirms this to be true, such stereotypes are used to provide the justification to the belief that someone would
identify as gay. It is these stereotypes that are discrete, and in some instances can be used to discriminate against
others. I do not mean to say that any individual who dresses in a certain manner or has a particular vocal inflection is
gay, nor am I saying that those who do not dress in a way would be stereotypically categorized as gay are
automatically straight. However, in some instances, these discrete understandings of being gay, regardless of their
accuracy, are present in society and used for discrimination shows that there can be an element of discreteness. The
fact that these stereotypes do not apply to everyone proves the issue with relying on discreteness altogether, as I will
discussed further throughout the body of this chapter.
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claiming they have known they were gay from early elementary school to others not recognizing
that aspect of themselves until the end of their life. Now, among this population, not all will
make their sexuality public upon recognition, with many waiting many years to publicize that
aspect of themselves, and some not ever publicly affirming their true sexual orientation. The
nature of sexual orientation allows individuals to be anonymous and not live openly and
therefore make them unable to become discrete. (Yoshino 1996, 1778)
The reasons for staying anonymous and not publicly acknowledging one’s sexuality are
not particularly difficult to understand. Because of widespread vitriol and codified laws
discriminating against gays, many do not want to experience potential professional, economic, or
social marginalization and hardship. (Sunstein 1994, 8) So, instead of putting oneself in positions
to be subjected to that form of bigotry, they choose to stay anonymous. This does not mean that
that individual is not being subjected to discrimination. It only means that the society that is
enforcing said discrimination doesn’t know its exact targets. However, just because the
oppressive majority cannot pinpoint the exact individuals they are discriminating against does
not mean that the individuals subjected to that discrimination, even if they are subjected to it
privately, are not harmed by the discrimination. (Ackerman 1985, 729) Equal Protection is still
not extended to those individuals. The only difference between gays and members of discrete
classifications is that every individual of a discrete class being discriminated against can be
identified. This skews what it means to be marginalized, because the basis is not the
marginalization itself, but the ability for the majority to be able to identify every member of the
minority that they are discriminating against. The fact that the majority can’t locate all who are
being marginalized does not take away from the existence of that marginalization. The
precedents established, however, do not allow for this consideration to be taken into account
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given the current established precedents and reliance on these precedents that place a premium
on discreteness.
The second way in which an individual can be discrete is by possessing and displaying
characteristics that many would attribute to homosexuality. The problem with doing so and
relying on stereotypes to determine discreteness is that they are wholly misrepresentative. Not all
individuals who identify as gay possess qualities that would allow them to be pinpointed as gay.
By relying on discreteness, activists have sought to fit orientation within this paradigm. The
question that arises is should this form of discreteness be recognized. And if it is, then would
gays who do not embody the stereotypes traditionally associated with that form of sexuality, and
thereby remain facially anonymous, not be considered worthy of heightened scrutiny? The
reliance on discreteness, and lack of recognition of the ways anonymity can be applied,
demonstrates how the law does not provide clear ways to interpret how to understand gays.
The other issue with discreteness is that there are benefits conferred to minorities that are
discrete that may not necessarily be afforded to those who can be anonymous. In being discrete,
all individuals as part of that group can easily mobilize together to achieve political and social
change, as it is easier to know who to mobilize. (Ackerman 1985, 735) However, with gays
having the ability to remain anonymous, it affects others who do seek to make their orientation
public and want equal rights for themselves regardless of their orientation.(Yoshino 1996, 1778)
In many ways, it is even more harmful that in order for gays to build coalitions to gain political
change through legislative channels, all individuals must be forthcoming with that information
about themselves. This is a premise that we have seen simply does not happen, as the
metaphorical closet still holds many gays inside its confines to this day.(Yoshino 1996, 729)
Absent this coalition building and consistently effective change to law, the need to recognize the
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anonymity associated with being gay is absolutely necessary, yet the precedents not only do not
recognize it, but they place a premium on the opposite quality. What can be taken from this
dichotomy is that the precedents are rife with error and signal that something is fundamentally
wrong.
When looking at the other quality of minorities that the Court has placed importance
upon, insularity, there are similar issues arising with this concept to that of discreteness. Having
insularity can allow for benefits that the antithesis, diffuseness, does not allow for. (Ackerman
1985, 732) This applies aptly for gays. Gay citizens are not born into insular, self-determined
communities in the way that racial communities naturally form. Individual nuclear families can
and do have both gay and straight members. Gay persons can be born anywhere across the
country into any home, regardless of the political affiliations or attitudes towards gay persons of
the parents. (Halley 1986, 936) As such, there is not a natural gay community that exists that all
who identify as such can become a part of without consciously seeking it out. The time and effort
required for gays to mobilize is much more difficult than members of a similar race, because
gays are much more spread out, which only adds to the issue of anonymity. This would lead to
the natural conclusion that diffuseness actually acts as an obstacle to attaining political power,
instead of a trait that can spur influence. However, the precedents are clearly aligned to not
recognize diffuseness and instead search for the presence of insularity, which can hold many
benefits in terms of political mobilization, as a factor in granting heightened scrutiny.
The thinking that insularity actually confers some benefits and should not be a
qualification in finding for heightened scrutiny has been considered by Courts, most notably by
Justice Antonin Scalia in his Romer dissent. While far from a conclusive understanding, Scalia
claimed that gays were insular, he then stated that as such they had the ability to demonstrate
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their political power, as they could mobilize and use collective resources to affect political
change. (Romer) By being insular, Scalia claims that gays have strong political power and
therefore do not need judicial protection, because of their insularity and the benefits conferred by
this trait of the group. Scalia’s interpretation serves to highlight the problems with the
application of tiers of scrutiny to new groups deserving judicial protection. Through Scalia’s
interpretation, gays are to be seen as insular. That factor would appear to positively affect
analysis about whether they should be awarded heightened protection. The other option the Court
could take would be to find that or the Court could now say that being insular now allows for
benefits that do not actually provide a need for judicial protection. (Romer) The problem with
these options, assuming for the moment that gays are indeed insular, is that the Court either
makes a claim that many would interpret as being untrue, (Halley 1994, 509) or the Court would
be changing the standards for equal protection simply based on convenience and ease of
adjudication for the particular case in front of them. If the Court can now claim that certain
factors should not become a part of equal protection analysis, then it gives license to disregard
other precedents and undermines the consistency that the court values so much.

Measuring Discrimination Against Gays
The one constant among Equal Protection precedence is that the Court has always
recognized some form of prejudice directed towards groups that are ultimately given heightened
protection. The basis of this reasoning is simple: the Court seeks to protect groups if it has been
demonstrated that their rights cannot be insured absent the judicial branch’s involvement.
(Constitutionals Status 1980, 1301) However, that is the extent of the shared commonality
among all equal protection cases. As explained in more detail in Chapter Two, the way that the
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Court measures prejudice leveled against a group is manifested in two forms: historical
discrimination and political powerlessness of the group.
Before understanding how to reconcile these two different forms of prejudice, it is
important to recognize the faults of each of these different factors when applied to gays. The
nature of anonymity undertaken by many gay citizens contributes to the difficulty in trying to
assess the extent of historical discrimination that gays faced. (Yoshino 1996, 1798) Historically,
there was not much specific codified legislation that targeted gays until the 1990s, when local,
state, and federal legislatures passed many anti-gay laws.(Constitutional Status 1980, 1307)
However, the absence of discriminatory legislation does not necessarily mean that gays weren’t
being discriminated against. Exercising a sexuality that ran counter to the heteronormative norms
was not necessarily criminalized or made illegal, but the social pressures to live within those
heteronormative bounds kept gays in the closet (Ackerman 1985, 731). The fear of ostracization,
professionally and personally, motivated many gays to keep silent about their true sexual
orientation. Because of the strong social pressures and widely accepted forms of animus against
gays, there was no need for the legislature to pass laws to ensure the marginalization of gays,
because society effectively did so on its own. (Ludwig 2006, 515)
The issue with trying to measure past discrimination is that there are so few objective
methods to measure it. (Ludwig 2006, 552) One of the best and most relied upon methods is
through analysis of the proliferation of legislation that prevented gays from accessing rights and
privileges to the same degree as their straight counterparts. So, if the Court were to primarily
look at discriminatory legislation, then there would be a case to be made that gays have been
subjected to a number of different prejudices enforced by all levels of government, ranging from
local municipalities to the U.S. Congress. However, what is important to recognize is what
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prompted said legislation to be enacted in the first place. The anti-gay majority that had existed
for so long was finally being challenged consistently and effectively by gay rights activists, who
were finding more success through both legislative52 and judicial (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993) means
to advance their causes. As a response to the threat that gays would be successful in gaining
greater recognition and dismantling of the discrimination they faced, anti-gay forces sought to
codify many of the long standing traditions of heteronormativity. As such, the 1990s saw a large
spike in bills passed that had the intent of discriminating against gays, ranging from lack of
extension of tax benefits for gay couples to marriage restrictions. Gays were subjected to great
anti-gay animus in the form of legislative marginalization. The paradox created by the legislative
developments of the 1990s was, and continues to be, troubling for the Court. (Rush 2008, 714)
Quite simply, the Court could recognize the legislation as discriminatory and use it as evidence
that historical discrimination occurred, thus justifying a primary factor in finding for some form
of heightened scrutiny for gays. Looking more closely at that legislation highlights the fact that
the great influx of discriminatory laws passed were in response to greater political influence and
mobilization around the platform of expansion of rights for gays. (Rush 2008, 712) So, if the
Court were to use this legislation as justification, then it would effectively be claiming that only
when gays began to grow and gain more political power are they now more entitled to
protection. This is problematic for two reasons. First, it established the precedents that groups are
only entitled to protection when they begin to become politically powerful, but not so powerful
that they can be successful through typical political avenues. By this logic, gays would have had
to overcome the discrimination on their own to a small extent before they were entitled to

52

Some examples include the ordinances passed in Colorado cities Denver and Boulder ensuring equal protection of
gays, and the wide expansion of employment protections in states such as Massachusetts, California, and New York.
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judicial protection. This is highly problematic, because the purpose of judicial intervention and
protection is to ensure that those most marginalized are given fair opportunities to exercise their
enumerated rights, be it political, social, economic, or any other right. (Siegal 2006, 402) Under
the precedents established, the most marginalized would not be the ones most protected. It is
simply the ones with the most codified legislation specifically targeting them, which does not
directly correlate to the historical discrimination faced by the group in the way the Court would
have it.
The second reason that recognizing prejudice through legislation that was only passed in
response to greater mobilization around gay rights is that it contradicts the other prong of
measuring prejudice levied against gays: political powerlessness. As this time period saw a rise
in political power for gays, this would signal a need for less judicial intervention, not more of it.
This demonstrates one of the issues with relying on political powerlessness as a factor in
determining when and how to apply heightened scrutiny. In order to satisfy the prong of
historical discrimination, one must undermine the evidence for demonstrating the political
powerlessness of the group. This chasm shows the discontinuity in applying the two standards in
accordance with each other, as they only undermine the opposite and thereby give way to
inaccurate and misleading conclusions.
Outside of the apparent schism between the two prongs demonstrating prejudice, there
are other fundamental issues with measuring political powerlessness when applied to gays and
the history of gay rights. As is common with almost all social movements, as groups mobilize in
greater numbers and find new ways to convey their message, the natural effect is that new
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conversations are had and opinions are changed. This can act both positively and negatively. 53
Regardless of whether the attitudes changed are beneficial or harmful to a movement, the simple
existence of attitudinal shifts demonstrates the lack of constancy in support for positions, and
thereby demonstrates a lack of consistency in the political power behind certain platforms.
Given that there are natural shifts in attitude regarding different political positions and
that these attitudinal shifts strongly correlate to political capital, the Court must face a large
paradox that needs to be resolved. Remember that once the Court determines a level of scrutiny,
that tier is effectively binding for all future cases. The paradox is that the Court is applying a
long-lasting precedent based on a factor that has been proven to change so frequently. What then
happens is that it would seem arbitrary when the Court decides to award suspect or quasi-suspect
class status because that determination was based on an ever-changing factor. One could
convincingly argue that it would have made the most sense to award heightened scrutiny in the
90s, when there was a proliferation of anti-gay legislation passed, and the political might of gays
was weaker. (Ludwig 2006, 518) However, gays have seen many legislative victories over the
past decade or so, rapidly seeing the expansion of marriage equality in states across the country,
among many other victories. 54 Therefore, it would appear as if gays now need this protection less
than they did 20 years ago. With the Court using this as a factor, it gives them the license to
never give a determination of the need for heightened scrutiny, because they can always call
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Examples where increased awareness and conversation that have led to positive impacts for the group seeking to
highlight those conversations include blacks, women, and even gays. On the other hand, greater religious
consciousness has had the effect of putting religious teachings, especially evangelical Christianity, in an increasingly
negative light. Regardless of what the shifting attitudes are , the fact that these attitudes do shift and do gain and lose
support proves a lack of constancy in political powerlessness, which is premised upon the support one has for their
desired political outcomes.
54
16 states now recognize full marriage equality for same sex couples, with Hawaii and Illinois both being ratified
within the past month. The military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” provision preventing gays from serving openly in any
branch of the United States military was repealed. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act was also recently
brought to the House floor after six years of not being proposed.
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upon the argument of the lack of need for judicial intervention due to the changing political
climate around these issues. This is problematic because it makes the entire system of tiered
scrutiny completely arbitrary, in the sense that it is up to the Court when they decide that judicial
intervention must become binding and ignore the developments of political movements, or that
political movements outweigh the need for judicial decision-making. 55 When specifically applied
to gays, the court has been unwilling to recognize the need for judicial protection and has made
claims that gays are politically powerful and can impact legislation without extra protection.
(Windsor) This is inconsistent with how the Court has understood political powerlessness in the
past, especially when compared to women. The natural conclusion is that the Court is allowed
the opportunity to make political decisions about identity politics and justifying them in legal
precedence.
Another difficulty of measuring the political power of gays is due to the way gays have
formed communities. As is rather obvious, there are areas of the country that are both more
accepting of gays and have seen a larger concentration of gay citizens, be it families or singles.
(Ludwig 2006, 554) For instance, areas such as San Francisco, Northwestern states (Oregon,
Washington), and New England cities, to name a few, have demonstrated much higher levels of
acceptance for gays,56 and that has been reflected both in the number of gays who live in those
areas and the legislative protections extended to gays. However, not all areas are like San
55

The Court has proven that they are prone to this exact form of arbitrariness regarding when they do and do not
apply heightened scrutiny. In the early 1970s, the National Organization for Women began a campaign to pass what
they called the Equal Rights Amendment which would ensure “equality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” (Equal Rights Amendment Text) After
receiving the requisite number of votes in both the House and Senate, the amendment later failed when being voted
on by the individual state legislatures. However, what is important here is that women demonstrated that they had
great political power, going so far as to be on the brink of passing an amendment to the Constitution ensuring their
equal rights. Even so, they still were recognized as deserving intermediate scrutiny, even though they had
demonstrated that they wielded a great deal of political capital, and were thereby not powerless. (Brown 1971)
56
San Francisco’s estimated gay population is at 15.4%, Seattle’s gay population is at 12.9%, while Boston’s is at
12.3%. The national percentage of self-identifying gay citizens is about 3.4% of the nation’s electorate. (Gates 2006)
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Francisco or Seattle. There are many areas of the country that are much more hostile towards
homosexuality, and as a result, there are far fewer (openly) gay citizens residing in these areas.
(Yoshino 1996, 1804) Due to a lack of gay acceptance and gay population in those communities,
gays who do live there are much less likely to have political capital and influence to access
typical legislative channels to prevent discrimination than do gays who live in more progressive
areas. (Ackerman 1985, 730) This begs the question as to which situation should the Court look
to when deciding political powerlessness. Does it recognize those who are the worse off and
have the least political power, or does it recognize that in many areas gays live almost equally to
their straight counterparts and have great influence in their regions? The disparate amounts of
power in different areas of the country presents a large quandary for the Court in terms of
understanding how to measure the political power of the group as a whole. Such a factor creates
different circumstances and different burdens in protecting people who possess the same trait
that is being discriminated against, and only differ due to the location of residence.

The Question of Immutability
Unlike many of the factors used in Equal Protection jurisprudence, immutability was not
introduced in footnote four of Carolene as an element in finding suspect class status. Rather, the
first time it was formally introduced was in Frontiero, in which Justice William Brennan wrote
that the factor was necessary for finding suspect class status, as an individual was being punished
by their government based on a characteristic that was a part of their identity but they had no
control over. (Frontiero) The definition was further clarified in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, in which the Court stated that immutability is one which “its possessors are
powerless to escape or set aside.” (Bakke)
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Given the Court’s position on immutability, gays have tried extensively to find
orientation to be immutable, to varying degrees of success. Many researchers have found strong
correlations affirming the belief that one’s orientation is outside of the individual’s control,
coming to many determinations that orientation is immutable, grounded in biology, psychology,
and genetics. 57 However, even with much data that would suggest that orientation is determined
by some outside influence independent of the choice of an individual, the data is not conclusive.
There is no consensus among the scientific community that definitively states that orientation is
immutable. (Halley 1994, 516) Without this consensus, courts have been unwilling to root their
decisions in a determination that orientation is immutable, thus allowing them to find that gays
are entitled to strict scrutiny. The Court does not want to establish precedents that bind their
action for the future on a rationale that could become obsolete due to continued scientific
research. (Constitutional Status 1985, 1302) When looking at the scientific studies regarding
immutability of orientation, they continue to proliferate and new theories are tested and
contributed to the literature constantly. (Halley 1994, 537) Even though many contribute to the
literature suggesting orientation is immutable, none have been proven with the certainty that an
alternative viewpoint contesting that view would look unprofessional or incorrect. Absent this
certainty, the Court is put into the position of having to be the arbiter over an area of study that
they do not specialize in and subsequently make a determination that would be binding, even
though that decision could be proven wrong through future studies. (Balog 2005, 548) If the

57

Kari Balog, in her piece, “Equal Protection for Homosexuals: Why the Immutability Argument is Necessary and
How It Is Met”, argues from a perspective that science has proven sexual orientation is indeed immutable, due to the
wide array of studies confirming links to the biology, psychology, and genetics of an individual that are outside of
their own control. The strength of these studies, combined with their multiplicity all leading to the same conclusion
(that orientation is immutable), Balog then argues from the perspective that others must prove that orientation is not
immutable. This perspective, while strong in argument, has not gained much traction, either through academia
(Halley 1994; Yoshino 1996) or thorough the Courts (High Tech Gays, 1990; Steffan v. Aspin, 1993)
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Court were to find orientation immutable, and further studies come out proving otherwise, then
the legitimacy of the Court can reasonably be called into question, as the previous decisions
made would be wrong and there would be the perception that the Court is acting outside its
bounds of authority.
Additionally, immutability is not the proverbial smoking gun of the tiered scrutiny
jurisprudence that gay rights activists want it to be. (Sunstein 1994, 9) Many courts have been
unwilling to rely on the immutability of a trait so strongly that it automatically triggers strict
scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny (High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
1990; Baehr) The argument commonly relied upon is that many traits are immutable, such as
male-patterned baldness, that are not protected classes. The immutability of a trait must align
with the other factors. (Sunstein 1994, 9) While this seems reasonable, it calls into question the
legitimacy of Brennan’s proclamation of the factors used for heightened scrutiny. It also
reintroduces the same unanswered question of how to weigh the different factors against each
other.
Finally, the issue with immutability is that many who do not endorse this view about
orientation on the whole. There are many who believe that orientation is mutable in the sense
that it is fluid and does not hold to one fixed construction throughout the entirety of one’s life. It
may not be consciously switched by the individual, but it naturally changes throughout one’s life,
in a way that does not occur with race or gender. As such, the government should not enforce
legislation that enforces the strict binary of hetero- and homosexuality when individuals naturally
do not fit within this construct. (Halley 1994, 517)
Even if one were to endorse this belief about the mutability of gays, it does not mean that
it would automatically disqualify gays from deserving heightened scrutiny. The Hawaii Supreme
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Court, in Baehr v. Lewin, stated that the lack of scientific evidence did not prevent them from
finding gays to be entitled to strict scrutiny. Furthermore, the Courts have demonstrated that
certain choices are also protected by strict scrutiny, with the most salient example being religion.
(Rush 2008, 740) There is no argument to be made that one’s religious affiliation is immutable,
yet the fact that it is chosen by the person has been seen as a value worth protecting. (Sherbert v.
Verner, 1963; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972) In extending this logic to gays, since orientation is a
fundamental aspect of one’s self-identity in a way similar to that of religion, the choice of one’s
orientation should be protected in a similar way, thereby lessening the need for scientifically
proving the immutability of sexuality.

Comparing to Past Precedents
As is clear, the way in which to measure many of these factors is highly subjective. As
such, the Court has tried to draw parallels between groups that are petitioning to be granted some
form of heightened scrutiny to those that have already become enumerated within the tiers. Once
race was formally established as being protected by strict scrutiny, gender was subsequently
compared to those precedents and the determination of intermediate scrutiny was based in part
on the similarities and differences that one’s gender had upon their ability to actualize their rights
as one’s race had. (Reed)
The problem with comparing different groups to one another is the system in which it is
done. Because race was the first group to receive suspect class classification, the factors that
were to be used in Equal Protection cases were tailored to fit with the nature and hardships
citizens faced due to their race. Thus, it is easy to see how factors such as insularity and
discreteness would be relied upon by the Court in order to come to a determination of the need
for judicial protection, as blacks were clearly discrete and were segregated by law, thereby

Binder 84

making them insular and removed from political influence. (Siegal 2006, 405) Once strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause was formalized and other groups began to petition for
similar protections, courts relied upon analogies to the groups that had been formally recognized
as deserving suspect status. (Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, Montgomery County,
Ohio, 1985) The reasoning behind this was simple. If a group experienced similar treatment and
the element of their personhood being discriminated against was similar to that of race, then it
would logically apply that that group would deserve suspect class status. The problem with
relying on past precedent and analogizing groups to race is that the Court is relying on
disanalogous parallels that are made to a group simply because it had the luxury of being the first
to receive heightened protection by way of the Equal Protection Clause. (Schacter 1994) That is
not to say that race shouldn’t be considered a suspect classification. However, what I am saying
is that by forcing parallels of groups to that of race, it minimalizes the individuality of the
problems and conceptions of other identities that have been discriminated against and mandates
comparison to a group who happened to be selected first.
To further illustrate these harms, let’s pretend for the sake of argument that gays had
received suspect class status first. Presumably, diffuseness would be recognized, as gays can be
born into any family and cannot be segregated in nearly the same ways as blacks could be. If
diffuseness was then a standard for finding suspect class status, then blacks would not be able to
fulfill that standard. Does that mean that there should be less protection afforded to them?
Presumably not. This example seeks to illustrate the fact that race was merely the first
classification to receive protection, not the most important one that all others should measure up
against.
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The issue with comparing to race or gender extends greatly when looking at how to
measure prejudice. When looking at historical discrimination, the Courts have commonly looked
to the fact that blacks were subjected to slavery and had all of their basic rights infringed upon,
be it political, social, economic, and even moral rights. Because of the proclivity to compare
groups to one another, past discrimination of groups is measured against blacks. This was one of
the reasons that women received intermediate scrutiny, because the marginalization they faced
was not a as great, and the intentions behind that marginalization were not as vitriolic. (Craig)
When looking at the history of gays, they had never been subjected to something as devastating
as slavery. The issue that arises here is that because the discrimination faced by gays was not as
dehumanizing as the groups already protected, the history of the discrimination becomes clouded
and lessened and understood for what it wasn’t, as opposed to what it was and how it affected
citizens. (Ludwig 2006, 551)
Furthermore, there are areas of discrimination faced by gays that were not experienced by
blacks, such as the need to hide a fundamental aspect of one’s identity for the entirety of one’s
life due to the fear of complete ostracization by one’s family or community. The intention of
segregation and anti-gay laws also differed greatly. Segregation was meant to do just that:
segregate the races from interaction amongst each other. Anti-gay legislation was not meant to
segregate but rather suppress. Gays were denied any recognition of their identity, and even saw
that identity criminalized. (Sunstein 1994, 17) These are examples of discrimination not
experienced by blacks. Does it make it less worthy of recognition?
Overall, the histories of different groups are just that: different. By using a system that
tries to standardize and compare unique, multifaceted histories, it misunderstands the effects that
the discrimination had upon individuals, and the need for protection from said discrimination. By

Binder 86

requiring such formal factors that have so much subjectivity without any form of objectivism, the
most logical way to achieve said objectivism under the current model is to compare different
groups with different histories and struggles. However, doing so only creates less proper
classification and conceptualization of the different groups applying for heightened judicial
protection.
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Chapter 4 – The Right to Intimate Association
Throughout my thesis up until this point, I have critically analyzed the direction that the
Court was taking in extending gay rights across the country. The road to equality through 14th
Amendment jurisprudence is treacherous, to say the least. Sweeping characterizations and
drawing false analogies are the hallmarks of Equal Protection analysis, and require much of the
discriminated group to prove that they deserve their right to be protected, which as I have
explained I find highly problematic.
In the remaining chapters, I will lay out the judicial history for an alternative
constitutional approach for understanding gay rights. The right to intimate association, found as
an essential form of liberty enumerated under the Due Process Clause under the 14 th
Amendment, provides an approach that can both offer the Court much greater clarity of gay
rights and represent the people in ways equal protection analysis is not capable of doing. The
fundamental difference between the two approaches is the way that the Court analyzes who the
right applies to. The Equal Protection Clause requires a minority to prove why their class of
people deserves the right to equal protection on the basis of a multitude of haphazard factors.
The right to intimate association does not separate citizens into distinct categories. Rather, the
right is applied to all, and is weighed and adjudicated for its own sake, instead of being awarded
because the individual petitioning for recognition of the right based on dividing, personal
characteristics about oneself (as Equal Protection requires). My proposed theory is that those in
same-sex relationships are exercising their right to intimate association, yet are infringed from
being able to properly actualizing this right due to government and private restrictions upon these
relationships. In this chapter, I will explain the purpose of the right to intimate association, as
well as detail the method and the rulings that the Court has relied upon to sustain this right. This
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serves as foundation for my original contribution, that gay rights should be adjudicated under
this constitutional theory instead of through Equal Protection.
While the Supreme Court did not formally recognize it until 1984, the idea of the right to
intimate association has long predated the Court’s analysis on the right. Alexis de Tocqueville, in
his seminal work Democracy in America written in 1835, claimed that “Americans of all ages,
all stations in life, and all types of dispositions are forever forming associations…of a thousand
different types – religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large
and very minute.” (de Tocqueville 1835, 485) Many other political philosophers have echoed the
same belief, writing that intimate association is as central to an individual’s liberty as the
freedom of speech, because the relationships one creates with others are so fundamental to living
meaningful lives. 58 Outside of its constitutional justification, the right to intimate association is
valuable for its own sake. In order to better understand its place as a well-established right by the
Courts, we must understand its intrinsic value.
One of the most influential legal scholars of the past half-century, Kenneth Karst, has
written extensively on the existence of a right to intimate association. In his 1980 piece The
Freedom of Intimate Association, Karst gives his interpretation of the structure and purpose of an
intimate association which seems to adequately reflect both the sentiment and the importance of
the relationship. Drawing upon studies of prominent psychologists and sociologists, 59 he defines
intimate associations as close, familiar personal relationship with another person or persons. A
prime example Karst cites is the associations formed through marriage or family.(Karst 1980,
58

This includes, but is not limited to, Reena Raggi (Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 1977), David
Fellman (The Constitutional Right to Association, 1963), and Charles Rice (Freedom of Association, 1962).
59
Karst reviews prominent sociologists Emile Durkheim and Max Weber for understandings on the definition of
intimate associations, and he notes the studies of some of the most well-known psychologists and biologists, such as
B.F. Skinner (Science and Human Behavior), E.O. Wilson (On Human Nature), and Harry Harlow (The Nature of
Love)
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629) The association is more than the sum of its members, meaning that the relationship between
the individuals provides unique benefits for those in the relationship that they would not
otherwise exercise. (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 1977)
As social beings, Karst claims we all seek out and cherish such relationships in a
multitude of different ways and intensities. Given that an individual is not a hermit completely
closed off from human interaction, all individuals share in the company of others in intimate
settings. (Karst 1980, 631) Intimate associations range from close friendships to marriages to
sexual encounters to exclusive social groups, such as a fraternity. The pervasiveness of intimate
associations, combined with their importance, form what de Tocqueville claims is a right that is
as inalienable as individual liberty.(de Tocqueville 1831, 487)
The value of intimate associations comes from the benefits that the existence of the
relationship confers. Such relationships give the opportunity to enjoy the company of others,
whether that be in conversation, in romance, or in pure sexual desire. Intimate associations fulfill
the basic human need to feel loved and cherished, and to allow such individuals the opportunity
to demonstrate their own capacity to love and care for another individual in a substantial, unique
way. (Karst 1980, 632) It is through intimate associations that persons can develop their own
intellect, emotional intelligence, or self-worth, and can aid others in developing in similar
ways.(Karst 1980, 633)
The importance of the intimate association is further demonstrated through the close link
it has with the freedom of choice and autonomy. In order to cultivate such intimate associations,
and by extension confer the benefits, we must choose to trust another individual in such a deep
way to allow ourselves to develop those bonds and realize those benefits. Individuals exercise a
great deal of choosing who they trust to develop a deep connection with, which makes that bond
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that much more meaningful. (Linder 1984, 1901) The discretion we can exert in choosing our
intimate associations allows for the cultivation of our own unique identity and our own unique
life course. (Karst 1980, 635) The power of the intimate association would be compromised if
the individual was forced to coexist and share the experiences of intimate associations without
the option of choosing who they are sharing those experiences with. Thus it show the importance
of the choice in whom to trust and form these bonds with. In this sense, the autonomy exercised
by individual persons reflects the liberty inherent in the formation and cultivation of intimate
associations.(Linder 1984, 1901)

History of Intimate Associations Under the Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court first formally recognized the right to intimate association in Roberts
v. United States Jaycees in 1984, claiming the right was embedded in the precedents of the First
and 14th Amendment. However, there were many cases leading up to Roberts that shaped the
rationale later adopted by the Court in the seminal case. By many scholars’ accounts, the ideals
of the right to intimate association were first broached in Griswold v. Connecticut, which found a
Connecticut statute barring married couples from accessing contraception unconstitutional.
(Schwartzchild 2013, 97) The Court found Connecticut’s ban unconstitutional in two ways. The
first, which has traditionally been seen as the binding precedent and the most scrutinized aspect
of the decision, was the finding of an implicit right to privacy through the penumbra of specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. (Griswold, 1965) In order to support this belief, Justice William
Douglas wrote that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments all guaranteed specific
zones of privacy. The common theme of these Amendments demonstrate an underlying right to
privacy. With this new recognition to the right to privacy, the Court found the decisions made in
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marriage regarding procreative choices to be protected by the protected sphere of privacy.
(Griswold, 1965)
The Court also found Connecticut’s contraceptives ban unconstitutional on 14th
Amendment Due Process grounds. The Due Process Clause of the 14 th Amendment says that “no
State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
Especially notable about the Due Process Clause is the right to exercise one’s liberty, which the
Court has interpreted mean that any rights fundamental to the liberty of individuals through all
spheres of life. (Griswold, 1965) Under the liberty provision of the Due Process Clause, the
Court established what is now known as Substantive Due Process. Any rights that may be found
under Substantive Due Process are not found in the first eight Amendments, yet are determined
to be fundamental to an individual’s existence and livelihood. In Griswold, the liberty being
recognized was the right to privacy in the comfort of one’s marriage. (Griswold, 1965)
In determining that privacy within marriage was a liberty that should be protected under
Substantive Due Process, the Court elaborated on the purposes and benefits of marriage.
Through this analysis do we begin to see the right to intimate association begin to develop.
Justice Douglas stated that the decisions made within the bonds of marriage must warrant a high
level of protection, as marriage “is intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life; [that is] a harmony of living.” (Griswold, 1965) Griswold also affirmed
the autonomy that is necessary in forming meaningful relationships, which lends credence to the
perceived importance of developing marital and romantic bonds. Constitutionally, the decisions
made in marriage are protected under the right to privacy, which is found through Substantive
Due Process. It was this refocusing upon the liberty component of the Due Process Clause that
laid the groundwork for the Court’s decision to come in Roberts.
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While the idea that certain unenumerated rights could be fundamental and recognized
under the Due Process Clause was a novel one broached in Griswold, the importance of marriage
was an ideal that was already well-established. The majority opinion for Loving v. Virginia,
which found all bans on interracial marriage unconstitutional, also articulated the importance of
marriage in our society, saying that “the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” (Loving,
1967)Although the Court did not claim that the right to marriage was its own protected right, its
existence and importance to individuals was a central part of the ruling, and formed the
argumentative foundation for future cases to formalize the right to marriage, and later the right to
intimate association.
In 1976, the Court held in Zablocki v. Redhail that any restrictions upon an individual’s
right to marry were subjected to strict scrutiny. 60 The freedom to marry, the Court stated, “has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.” (Zablocki, 1976) Furthermore, the Zablocki decision reaffirmed the
principle established in Maynard v. Hill, decided in 1888, which stated that marriage is “the most
important relation in life” and is the “foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress.” (Maynard v. Hill, 1986) Zablocki relied upon
the well-established precedent of the importance of marriage to find the right to marriage to be a
protected element of liberty enumerated under the Due Process Clause. This finding ultimately
became the bedrock of the Roberts decision. (Linder 1984, 1899) However, the Court also found
that the more recent Griswold decision substantiated the finding that marriage was a fundamental
60

Later in this chapter I will address how the tiers of scrutiny are used in determining the right to intimate
association and the weight of that right against government interest. While it may come across that I am vehemently
anti-tiered scrutiny, I must clarify that I believe the essence of the tiers has intrinsic merit. The way in which they
are applied to 14th Amendment jurisprudence is the primary issue I take with the system of tiered scrutiny.
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right to liberty. Because many of the decisions made in marriage are private and recognized as
such, some of the most fundamental elements of marriage are already protected. This established
reason to find the entire institution of marriage valuable in itself and therefore worthy of judicial
protection as an essential form of liberty.
The next year, in 1977, the Court returned to the question to clarify the importance of
marital and family relationships and these relationships’ place under the 14th Amendment. In
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court was faced with the question as to whether a city
ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single immediate family
was a violation of the liberty established in the Due Process Clause. Challenging the law was
East Cleveland resident Inez Moore, who had established residence with her son, his son (her
grandson), and another grandson whose parents were absent from the child’s life. While the
Court noted the city’s justification for the ordinances (overcrowding and traffic prevention,
lessening the financial burden upon the public school system), they found that the intrusion upon
family living relationships was a greater concern, thereby finding East Cleveland’s ordinance
unconstitutional. Recognizing much of the same precedent used to decide Zablocki, the Court
held that the freedom of choice in marriage and family arrangements was one of the liberties
protected by Substantive Due Process.(Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 1977) Due Process of
liberty, the Court said, was intended to recognize and respect the liberty of the individual, and
balance that respect against the demands of organized society. (Poe v. Ullman, 1961) This
protection of liberty mustn’t be determined on arbitrary lines, but rather from careful respect for
the teachings of history and recognition of the basic values that underlie our society. (Griswold,
1965) As such, the restriction of decisions so central to the foundation of familial life met the
standard of impeding on the liberty of individuals in their most personal relationships. (Moore,
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1977) The process of child-rearing is fundamental to the purpose of cultivating a family, and it is
neither the Court’s nor the City of East Cleveland’s place to determine the way in which that is
done. (Moore, 1977)
There are two notable standards established by the Moore decision. First, the Court’s use
of the Due Process Clause represented a noticeable shift towards recognizing the intrinsic
benefits of meaningful personal relationships between individuals, instead of relying on the
privacy necessary in cultivating these relationship. While this may appear to be a minute
distinction, a clearer understanding about the importance of these relationship purely in their own
right demonstrated their importance and their need to be protected in a much stronger way.
Recognizing the relationship’s importance for their own sake is preferred over trying to faultily
fit them under a privacy jurisprudence, especially because the right to privacy does not apply to
all substantial restrictions upon marriage or family. 61 This distinction made it clear that these
intensely personal relationships are valued and protected for their own value as a form of liberty
of all individuals.
Moore also helped shape what became the right to intimate association through its
recognition of personal relationships afforded through extended families. While not monolithic
in its approach, (Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923) 62 the Court had previously focused its liberty
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The questions posed by Moore show how privacy does not necessarily cover all infringements on the liberty in
forming meaningful relationships with other in the confines of family and marriage. The case dealt with whether the
City of East Cleveland could restrict cohabitation to nuclear families. The decision on how and who to live with may
be personal. However, the actual cohabitation is not a private existence. It is known through census reports and
establishment of one’s home mailing address, both of which are public records. As such, it can be convincingly
argued that there is no privacy restriction, but there is a liberty restriction upon the right to live with the family as
one so defines. The Court rightly made this distinction between privacy and liberty in such relationships and
established a clear precedent for the future that marriage and familial relationships were valued in and of
themselves, not just as a form of privacy that is protected.
62
Other examples of cases that recognized some rights of the family include Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Yoder
v. Wisconsin

Binder 95

protections of such associations on the bonds and benefits afforded by marriage. (Loving, 1967)63
The recognition of the importance of relationships outside the confines of marriage expanded the
Court’s view on intimate associations. It was not that marriage is uniquely capable of providing a
form of liberty that needed protection, but rather that marriage gave a strong example of this
liberty. This difference, and the Court’s recognition of this difference, demonstrated a proclivity
and openness towards accepting close, personal relationships as forms of liberty, with less regard
for the form that these associations take. The concern was on the benefits these relationships
conferred to individuals.
While highly notable, the aforementioned cases are not the only ones that laid the
groundwork for the Court’s decision to recognize the right to intimate association in Roberts.
There are several more cases that found intrinsic value in the existence of intimate associations. 64
What is significant is how the foundation for the right to intimate association was so prevalently
applied to a whole range of cases dealing with distinctly separate constitutional issues. The
importance of this unestablished right was central to the Court’s holdings granting contraceptive
rights to all, (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972) the right to sit-in to challenge racial segregation, (Bell v.
Maryland, 1964) and the right to have parental access and guidance to one’s child born out of
wedlock. (Stanley v. Illinois, 1972) These cases were also varied in the constitutional questions
they posed, challenging and clarifying the understanding of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
14th Amendments. The main takeaway from the diversity in cases that employed the rhetorical
and argumentative force of arguing for the right to intimate association is that the right has been
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See also Griswold, Zablocki, and Ullman,
Some additional examples include Eisenstadt v. Baird, which gave unmarried couples access to contraception;
Doe v. Bolton, which extended abortion rights to married couples; Bell v. Maryland, which found sit-ins to protest
racial segregation to be constitutional under the First Amendment; and NAACP v. Alabama, which found that the
NAACP was not required to publicized its list of membership.
64

Binder 96

central to the facilitation of many other rights. (Linder 1984, 1887) Its importance is evidenced
through the many cases decided on other issues that used the importance of intimate association
as reason to uphold other rights. This shows that the intimate association has its own intrinsic
value that needed formal recognition.

Formal Recognition: The Court Defines the Right to Intimate Association
As the purpose of intimate associations became more elucidated over the course of the
20th century, both in the courts and in academia 65, the Court formally recognized and articulated
the right to intimate association in the groundbreaking case Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
The case challenged whether the United States Jaycees 66 had the right to exclude women from its
membership. A national civic organization, the Jaycees’ expressed purpose, according to its
bylaws, is to promote and foster the growth of Americanism and civic interest and provide its
members with an avenue for intelligent participation in the affairs of their community, state, and
nation, and to cultivate friendships with others sharing similar ideals. (Roberts) Additionally, the
Jaycees restricted their memberships to only men, and justified this discrimination as necessary
to achieve the purposes of the organization. However, the Minneapolis/St. Paul chapter began
allowing women into the Jaycees, thus violating the national ban on female participation. As a
result, the chapter had its charter revoked by the national office, prompting the litigation that
eventually led up to the Supreme Court’s decision. The question faced by the Court was whether
the associational rights of the Jaycees outweighed the state of Minnesota’s interest in upholding
its Human Rights Act, which states that no place of public accommodation can discriminate on

65

See Karst (1980), David Richards (Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 1986) , Rice (1962),
Fellman (1963)
66
Throughout the course of the chapter, the United States Jaycees may be referred to as such, or as “U.S. Jaycees”,
or simply “Jaycees”
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the basis of, among other characteristics, gender. (Roberts, 1984)67 Writing for a 6-3 majority,
Justice William Brennan held that the United States Jaycees were not permitted to restrict
women from membership, employing a newly-devised metric to better weigh the competing
interests of associations and the state that made the precedent so fundamental in future cases.
In their briefs to the Court, the Jaycees contended that restricting membership to only
men was protected under their First Amendment rights to speech and association as articulated in
NAACP v. Alabama, which had stated that the right to association was a facilitative right that was
essential to allowing individuals the ability to actualize their First Amendment rights to the
freedoms of speech and assembly.(NAACP v. Alabama, 1958) While the precedent of NAACP v.
Alabama would appear to be sufficient for coming to a conclusion about whether the
associational rights of the Jaycees merited their exclusion of women, the Court took the
opportunity to explain exactly which associations were protected.
Instead of accepting a broad right to association to reflect all human interactions, the
Court clarified the scope of associational rights by diving the right into two distinct types:
intimate and expressive association. The fundamental difference between the two is the value
that each type has for individuals. Brennan defined expressive associations by saying that the
Court has “long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.” (Roberts, 1984) Finding
that the right to expressive association was necessary to recognize its facilitative nature in
exercising the enumerated rights to speech and assembly, the Court determined that the right to
67

It is a point of contention as to whether or not the Jaycees are considered a private or public organization, and as
such, whether that requires them to abide by the Minnesota Human Rights Act, or whether they have greater latitude
in determining the associational purposes endowed to private groups.
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expressive association was inherent to the First Amendment. The Court then stated that given the
state’s compelling purpose in protecting against gender discrimination, the organization must
show why the restriction upon women is a central purpose to the association’s existence.
(Roberts, 1984) This metric was utilized in order to determine whether or not the discrimination
is central to the group’s existence. If a group exists to exercise their First Amendment rights to
hate other individuals on the basis of some characteristic, then the government is not within its
powers in suppressing that voice and association because this would effectively amount to
censorship. However, if a group’s purpose can be blind to personal characteristics and still exist
without fundamental harm to the association, then the discrimination against individual based on
some arbitrary characteristic is not justified. In the case of the Jaycees, the purposes of
promoting civic engagement for citizens ages 18-35 was not mutually exclusive to men. As such,
the discrimination was an unjustified exclusion that was irrelevant to the actual purposes of the
organization, which then made the state’s interests outweigh the association’s purpose in
upholding a restriction of women.
The second, and more important, form of association the Court delineated in Roberts was
the right to intimate association. Unlike expressive association, which finds its constitutional
roots in the First Amendment, the Court found this form of associational right as essential to
personal liberty covered by Substantive Due Process of the 14th Amendment. (Roberts, 1984)
The Court recognized that there are elements of the two types of association that may coincide.
However, they decided to separate the two forms for two purposes: to better understand the role
of the United States Jaycees as either an intimate or expressive association, and to establish a
clear, binding precedent articulating the importance of two separate rights that are essential to
upholding existing enumerated rights. The intention of the Bill of Rights was to protect
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individual liberty from the power of the government. (Rakove 1985) The Court determined that
the intimate associations individuals form help foster and sustain that liberty by providing,
among other benefits, emotional enrichment, a clearer understanding of one’s own identity, and
diversity of ideals and thought.
Brennan then goes on to provide an archetype of the ideal intimate relationship: the
family. Stating that it is these relationships that exemplify the benefits conferred through this
form of association, Brennan cites the intimate nature of the family and the many fundamental
decisions made through these associations as proof of the need for judicial recognition of this
form of liberty. (Roberts, 1984) Families, according to Brennan, “involve deep attachment and
commitments to the necessarily few individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s
life.” The importance of these relationships manifest themselves in both theoretical ways (the
cultivation of ideas and identity) and in practical decision-making processes exclusive to the
family (the decision to have children(Skinner v. Oklahoma 1942; Carey v. Population Services
International, 1977), raising of children (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 1977), and
cohabitation with relatives (Moore, 1977), among other decisions linked to family relationships).
In order to determine whether or not a relationship between persons is considered to be
an intimate association, the Court must consider only the factors of size, selectivity, purpose,
policies, and congeniality, and any other relevant characteristics as determined by the court
presiding in future cases regarding questions on the scope of this right.. The purpose of having
such factors is to better understand what genuinely is to be considered an intimate association.
Again, the Court references the family to illustrate these factors. The family is distinguished by
relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity, and seclusion from others in critical decision
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making. (Roberts, 1984) While these qualifications could appear to be arbitrary, they actually
highlight the inherent value in recognizing intimate associations. The selectivity, or choice, in
who one forms these relationships with is an element of the liberty endowed by the 14 th
Amendment. This choice is essential to cultivating meaningful associations, as the ability to trust
and grow is dependent on the willingness to open up to another individual.(Karst 1980, 633)
The size of the relationship also indicates its intimacy. Pragmatically speaking, the
benefits that are fulfilled through intimate associations (personal growth, sharing of ideals, child
rearing68) would be increasingly difficult to realize as the size of the intimate associations grew.
For instance, it would be difficult to claim that the relationships between all employees in a
corporation would be classified as intimate associations, as the bonds between the individuals
within one company would most likely not be considered intimate due to lack of choice in who
one’s coworkers are along with a lack of opportunity for all within a company to come together
as one intimate association. However, a deep friendship or relationship fostered by way of shared
employment could be considered an intimate association.
As determined in earlier cases, any rights found to be essential to liberty are placed under
strict scrutiny, in that the government must have a compelling purpose and it must be the least
restrictive means to accomplishing that aim in order to infringe upon the right. (Griswold,
1965)69 The right to intimate association is rooted in the liberty component of substantive due
process, meaning that any infringements on this right must be weighed under the scale of strict
scrutiny. 70
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In the case of marriage or family, which the court has already is the archetype for protected intimate associations.
This precedent was reaffirmed in Zablocki (1976), Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974), and Carey v.
Population Services International (1977)
70
It is here that there could be potentially some confusion about what I am advocating for. In chapters Two and
Three, I provided a detailed critique of the way in which Equal Protection precedence has been established. In short,
69
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Additionally, what is notable about the Roberts decision is the emphasis placed on the
importance of this right for its own sake. There is little analysis that the right to intimate
association only is endowed to a select few, or endowed to those who cultivate specific types of
intimate associations. All Brennan does in this opinion is establish that there is a right to intimate
association found as essential to exercising the liberty, and illustrate the basic structure of the
form that these associations could take. There is no mention of appealing to historical norms or
traditionally-protected relationships. This is notable, as future courts begin to try to redefine the
right to reflect appeals to historical norms and traditions as necessary to guaranteeing this form
of liberty to individuals.

Questioning the Scope of the Roberts Decision
In the 30 years since Roberts was decided and the right to intimate association was
formally recognized as protected through Substantive Due Process under the 14th Amendment,
the Court has not been faced with many cases forcing them to further clarify or limit the
understanding of the right. One tension that has arisen, however, is whether intimate associations
are only protected if they are a relationship this is rooted in the traditions, culture, and morals of

the way in which the tiers of scrutiny are employed is highly problematic. This analysis could lead many to believe
that I am against the use of the tiers of scrutiny in weighing rights claims. However, the problem I have with Equal
Protection jurisprudence is not that the tiers of scrutiny are used. It is the way that they are used for the Amendment.
Individuals’ equal rights claims are adjudicated based on the characteristics of one’s identity, thereby separating
everyone into categorized groups and weighing whether certain groups are deserving of equal rights or if they are
not. This separation is perpetuated by attributing an assigned tier to different minority groups (e.g. strict scrutiny for
race, intermediate scrutiny for gender). In this system, the tiers are not the problem. The way the tiers are used is the
problem. When looking at the ways the tiers operate for their own sake, they provide a weighing mechanism that
clearly establish the burden upon the government in order to justify why a right can be infringed. This shows the
importance of the right and compares it to the importance of the government’s purpose. The primary difference
between the tiers of scrutiny for Substantive Due Process claims and Equal Protection claims is that the right is
being endowed to everyone, not a select few based on capricious characterizations. As such, there is much less
subjectivity and arbitrariness as to who gets enhanced judicial protection, as everyone is ensured the exact same
protection of the right, given that rights are endowed to all unless there is some extenuating circumstance (e.g.
imprisonment).
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the nation and its history. This question was broached in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas in 1989,
only five years after Roberts was decided. In a case that was primarily focused upon whether the
First Amendment allows the distribution of pornography, the Court weighed whether an
individual’s right to intimate association was being violated by disallowing hotel to rent rooms at
hourly rates, which are typically purchased for brief sexual activity. In a comprehensive bill
aimed at protecting the morals of the community, the City of Dallas barred hotels from offering
rooms for ten hours or less, claiming that such rates promote non-procreative sexual conduct and
prostitution. The petitioners claimed that this provision of the bill infringed on the right to
intimate association, asserting that the right to engage in sexual activity with a partner of one’s
choosing fit under the model of an intimate association laid out in Roberts. (FW/PBS, 1989)
Unfortunately for the petitioners, the Court did not agree with their stated position. While
the Court reiterated the need for recognition of the right to intimate association as an essential
form of liberty, they claimed that the sexual relationship between individuals consummated in
hotel rooms are not a protected form of intimate association. (FW/PBS, 1989) Such sexual
conduct is not the sort of relationship that has traditionally conferred the benefits of intimate
association that allowed the right to be recognized in the first place. The FW/PBS decision
created a schism in how intimate association should be understood. Does the right encompass
non-traditional relationships, as suggested in Roberts, or is it limited only to associations
commonly rooted and viewed as essential to the cultural and moral fabrics of our society?
(Marcus 2006, 287)
This question was highlighted again in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court upheld
bans on sodomy committed by individuals of the same gender. While the Court was not as
explicit in recognizing the importance of the right to intimate association as they would be in
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FW/PBS, they decline to recognize the relationships of those partaking in same-sex sexual
conduct as constitutionally protected, finding that there is no element of gay sex that is essential
to the liberty of the 14th Amendment. (Bowers¸1986) The majority justified this view by saying
that homosexual sodomy has no root in the traditions or commonly accepted beliefs of the
country. Given that there was no lasting expectation that individuals should have the right to
engage in these actions, there could then be no claim that such conduct is essential to liberty,
because it had never been widely considered essential prior to the previous few decades. If it is
not rooted in history, then it is not an everlasting principle that simply hadn’t gotten judicial
recognition. (Bowers, 1986)
The dissent in Bowers lamented the Court’s holding, finding that they had not grappled in
any way with the right to intimate association, only concerning themselves with the question of if
there is a fundamental right to sodomy. The dissent, written by Justice Harry Blackmun,
reaffirmed Roberts in saying that the right to intimate association is indeed essential to liberty,
and it is not the state’s role to determine what forms those associations may take. (Bowers, 1986)
Even when appealing to history, Blackmun claimed that protection of these associations fits
within the national ethos that the majority claims they are rooting their decision in. He held that
the liberty of individuals to form their own relationships has always been valued by our country,
and that the autonomy to choose is one of the bases of our nation’s existence. Furthermore, he
says that the fact that these relationships are non-traditional is actually reason that they should be
protected, not restricted. (Bowers, 1986) Non-traditional relationships, such as romantic
relationships between individuals of the same sex, foster diversity throughout society. Diversity
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of views, demographics, and identities, are protected through the Bill of Rights and is celebrated
as one of the unique qualities of American culture. 71
Only 17 years later, the Court explicitly overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, finding
that the choice of individuals to partake in sodomy was protection under the right to privacy that
is intrinsic to the liberty protected under Substantive Due Process. (Lawrence, 2003) Less
notably, Lawrence also clarifies the question of whether only traditional relationships were
protected intimate associations. The ruling signaled a willingness of the Court to defer to the
right to autonomy of individuals to choose their own relationships, as opposed to allowing the
government to define which relationships were permissible based on commonly-held tradition.
(Lawrence, 2003) The Court takes two approaches to repudiate the FW/PBS standard. They state
that there is no one clear way to understanding history and tradition, and that the state should not
be defining the relationships people can and cannot have. In trying to homosexual sodomy, the
state argued that individuals partaking in sodomy were acting against widely accepted morals.
The Court rejects this claim, however, saying that history is being distorted to fit the views of the
petitioner, not the other way around. When analyzing the enacted laws during the late 18th
century, when the United States gained its independence, there were no laws distinctly targeting
gays. Rather, it targeted all sodomy between any adults, regardless of the genders of the
participants.72 The beginning of anti-gay legislation and law enforcement began in the mid 20 th
century, which would certainly not be representative of a commonly held belief rooted in our
nation’s ethos. This example illustrates the majority’s point that in determining whether a right is
71

Among others, the First Amendment clearly seeks to promote differing views and lifestyles to allow for all to
cultivate their own chosen identity and prevent a monolithic conglomeration understanding of culture.
72
There are some who argue that homosexual sodomy would not have been conscribed into law because it was seen
as so abhorrent that it was obvious that it would not need to be codified. However, to the point in which such
extrapolations are continuously drawn to support theses on the morals of the country, it only shows the difficulty in
relying on historical morals and traditions as an objective measure of whether rights should be protected.
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fundamental to all individuals, the history is simply not conducive or extensive enough to justify
whether a right can or cannot be proscribed.
The Court frequently seeks to distance itself from relying on historical ethos arguments in
rights analysis. But even if the history was clear enough to definitively dictate whether a form of
relationship is morally rooted in the country’s ethics, the government does not even necessarily
have the right to restrict non-traditional relationships. The majority claims that the government
does not have such a strong interest in defining the deeply personal relationships of private,
consenting citizens. The interests of the Court are “to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code.” Given that the sexual relationships of consenting individuals are a private
matter, and therefore protected by the substantive due process right to privacy, the obligation of
the Court is to determine how that right can be best protected, so long as there is no
countervailing right that would allow for restriction of the original right. With the only opposing
interest in Lawrence an appeal to tradition, which the majority was skeptical of, the opinions of
each individual justice were of no concern in deciding whether non-traditional intimate
associations should be protected found that their opinions of the private relationships were of no
concern.
What is key to recognize about the Lawrence decision is the how they found nonprocreative sexual relations to exist as a right under Substantive Due Process. They did not say
that the government’s ban was infringing on the liberty central to intimate associations. Rather,
they found that the law violated privacy rights in choosing and actualizing sexual desires with
another individual. (Lawrence, 2003) Considering not all sexual actions are allowed, namely that
individuals are not allowed to have sex or any like conduct in public, the private setting in which
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many choose to have these relations reduces the interests of the government because of the
interests in protecting privacy rights.
Although the Court did not explicitly call upon Roberts to decide Lawrence, the past
intersectionality of the privacy and intimate association arguments, along with their shared
constitutional justification of Substantive Due Process, provide a common argumentative basis.
The justification for the Court’s decision in Lawrence may not specifically call upon the right to
intimate association, yet much of the same precedents can be applied as support for both an
argument for right to intimate association and right to privacy. Much of Roberts was based off of
the privacy determinations made in Poe, Griswold, and Roe, among other cases, and many cases
justified by privacy after Roberts were decided upon analysis given by the Court in Roberts.73
The exact same approach to understanding Roberts can be applied to the understanding of
intimate associations implicit in the Lawrence decision.

Other Instances of Right to Intimate Association After Roberts
Outside of the questions about the role of morality and tradition in granting intimate
associational rights protection, the Court has been faced with other quandaries regarding the
scope of the right to intimate association. While the Supreme Court has not decided many cases
since Roberts that directly clarify the definition of the right, that does not mean lower courts
have not been posed with shaping the right in certain ways. Since Roberts, many have claimed
that their association be protected under Substantive Due Process as an intimate one, with
varying degrees of success. There has also been dispute as to whether all restrictions of intimate
association are adjudicated under strict scrutiny, or if there are some infringements on
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Examples include Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), Cruzan by Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health (1990)
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relationships that could be interpreted as intimate associations that are not entitled to strict
scrutiny. (Akers v. McGinnis, 2003)
In the Roberts majority opinion, Justice Brennan suggested that there could be a sliding
scale in determining both the level of intimacy in a relationship and the importance that
relationship has for an individual. (Roberts, 2003) While the courts have not adopted a clear
sliding scale, they have continued to use the example of the romantic and family relationship as
the archetypical intimate association. (Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 1987) In conjunction with this, courts have also relied on the parameters established by
Brennan in the Roberts opinion of size, selectivity, and purpose, to best understand the essence
of an intimate association.
Utilizing these factors, different courts have characterized other relationships as intimate
associations essential to liberty. There have been many cases that protect the relationships of the
family that extend outside the bounds of the immediate nuclear unit. (Parham v. J.R., 1979) The
bonds of foster children with their foster parents are considered to be intimate associations, even
though the children are not legally considered to be permanent dependants or members of the
parents’ family.(Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 1977) The relationship between an
aunt and her niece was protected as an intimate association. (Prince v. Massachusetts, 1944) The
right to divorce one’s partner is also protected as a decision under the liberty needed to create
intimate associations. (Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971) The realm of intimate association goes so
far to even include protection from prosecution of marital rape, as the bind shared between those
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married outweighs the government interest in prosecuting sexual assault. (Dworkin 1988, 16567)74
Outside of the family, the Court has also recognized other forms of intimate association.
The bonds of close friendship have been continuously protected, as they confer many of the same
benefits about cultivating one’s identity, exercising one’s autonomy in choosing relationships,
and trusting another individual in profound ways similar to the bonds of family.(Corrigan v. City
of Newaygo,1995) Fraternities and sororities are also considered to be intimate associations, as
they function in relative seclusion and maintain a level of exclusivity that allows bonds to be
fostered that have inherent meaning to the individual in a similar way that other protected
intimate associations do. (Chi Iota of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City University of New York
, 2007) Prisoners, even though they have forfeited many of their rights by committing crimes,
have their right to be visited by family members protected under the right to intimate association.
(Overton v. Bazzetta, 2003) To be clear, I am not necessarily endorsing that all of these
associations be considered intimate and essential to the liberty of Substantive Due Process. My
point in illustrating the different types of associations is to show how the Courts have applied
this line of precedence to a wide range of relationships, which can then be used to show how
same sex relationships can also be covered.
The tier of scrutiny applied to intimate associations has also been in a minor state of flux.
The courts have ruled that not all relationships that could be construed as intimate are worthy of
the protection of strict scrutiny. In Akers v. McGinnis, the Sixth Circuit held that relationships
74

While this is a highly controversial notion, and one that many persons would find morally reprehensive and many
Courts would seek to repudiate, my choice to include this form of protected intimate association is to show the
breadth of relationships and privileges within those relationships that the Court protects. In Chapter Five, I will
compare the government interests in preventing the actualization of gay relationships to the government interests in
not being able to prosecute rape, given this example, to elucidate the breadth of what is considered an intimate
association.
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that are intrinsically intimate, such as marriage, are not always protected by strict scrutiny. In this
case, the court was asked if a policy of the Michigan Department of Corrections that barred
employees from any non work-related conduct with the prisoners being held in the corrections
facility infringed upon the employees’ or prisoners’ right to intimate association. The plaintiffs
claimed their rights to privacy and intimate association were being violated. However the court
was not compelled by their claims.(Akers, 2003) The reasoning behind this decision is highly
noteworthy. First, the court reaffirmed that intimate associations are a form of liberty protected
under the 14th Amendment. Yet they also stated that not all intimate associations are protected by
strict scrutiny, and that the impact upon the right must pose a substantial harm or potential harm
to a large number of people in order to trigger strict scrutiny protection. In this case, the right to
intimate association only applied to employees of the prison and the prisoners. The Sixth Circuit
found that the restrictions upon these individuals’ right to intimate association was not so
fundamentally restrictive that it required such strong protection, because the relationships
between employees and prisoners were not so important, and this policy did not restrict anyone
outside of the prison. The restriction also only limited the individuals affected in a marginal way,
as there were many other people in both employees and prisoners lives’ to form intimate
associations with. Strict scrutiny was reserved for cases in which a large subset of the population
is affected by some restriction. This case did not apply to that necessary large subset. As such,
the Court determined that rational basis review was appropriate for adjudicating this case. Under
this metric, the state was found to have a rational basis for preventing non work-related contact
between corrections facility employees and prisoners.
While the Akers rationale may appear flawed, it has been upheld by other Courts, and
remains a rather strong precedent in adjudicating intimate association claims. The Sixth Circuit
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found in Anderson v. City of Lavergne that police officers of different ranks were not allowed to
be in a relationship while both were employed at the same precinct. They were given the option
of one being transferred to another precinct within the district. (Anderson, 2004)The court stated
that this imposition did not amount to a categorical infringement upon their 14th Amendment
rights, and was therefore adjudicated under rational basis review and the ban on inter-office
relationships was upheld. Cases that dealt with issues of intimate association infringement of
small magnitude were decided similarly, thus proving the strength of the Akers standard.
(Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power System, 2001)
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not discuss two of the biggest right to association cases
regarding gays in the past twenty years. In 2000 and 1995, respectively, the Court decided in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston that expressive associations were allowed to ban participation and inclusion of gays if
their central purpose was based around disapproval of gays. The Court found in both cases that
the government could not force associations protected by the First Amendment to include
individuals that went against the fundamental beliefs of the associations, as that would
effectively be censorship. (Dale, 2000; Hurley, 1995) Stating that as long as the central purpose
of the association was disapproval of gays, such exclusion was allowed. However, if the
discrimination was secondary and not fundamental to the speech being advocated for through the
association, then the bans would not be permitted. In both of these cases, the Court held that the
central purposes of the expressive association in question did indeed seek to discriminate against
gays, thereby permitting continued discrimination. (Dale, 2000; Hurley, 1995)
While these were seen as large blows for gay rights, they actually served to strengthen
associational rights and limit government involvement in associational formation. Although
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these cases dealt at expressive associations instead of intimate association, the notion that the
association’s right to define its own membership outweighs the government’s interests in
dictating that membership has positive implications for intimate association, as the logic could be
applied to the formation of intimate associations. With the strengthening of associational rights,
the limits upon the government are also subsequently strengthened, thus making it more difficult
for the government to infringe upon the right to association.
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Chapter Five – The Rights of Those in Same-Sex Relationships
In the previous chapter, I discussed the history and development of the right to intimate
association, found under substantive due process of the 14 th Amendment. It is this right within
the 14th Amendment that I believe best represents the most sound and reasonable constitutional
claims for those who are restricted based on their choice to form same-sex relationships. It is this
line of precedent that most properly reflects the constitutional claim that restrictions upon those
who engage in same-sex relationships are unconstitutional. As an alternative to Equal Protection,
I believe that the relationships between two individuals of the same gender ought to be
considered an intimate association under the 14th Amendment. The right to intimate association
does not characterize people by any labels or imposed identities. It instead recognizes the nature
of certain relationships between people and weighs whether those relationships are worthy of
protection. Given the precedence and the purposes for protecting intimate associations, it is my
belief that same-sex romantic relationships should be considered intimate associations protected
under the Due Process Clause. This then establishes the right to engage in these relationships as a
fundamental right, entitling individuals to the protections that come along as such.
Before explaining the unconstitutionality of restrictions upon those engaging in same-sex
relationships, it is important to properly identify to whom this right extends. Over the past halfcentury, with particular emphasis on the past 10 years, there has been a large groundswell in
support for gay rights on the whole. 75 One of the goals of gay rights activists has been to try to
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Gallup has tracked the public opinion on gay rights over the last 30 years. With regard to whether or not
homosexual sexual conduct should be legal, 64% of respondents in 2013 believe it should be, compared to only 31%
who believe it should be illegal. This represents a 21-point increase since 1977, when support for legalization of
homosexual conduct was only at 43%, and fell to its low of 32% in 1986, the year the Court decided that Georgia’s
ban on sodomy was constitutional in Bowers v. Hardwick. With regard to same-sex marriage, only 27% of
respondents believed same-sex marriage should be recognized in 1996, compared to 68% who believed there should
be no formal recognition for gay couples. Those numbers look dramatically different now, as a majority of citizens
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achieve equality and proper recognition of same-sex relationships by the government and by
society.76 The means to achieve these goals have ranged from challenging discriminatory laws
through the court system , to political influence, to spreading a unified message through media.
As a movement, those in support of gay rights have mobilized and changed mass public opinion
in unprecedented ways. 77
Central to the discourse around gay rights has been the debate about the source and
manifestation of homosexuality in individuals. One of the most common questions has been the
source of homosexuality and whether it is immutable or chosen by the individual. Additionally,
there a large amounts of conversation about whether one’s orientation is fixed, or if it is fluid and
ever-changing over the course of a person’s life. 78 Many believe that homosexuality is
immutable and as such should be reflected in the Court’s understanding of sexual orientation,
(Balog 2005, 548) while others claim that because there is no conclusive scientific evidence that
proves immutability, along with individuals who claim that their sexual preference is fluid, the
Court should not recognize this factor. Along with this debate is the role of one’s orientation in
forming their personal sense of identity. For many, one’s sexual orientation can be a defining

believe same-sex couples should have their relationship recognized (54%), compared to only 43% in opposition.
(Gallop 2014). This trend in greater support is more obvious over the past ten years, as support for marriage equality
was only at 33% of citizens, a 21-point differential. (Pew Research 2014)
76
One method to determine the goals of the gay rights movement is to look to the mission statements of prominent
gay rights organizations. The Human Rights Campaign, which is the largest LGBT rights organization in the
country, states that their mission is to “end discrimination against LGBT citizens and realize a nation that achieves
fundamental fairness and equality for all.” (HRC, 2013) GLAAD (formerly the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against
Discrimination) holds their purpose to “promote understanding, increase acceptance, and advance equality.”
(GLAAD, 2014) Because of their influence and large representation of LGBT persons, they serve as a strong basis
to understanding the goals of the gay rights movement on the whole.
77
In addition to the commentary in footnote 1, the percentage of respondents who responded with no opinion has
steadily and consistently decreased, signifying the wider education of more people on gay issues. Even if some of
those individuals who would have said no opinion later stood in opposition to gay rights, the fact that more have an
opinion signals that there is a greater public consciousness of gay issues, which is essential to either attract new
supporters or change the views of those opposed. (Gallop, 2014)
78
This is argued through academia and national media. See Halley (1994), Balog (2005), Ambrosino (2014), and
Michelson (2014)
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quality in shaping their identity of themselves. (Nurius 1983, 128) As we’ve seen the Court
articulate, one’s identity and the cultivation of this identity is an essential aspect of what makes
us human. (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003) For others, however, orientation is simply a stated fact
about oneself that was outside of their control, similar to that of their race or gender. As such,
this does not define that individual any more than the aspects of oneself that are consciously
chosen by that individual, such as their interests or profession. (Nurius 1983, 124)
These conversations among the gay community and throughout society on the whole are
greatly beneficial to the gay rights movement. They have an impact both in greater awareness
and acceptance of sexualities outside of heterosexuality. For the right to intimate association,
however, these distinctions and understandings about sexuality are irrelevant. Under the
approach that I advocate for, it is not relevant whether an individual chooses to identifies as gay,
or whether or not one’s sexuality is immutable. It also does not matter if an individual’s sexuality
may change 20 years from now. All that is relevant is if a same-sex relationships exists at some
point in time, and whether or not these same-sex relationships should be protected under the right
to intimate association. If that relationship is not recognized simply due to the genders of the
individuals. This constitutional theory is not meant to protect just those who identify as gay.
Rather, the right to intimate association is a right that is extended to all, and all ought have the
opportunity to actualize this right.
This clarification is important because it contrasts the Equal Protection argument. There
are many rights that are not intended for all to use and call upon. However, what is important is
that all have the opportunity and ability to have their rights protected, even if one is not actively
employing in their daily lives. The potential for infringement signals the need to recognize all
rights for all individuals. One prime example of rights extended to all that may not apply to all is
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the free exercise of religion. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court said that the State could not
withhold unemployment benefits because of an individual’s unwillingness to work on Saturdays
because of her beliefs as a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, the religion of her
choosing. (Sherbert v. Verner, 1942) While a very small subsection of the population practices as
Seventh Day Adventists, the right to free exercise of religion is extended to all, regardless of
religion. An individual’s practice of religion may not be infringed in one moment, but there is the
potential for it to be infringed in the future. This principle is further elucidated through the
understanding of identity and religion. One cannot be discriminated on the basis of their religion,
even if they do not actively practice. This example parallels the right to intimate association in
protecting same-sex relationships. Not all citizens will partake in these relationships. However,
the right is extended to all, regardless of the way that one self-identifies.
Given that this right applies to all, it is important to understand how this right will be
extended. What I will do over the course of this chapter, is argue that same-sex relationships fit
the parameters of an intimate association established by the Court. The purposes and
composition, among other features, of same-sex relationships align with the necessary
qualifications the Court has previously articulated. Over the course of this chapter, I will
articulate how same-sex relationships fit within the Court’s precedents, and how the application
of the right to intimate association when applied to individuals in same-sex relationships
withstands any countervailing challenges.

Same-sex Relationships as Intimate Association Essential to Liberty
As I explained in Chapter Four, the right to intimate association is valued for many
reasons. It is through intimate associations that we enjoy the company of others, fulfill a
necessary psychological need to interact with others, (Karst 1980, 627) grow through
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conversation, experience romantic and sexual intimacy, and develop our own emotional
intelligence in more profound ways, among many other benefits. (Rice 1962) The association is
valued for more than just its individual members. The actual relationship is valued, because the
benefits would not be conferred if it were not for the existence of that relationship. Intimate
associations are also valued for the autonomy inherent to their formation. In order to enter an
intimate association, one must consciously choose to develop bonds with another individual or
group of individuals. An individual’s choice to trust and develop a relationship with a person of
their choosing is that much more powerful than any relationship forced on an individual, as the
value of intimate associations comes from the choice to enter into one with another person, or
group of people. (Karst 1980, 630)
Before I explain how such relationships fit into this established framework, it is important
to understand the nature of same-sex relationships. In short, same-sex romantic relationships
function in highly similar ways to opposite sex relationships. Those in same-sex relationships
make life commitments to each other (and marry if their state of residence has recognized their
union), they raise children together, reside together, share financial commitments, and make
important life decisions as a unit. However, not all same-sex relationships require such a deep
commitment. Same-sex relations can be purely of a sexual nature, resulting in satisfying sexual
desires with another individual similar to that of opposite-sex relationships of like form. Overall,
the manifestation of same-sex relationships does not differ fundamentally from the more wellknown and culturally accepted opposite sex relationships. 79
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I recognize that there is a large debate over whether same-sex relationships are actually similar to opposite sex
relationships, with many who seek out same-sex relationships wanting to distance their associations from the
puritanical rigidity of opposite sex relations. Many argue that aspects of lifelong commitment, such as monogamy,
are inherently unhealthy and unreasonable to expect out of individuals. (Ghaziani 2011) As such, many see samesex relationships as an opportunity to show different forms of love and commitment outside of society’s
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Inherent to the practical manifestations of the relationship are the intrinsic goods that are
essential to that relationship. At the foundation of these associations are the qualities that apply
to all intimate associations. Relationships between individuals of the same-sex in a romantic way
allow for those a part of the relationship to establish a deep connection with another individual,
and build a unique level of trust with that person. They allow for a greater realization of one’s
own identity, through deeper conversation and the resulting self-worth that comes from feeling
loved and reciprocating that same love. Same-sex relationships are even more likely to allow one
to develop their sense of self-identity and feel confident about that identity more than any other
relationship, due to the historical and current societal animus directed at individuals partaking in
such relationships. (Porche and Purvin 2008, 147) To love and trust an individual of the same
gender in the face of widespread contempt, and to do so publicly, creates a sense of self that is
more resilient, because the barriers to overcome in order to have that relationship are
comparatively so much higher.
Furthermore, it is clear that entering into a same-sex relationships takes a strong will of
choice and autonomy, which the Court has said is paramount to the existence of intimate
associations. If somebody seeks out romantic relationships, and chooses to find those
connections with somebody of the same-sex, they are exercising the liberty of choice that is
essential to forming any intimate association. The choice about which gender one prefers may be
biologically driven, or may be decided by the individual under their own exercise of their
autonomy. Under this constitutional theory, this distinction is irrelevant and unnecessary. As

expectations. (Michelson 2014) While this may be true, it does not take away from the fact that for many, their
same-sex relationships are similar to many depictions of opposite sex relationships. The comparison is used to
illustrate the nature of same-sex relationships, to give a clearer understanding about the dynamics and intimacy of
the association.
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long as an individual is exercising some choice in forming their intimate associations at the time
of their conception, then the motivation for why they chose the individual they did is irrelevant
in the eyes of the law.
In Roberts, the Court stated that in order to find a relationship between persons to be an
intimate association, they must look to the size, purpose, selectivity, and congeniality of the
relationship. (Roberts) As I’ve explained, the purposes of same-sex relationships clearly aligns
with the objective that the Court has established. With regard to the selectivity, the choice that is
exercised demonstrates the exclusivity and uniqueness of the relationship. That that choice is
made in the face of societal vitriol only strengthens the resolve of the individual in making that
choice. The congeniality is inherent to the choice being made. If both individual consent into the
relationship, then they would be doing so in a congenial manner, as it is a relationship pursued
and desired by both parties. Same-sex relationships also clearly fit within the constructs of the
final factor: size. Relationships between two persons of different genders have always been
recognized by the government. There is no difference between opposite-sex relationship and
same-sex relationships in size, as the only fundamental difference between these couples is the
genders of the individuals in the relationships.
In addition to the provisions established in Roberts, Brennan found that intimate
associations exist on a spectrum, with some being more important and essential to liberty than
others. The archetype of the most important association to protect is that of the family. (Roberts)
This includes both the romantic relationship between two individuals and the familial
relationships between parents, children, siblings and other relationships formed within the family
structure. Relying on this archetype, Brennan claims that both the family and romantic
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relationship allow “individuals [to] draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others.” The prevalence and meaningfulness of families and their benefits prove their
importance to both the individual and society. (Roberts) Under this claim, the families that are
created by two individuals of the same-sex confer all of the same benefits as families with
opposite gendered parents and mates. Individuals in same-sex unions create the lasting ties
between individuals in ways opposite sex couples do. They raise children. They experience life
together in similar ways. The families and marital relationships of individuals of the same-sex
are not fundamentally different in any way other than in the genders of those in the relationship,
which is important because the genders should not be relevant if the purposes of the relationship
align with the Court’s precedents.
The claim that individuals in same-sex relationships should have their association
protected due to the parallels to the Court-established archetype is even more substantiated when
comparing it to other protected intimate associations. In keeping in line with Brennan’s belief
that there is a continuum of different forms of intimate association and variance as to their
importance, (Roberts) the Court has found there are many types of intimate associations that
range in their form and purpose. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court ruled that an
extended family constituted an intimate association. (Moore) The Court has consistently stated
that close friendships constitute an intimate association. (Corrigan v. City of Newaygo, 1995)
Even fraternities and sororities, due to their selectivity, private nature, and positive effects that
they have upon their members, are protected under this right under the 14 th. (Chi Iota Colony at
Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City University of New York) When taking Brennan’s analysis
about how there is a hierarchy of protection of different forms of intimate association, what must
be done is a comparison between same-sex romantic relationships and other protected forms.
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Keeping in mind that the family is the archetype for protection, the association between two
consenting same-sex adults in a romantic relationship would quite clearly be considered closer to
the ideal than that of a close friendship or fraternity. By comparing these different forms of
association, we can see how the associations formed by those in same-sex relationships would be
considered more meaningful and therefore more worthy of protection given the Court’s method
of understanding intimate associations. With lesser forms of intimate association being afforded
the full protections of substantive due process, the logical conclusion is that gay relationships 80
would then have to be afforded all of the same protections afforded to all intimate associations.
The Court has also emphasized that the recognition and protection of intimate
associations should not be based on who the individuals are in the association. What is important
is whether the association fulfills the Roberts requirements, which do not specify who the
individuals can and cannot be in any way. (Doe v. Doe, 1973) In Moore, the Court specifically
said that arbitrariness in deciding what constitutes an intimate association for an individual
cannot be endorsed. It is not the Court’s role to determine what relationships have meaning in a
person’s life. (Moore) As long as that relationship fulfills the requirements established in
Roberts, then it ought to be recognized as an intimate association. The Court, in writing this, was
referring to the existence of familial relationships and how they take many forms. They stated
that the nuclear family is not the only form of family that should be protected. Rather, the
extended family can serve the exact same purposes and have the same impact upon one’s life as
the immediate family does, (Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 2002) and it is arbitrary and
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When I say “gay relationships”, I want to be clear about its definition. While I understand that it could be
interpreted in this way, I do not mean that it is a relationships predicated upon the identities of the individuals.
Rather, I am using the term interchangeably with “same-sex relationship”, meaning any romantic relationship
between individuals of the same-sex. I employ this terminology merely to avoid constant repetition of “same-sex
relationship”.
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unjustified for the Court to say that the nuclear family is the only form of familial relations that
confer the intrinsic benefits of intimate association. (Moore) In applying this logic to gay
relationships, it is arbitrary to say that only those in opposite gender relationships are cultivating
intimate associations that are essential to one’s liberty, but those in same gender relationships do
not. This is the exact form of arbitrariness that the court is seeking to avoid, yet absent any
recognition of same-sex couples as intimate associations, the Court is directly endorsing this
subjectivity.
The Court articulated an additional purpose in avoiding arbitrariness when determining
what should to be considered an intimate association under the 14 th Amendment. In writing about
how the family cannot be understood to just mean the nuclear family consisting of two parents
and their legal children, the Court stated that this understanding of a family cannot be considered
the “normal” or desired form of family because it does not reflect the diversity of society. Rather,
it is an imposition of white, suburban ideals. (Moore) The Court does not want to take away from
the associations formed in these relationships, but these norms should not be dictated as
preferred by the Court, or the only family relations worthy of judicial protection. By holding the
nuclear family dynamic as the preferred family structure, the Court would then be protecting a
style of living that is reflective of only a small subset of a population that has been privileged
above many others. The Court has the duty to recognize that meaningful family structure come in
all different forms, and only recognizing the form of family that those with privilege have
constructed does not reflect the duties of the Court, which is to adequately dispense rights to all,
regardless of their place in society. (Johnson)
This logic correlates to gay relationships. It is not the Court’s place to uphold certain
forms of relationships simply because they are strongly rooted in society due to the power those
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with privilege wield. Opposite sex relationships are strongly rooted in our society’s history, and
they have shaped much of our country’s cultural attitudes about the formations of romantic
relationships. However, given the Moore precedent, the Court is not concerned with merely
upholding associations created by those with privilege. It is concerned with determining what is
essential to liberty, and how the Court can best preserve what they deem to be essential to
liberty. Denying same-sex relationships as a form of intimate association would be accepting the
norms established by the majority, instead of searching for the mere existence of intimate
associations and the benefits they confer. The Court has made it clear that the form of the
relationship is not relevant, and that they should not only concern themselves with the forms of
association merely because some associations have been normalized by populations of privilege.
The source or tradition of association is irrelevant; the purposes, benefits, and links to liberty are
what matter. And in the case of same-sex relationships, they clearly align as intimate
associations, and the source of these relationships is not relevant to their existence and need for
protection.

How to Adjudicate Such Cases
Having established that the relationships between members of the same gender should be
considered intimate associations, it is imperative to understand what that means in terms of how
cases involving infringement upon this right should be treated by the Court. Because this is a
right found under substantive due process under the 14th Amendment, it would be designated a
fundamental right. (Roe v. Wade, 1973; Griswold) As a fundamental right, it is protected by strict
scrutiny, which in review means that in order to infringe on the right, the government must have
a compelling reason to infringe and the means of achieving the compelling purpose must be
narrowly tailored. (Korematsu) As explained in earlier chapters, this is the highest standard,
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meaning it is the greatest form of protection of an individual right. The perceptions of strict
scrutiny is that it is overwhelmingly protective of the individual’s rights. The protections would
be unprecedented for individuals in same-sex relationships , and would change the entire legal
understanding of same-sex relationships in society.
Even though it has been well-established that rights found essential to liberty under the
Due Process Clause are to be adjudicated under strict scrutiny, the Court has sometimes found
that there are situations in which the right to intimate association can be infringed in a minor
way. (Zablocki) This belief was broached in Roberts, when Justice Brennan wrote that if not all
of the qualities are met to prove that some relationship is an intimate association, then lesser
burdens can be imposed on the government in order to restrict the right. For situations when the
right is not restricted in a fundamental way, the Court has determined that rational basis review
ought to be applied. (Roberts) Articulated in Akers v. McGinnis, infringements upon the right to
intimate association are only weighed under strict scrutiny if they affect a substantial portion of
the population. Situations in which

select individuals are being restricted, but the rules

restricting them do not apply to a large subset of the populace, then rational basis review should
be employed. (Akers)
It is my contention that if a right is fundamental to liberty, then the scope of the
restriction upon the number affected should not be relevant. If there is an infringement to
individual liberty, then the Court should recognize that infringement upon an individual for its
own sake and the effect on that individual in that courtroom instead of weighing if it applies to a
great number of people. However, given the Akers standard, the Court has and continues to make
differentiations between restrictions upon intimate associations. Even with this standard in place,
any restrictions upon relationships between individuals of the same sex should still be
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adjudicated under strict scrutiny and could not be lowered to the more deferential tier of rational
basis review. By not recognizing relationships between individuals of the same sex, it limits the
possibility of developing meaningful romantic and family relationships by half of the available
population, as they are limited to finding those connections with only members of the opposite
sex. For those who identify as gay or lesbian, and prefer to find these relationships exclusively
with persons of the same sex, this serves as a restriction that cannot be avoided, as they would
not seek relationships with members of the opposite gender. As such, it is clear that even with
the Akers standard in place, limitations on same-sex relationships constitute a substantial
infringement on a large subset of the population.
The only way that a restriction on a gay relationship would be lowered to rational basis
review is if the same restriction was placed on a straight relationship. Why is this? Because the
Akers standard is blind to who the individuals are in an intimate association, and only recognizes
the sum of its parts. The examples of allowed restrictions include preventing workplace
disruption or maintaining productivity. (Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power System, 2001) Neither
of these justifications, or many others, are exclusive to one type of couple. They instead are
reflective of the effect that the existence of a relationship can have upon a workplace or other
relevant setting. As such, rational basis review is used for instances in which it would be more
productive for the workplace environment to transfer one employee to another department or
branch within a company to maintain professionalism instead of having both members of a
couple working together, as was the case in Anderson v. City of Lavergne. But if the harm being
imposed on a relationship singled out those only in same-sex relationships, then they would
unjustifiably be prioritizing the genders of the individuals in one relationship over another. When
the relationships between opposite and same-sex couples act in highly similar ways, yet one type
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is allowed while another is not, that should trigger strict scrutiny, because the marginalization of
one’s choices is more profound, due to their being limited based on their partner’s gender.

Weighing Same-sex Couples’ Right to Intimate Association against Competing
Compelling Purposes
In advancing this alternative theory substantiating the constitutional rights of those in
same-sex relationships, there are two prongs that must each be analytically satisfied. First, those
in same-sex relationships must be proven to form intimate associations. As I have discussed at
length throughout this chapter, gay relationships clearly fall within the Court’s precedents as an
intimate association that is deserving of strict scrutiny. The second prong relies on the first
prong, that same-sex relationships are considered intimate associations. In order to determine
whether same-sex relationships ought to be protected under strict scrutiny, the right must be
weighed against competing governmental purposes, as is the case with all rights analysis. Simply
establishing same-sex relationships as an intimate association under substantive due process does
not guarantee judicial protection of the relationship. All it does is establish how the Court should
understand same-sex relationships. In order to formally receive protection, it must be weighed
against competing values, and determined whether or not the right is deemed more or less
important than the given government purpose.
Because gay relationships have not been recognized as intimate associations, the courts
have not had the opportunity to say whether the government purposes for restricting this right
are compelling enough to outweigh the interests in protecting the liberty of the 14th Amendment.
Even so, the arguments against gay rights employed in the more traditional Equal Protection
cases apply to this constitutional approach. Primarily, the arguments against same-sex
relationships are rooted in arguments about the national ethos, morals, and protection of
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traditional values. Although the Court has taken into account the role of morals and national
tradition in its decisions, these arguments are insufficient when weighed under strict scrutiny.
They are not nearly compelling enough to outweigh a fundamental aspect of liberty such as the
right to intimate association.
The argument that gay relationships should not be recognized and protected as an
intimate association has been argued by claiming that such relationships are not deeply rooted in
society. (Doe v. Doe, 1973) These relationships do not adequately reflect the long standing
traditions of our country and have not been essential to persons throughout the country’s history.
Opposite sex marriage and its recognition has been the bedrock of organization of society at the
micro level. (Loving) Persons interact with the world through their families, and it is these
relationships that have established the nature of our society. What is key is that these families
have taken the form of opposite sex relationships. While I, and many others, have claimed that
this is an arbitrary distinction, there are many who argue that it is this familial relationships that
is fundamental. The exact form of the family is relevant, because it is this form that is enduring
and continued to be seen as the model of stability in society. (Devlin 1965, 64)
Because opposite gender relationships are deeply rooted in the ethics and norms of our
society, and have proven to be beneficial to cultivating a rights-enhancing, democratic state, then
it is argued that this should be protection of opposite-sex unions. By looking at the practicality of
the relationships, and that this practicality has been shown to be valued and beneficial, it then
provides an additional basis that the right is both necessary for individuals and important for the
government to protect for society on the whole. When analyzing same-sex relationships, there is
no history that they can serve the same purposes for society in similar ways to opposite sex
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relationships. Many contend that same-sex relationships simply cannot be as meaningful as
straight relationships. 81 The more salient argument, however, is that even if the relationships
between same-sex individuals are just as meaningful as opposite sex relationships, there is no
proof that they would benefit society in the same way as the relationships that have been proven
to be fundamental to our nation. (Devlin 1965, 61-62) Without this assurance, the government
then has a compelling claim at prioritizing relationships that are known to be positive for the
functioning of the state on a macro level.
The reliance on traditional norms is expounded in FW/PBS, in which Justice O’Connor
claims that intimate associations must be recognized as part of the country’s traditions in order to
be considered a fundamental right. Her argument was that if our country has been so successful
and individuals have been able to thrive for so long without recognition of this right, then is it
actually fundamental? If a right is so fundamental to liberty, then it would have been recognized
and become part of the national ethos, because any right that is so important wouldn’t be so
grossly overlooked.(FW/PBS) It is on these grounds that marriage between opposite sex couples
was recognized as a fundamental right. (Zablocki) It is an institution that had endured since our
country’s inception, and one that the majority of individuals seek out. (Loving) Because we as a
nation have always sought out to fill this need in our lives, the right can then be claimed to be
fundamental. But when applying that to gay relationships, there has been no such push or desire
to actualize these relationships in public settings. As such, the right cannot be thought of as
fundamental, because it wasn’t necessary for such a long period of time.
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While this argument can be persuasive, there are many responses that mitigate the impact
of this rationale. First, appealing to national ethos and tradition is inherently an arbitrary process.
(Richards 1986, 957) Slavery was a fundamental part of the country’s economy, culture, and way
of life for the first 70 years of the United States’ existence. Does that justify the practice, because
it is deeply rooted? What if we only look at any blatant racial discrimination, which was
explicitly codified into law for almost 200 years? (Millett 1963, 35-37) While these may seem
like extreme, straw man examples, they highlight the fact that under an appeal to tradition, truly
morally reprehensible practices could be justified as legitimate simply because they have been
important in society in the past. Argumentatively, the reliance on traditions of rights, instead of
analyzing a right for its own sake, is an is-ought fallacy. Because society has promoted and
endured with certain practices does not inherently justify them, and it does not preclude other
practices from being necessary as well. The simple existence of opposite sex relationships and
their success does not mean that there are no other relationships that can serve the same purpose.
This argument can only be used to reiterate the importance of opposite-sex relationships, which I
am not trying to take anything away from. The true role of opposite-sex relationships in my
argument is to show how they confer benefits very similar to same sex relationships. This then
lends credence to the argument that their similarities in structure and conferred benefits should
lead to similarities in judicial protection.
Additionally, the argument that because there is no proven track record of the beneficial
nature of gay relationships to society, there is no reason to recognize the right, is flawed in other
ways. The argument goes that it has not been proven that society would be detrimented by
recognizing same-sex relationships in equal ways to opposite sex relationships. While many
contend that states that have full recognition of same-sex relationships have had no issues in
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integrating same-sex couples and families into modern society, we cannot say with complete,
unflinching confidence that these relationships will ultimately have no effect or prove beneficial
to the democratic state, politically or culturally. (Baker v. Nelson, 1971)
Through my view, allowing gay relationships would actually provide its own intrinsic,
unique benefits for society. A greater understanding and acceptance of diversity allow
individuals to feel more comfortable and confident in all facets of their life, because they know
they would not be ridiculed or harmed because of aspects so fundamental to their life. While I
can reason and convince others that greater acceptance of different forms of romantic
relationships would be beneficial to society, I cannot prove with definitiveness. The lack of
definitiveness exists for speculation about whether recognition of gay relationships would be
positive or negative for society, because they have not been recognized in order to know with
any certainty one way or the other. To the point where we do not know one way or another what
the general impact of widespread recognition of these relationships are, however, we cannot rely
on any sort of determination that would presuppose their impact. Because no determination can
be made about the impact of gay relationships the Court should then remove any thoughts on the
impact of gay relationships upon society, and merely look at the relationship for its own sake and
whether the rights of those individuals should be valued. By removing speculation about the
impacts of same-sex relationships, the argument about why we should uphold only traditional
values and practices over protecting individual rights is severely weakened. With its weakening,
this purpose becomes far from compelling, and is therefore unable to sustain a ban on same-sex
relationship recognition.
As is clear, the reliance on tradition is fraught with issues in allocating and recognizing
rights essential to liberty. However, for the sake of argument, let’s assume that we must rely on
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the traditions of the nation in order to justify any claims of liberty under the Due Process Clause.
This leads us back to the initial problem with relying on tradition: that it is inherently arbitrary
which ideals are worthy of protection. (Schwartzchild 2013, 120) Just as opponents make
frequent claim that only opposite gender relationships are rooted in our nation’s history and
culture, those in favor of same-sex relationships can consequently say that recognizing their
intimate association does align with national traditions. Part of our national ethos is valuing
choice, and how that choice allows individuals to construct meaningful lives. As a country, we
value the individuality of persons and the autonomy that they have the potential of exercising.
Additionally, we value the exercise of that choice in the relationships that we form, as evidenced
by the enumerated rights to assembly (Thomas v. Collins, 1945) 82 , right to free exercise of
religion (which is typically done in communal settings), (Sherbert)83 right to protection from
quartering of soldiers (recognizing the sanctity of the home and the relationships that make up
the unit),and right to protection of one’s persons and papers, (Weeks v. U.S., 1914)84 among
others. The Bill of Rights, and subsequent amendments, highlight a general motivation in valuing
the individual capabilities and autonomies that all persons can exercise if given the opportunity.
The original purpose of the Bill of Rights was to ensure that the individual citizen’s autonomy
was protected in some fundamental ways.(Rakove 1985)
It is this tradition of protecting the basic essences of being a human being in a democratic
state that has been central to the formation of our government. These feelings of protecting
individuality have persisted throughout our country’s history to the present day, as evidenced by
82
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the intense focus upon libertarianism in our political debates today. When looking at our nation’s
traditions from this perspective, recognition of same-sex relationships would definitely fit into an
ethos of individual rights and self-actualization. The argument of appealing to tradition could be
applied as support, not opposition to the recognition of gay relationships. In comparing support
and opposition to same-sex relationship recognition when viewed through a framework of
comparison to national traditions, it can be convincingly argued that the text and basic ideologies
are aligned with recognition. The Bill of Rights alludes or specifically mentions the rights to
choice and association, whereas it makes no mention whatsoever about the genders of a romantic
couple.
The metric used to evaluate whether the government can infringe upon a fundamental
right requires a compelling purpose to outweigh the rights infringement. It does not require an
equal balancing between government objectives and rights protection. In order to serve as
justification for infringing upon the right to intimate association, the argument of upholding
traditional values must be so strong that it outweighs the interests of protecting the liberty
endowed in the 14th Amendment. First, it is not clear that we have selected the right value to
uphold, which undermines any argument that protecting one definition of a relationship is more
valuable than protecting a fundamental right. Second, even if it was clear that the definition of
proper relationships was the primary value to protect over all others, that still does not explain
why it is so compelling, and narrowly-tailored, to restrict all individuals from actualizing
relationships between themselves and individuals of the same gender and gaining proper
recognition of that relationship. It has not been shown that there is a tangible, significant harm in
recognizing same-sex relationships, which is necessary if the government purpose is to be
recognized and upheld. (Karst 1985, 649) As such, opponents must be able to show both why the
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value of opposite sex relationships so important, and how that value would be harmed in a
significant way if same-sex relationships were to be recognized. The argument of protecting
traditional values cannot do either of these two things, thereby showing its limitations and
inadequacies as a justification for restricting this structure of the right to intimate association.
Another argument employed by those against same-sex relationships is similar in form to
upholding traditional values. Many against gay relationships appeal to arguments about
upholding common morality. One of the most influential scholars in the field of legal
philosophy, Lord Patrick Devlin, articulates the nature of how law is determined. As a legal
precedent, he claims that the law is based on moral law, and that the root of codified laws is
reflective of moral underpinnings. (Devlin 1965, 61-62) When discussing the morality of
protecting strictly opposite sex relationships, the most common association discussed is
marriage. Devlin claims that marriage should be protected as an institution of one man and one
woman, because it both reflects the moral fabric of society and is a proven institution in society
that cultivates progress and stability. (Devlin 1965, 62-63) This logic can be applied to all
opposite sex relationships. Any form of limitation on recognition of relationships based on the
genders, can be attributed to the moral underpinnings.
The flaws with appealing to morality run deep. The entire argument is a monumental isought fallacy. The arguments to appeal to morality is made by stating that the law reflects
morals, and because the law has only reflected the legitimacy of opposite sex relationships, they
therefore can continue to recognize only these relationships. This argument assumes either
assumes that morals do not change, or it accepts that the only morals that are relevant are those
determined during the foundation of our country. It does not reflect the shifting understanding of
what is right and what is good. This is a common view of originalists, most notably Associate
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Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. Some originalists believe that the Court should interpret
the Constitution based on the cultural and social understandings of rights during the time that the
Constitution was written and ratified in 1787. In that time, same-sex relationships were not
allowed or written into the constitution as a protected right. (Scalia 1988) If it was actually
important to guarantee the right to have same sex relations and expect government recognition,
then the right would have been incorporated into the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Since
they were not, then we cannot subsequently find a right to exist in the constitution when the right
was not clearly explicated by the drafters.
The ultimate problem with appealing to morality is that there is no true understanding
about the origination of the morals that are supposedly essential to uphold. There is nothing to
reflect the sentiment that opposite sex relationships are philosophically more justified for
recognition than same-sex relationships. The most salient arguments for many against same-sex
relationships come instead from religious teachings. 85 Sonu Bedi, one of the leading scholars on
this matter, claims if we were to look to morals to justify bans on same-sex couples, the only
moral justification is rooted in religious teachings. Therefore, they are what he calls a “shadow
establishment of religion.” (Bedi 2013, 218) Upholding values rooted strictly or primarily in one
theology, as bans on same-sex relationships do, the Court would violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.”86 It would be irresponsible for the Court to rely on a justification to
restrict one’s rights that is unconstitutional in itself. The logical conclusion is that the reliance on
85
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morality is wrought with far too much error to be used to infringe upon the fundamental right to
intimate association.
If the morality preferring opposite sex relationships is not rooted in religious text, then it
must be found through secular reasoning in the will of the people. Such is claimed emphatically
by Devlin. (Devlin 1965, 47) It is my primary contention that morality, even if believed by the
vast majority of people, is not able to substantiate a ban on a fundamental right to humanity
without some other interest to substantiate that ban.87 However, even if we are to accept Devlin’s
framework that the government’s understanding of morality should be based on the will of the
people, it isn’t clear that the moral proclivities of persons in the United States today would
actually support restriction on same-sex couples. In actuality, more than half of the country’s
population supports marriage equality for same-sex couples. (Gallup 2014) Additionally, gay
marriage is the issue in which there is the greatest resistance in extending protections to
individuals in same-sex relationships. Employment protection and recognition of civil unions,
among other issues, show much greater widespread support for protection of same-sex couples.88
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same-sex relationships that would be used as justification to restrict the rights of those in same-sex relationships.
(Gallup 2014)
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So, if we were to rely on the will of the people (which as I’ve stated is problematic in its own
right), we would still come to the conclusion that same-sex relationships should be recognized.
This metric lends clear support for recognition of this right as a 14 th Amendment form of liberty.
It does not serve in any reasonable way as a government justification to limit the rights of
citizens.
Additionally, the arguments appealing to morals are vulnerable to the same criticism as
those about protecting national tradition. It is arbitrary which long-held morals are valued. While
there are many who consider the restriction of same-sex unions as a moral duty, this is not the
only moral obligation that can be conferred for this issue. For many, protection of diversity and
the cultivation of that diversity is important, so as not to homogenize society into one limiting
identity. (Marcus 2006, 282) This diversity allows for a greater freedom of expression and the
ability to develop one’s identity on an individual level. It also encourages a wider discourse of
ideas and perspectives. (Bowers) Another moral consideration could be the prevention of
government intervention into individual decision making. As a moral consideration, the
individual’s self interest in determining their own life path is essential to the construct of their
character and the pursuit of happiness.
Both of these moral claims, along with many others, are highly important in the minds of
many. To the point that these moral beliefs have real traction and can reasonably function as
government interests, then there is no reason that the moral that restricts the rights of same-sex
couples should be prioritized over all other valid moral considerations. Again, if it cannot be
determined which moral conclusion the government has a clear duty to uphold, then how can it
be claimed that one of these moral stances is so important to outweighs fundamental rights? The
simple conclusion is that it cannot.
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The final argument against recognition and protection of same-sex relationships is that
those in gay relationships can’t procreate. Those opposed claim that one of the primary purposes
of marriage is to provide an optimal relationship for child-rearing, and incentivizing the most
healthy relationship for procreating. Given that procreation can only be done between and
biological men and women, it is argued that the government should protect the optimal
relationships that promotes healthy procreation patterns. It is obvious that two individuals of the
same-sex cannot procreate on their own. (Lopez 2005) Given this, the argument is that by having
equal recognition between opposite sex and same-sex couples, the government would be
conflating an ideal form and a lesser form of romantic relationships under the umbrella of one
definition, even though there is one form of the relationships that is preferred, because of an
opposite sex couples’ ability to procreate. It does not mean that those in gay relationships should
have no rights. But given that they are not capable of procreating, and conferring all of the
benefits that come with being able to procreate, the legal recognition should not allow these
relationships to be seen as completely equal. (Girgis, Gordon, and Anderson, 2012)
This argument is deeply flawed for a multitude of reasons. First, it conflates romantic
relationships and procreation to a point in which they are inextricably linked to each other, which
is categorically false. While many in opposite sex relationships do choose to marry and have
children as married partners, that does not mean that the practice of procreation is inherent to
marriage of opposite sex relationships. Individuals frequently procreate outside the confines of
marriage, yet are not restricted in any way for doing so. Also, those in opposite sex relationships
that do not procreate are not prevented from having their relationship recognized. The fact that
such relationships and procreation are linked in some way does not mean they are mutually
exclusive to each other. Because individuals in same-sex relationships cannot beget a child on
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their own, their relationships are to be seen as less valid because of this incapacity. However, if
this logic were to be applied to all, then any couple who was infertile, medically unable, or
elderly would not have their relationship recognized as well, because they are just as incapable of
procreating as same-sex couples.
Furthermore, this argument is even less compelling when used as justification against the
right to intimate association instead of Equal Protection. As explained earlier, the right to
intimate association is one that is focused upon the benefits that intimate social relationships
between individuals have upon those involved. Among many other benefits, they allow one to
grow, development of virtues such as trust and love, and exploration of different ideas through
social relationships. All of these benefits, along with many others, are for the purpose of
recognizing the liberty essential to personhood. These rights are not awarded because of some
utilitarian societal benefit. Because these rights are solely focused on the individual, the societal
harm must be so great so as to outweigh the individual right. However, there is no harm
demonstrated in recognizing same-sex relationships that relates to procreation. Greater
recognition of same-sex relationships does not mean there will cease to be opposite sex
relationships in which individuals choose to beget children. Consequently, there is no compelling
purpose regarding protecting procreation that allows the individual right to be limited. If we
began to see a sharp population decline due to a much higher percentage of individuals in nonprocreative relationships, then there may be a compelling government purpose in protecting the
interests of society. Absent this decline or any sign of the size of the population being threatened
in essential ways, there is no purpose that outweighs the individual right on this basis.
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Expanding the Scope of the Right to Intimate Association
Up until this point, I have focused upon the rights of individuals who are in same-sex
relationships. This could lead to the conclusion that the right to intimate association only would
extend to those who have found that intimate association, and would only cover restriction that
affect the existence of same-sex relationships. However, this would misinterpret the purpose of
the right. At its basis, the right to intimate association, as with all rights found under the liberty
provision under the Due Process Clause of the 14 th Amendment, is one endowed to the
individual. It is not solely attributed to the existence of a romantic, same-sex couple, but rather to
the individuals within that relationship. All should have the right to pursue whatever
relationships that they desire, provided that those relationships don’t create a net harm that would
form a basis for government intervention. The focus has been on the actual relationship because
the reasons for protecting this individual right are found through the formation of the association.
The restrictions against individuals who seek to exercise this right have also been argued much
more strongly against the actual relationship, instead of the beliefs that underlie the relationship.
The opposition against same-sex relationships has focused their arguments on the relationship
itself, instead of focusing on the rights of the individuals in the relationship.
As I have stated numerous times, the purpose of the right to intimate association is one
that all should be able to access. Given this premise, the fact that one is actually in a relationship
that would be characterized as an intimate association is irrelevant. If one expresses a desire to
enter into a same-sex relationship, then they cannot be restricted from doing so, unless the
government could show a compelling purpose for restricting this desire. The reason for doing is
one cannot be punished merely for having a desire to exercise a constitutionally protected right.
It would be completely illogical for the Court to protect individuals in a constitutionally
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protected relationship, but then allow for restriction of individuals based on their want to employ
that exact right.
This analysis also extends to the right to not form intimate associations, and to not be
discriminated on this basis. If an individual seeks to never form any romantic relationships in her
life and chooses to remain single, she has the right to choose whether or not she actualizes her
fundamental rights. The choice that is so important in forming intimate associations still exists in
the right to not form such relationships. One is consciously exercising their autonomy to not
commit to a relationship with another individual. (Karst 1985, 634) They cannot then be
penalized for acting on their ability of choice in not pursuing the relationship. Abortion serves as
a compelling example to highlight this point. The majority of women will never have an
abortion, yet they all still have the right to choose to receive one or not. Such is the same with
intimate associations.
The idea of protecting one’s right to not act upon a constitutional right is not simply
drawn from logic. We see examples of the Court recognizing that an individual’s choice to not
actualize a right is still protected. The Second Amendment allows the individual the right to bear
arms, yet it is not required that she must do so. (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008) The choice
of whether or not one wants to act upon their enumerated right by owning a firearm is essential
to the right’s existence. The individual cannot subsequently be harmed in a significant way
because of their decision on whether or not they choose to actualize the right. As long as the
right is premised on the choice of the individual, then that individual can’t be punished for
choosing whether or not they want to exercise that right.
Additionally, this right would protect those who are discriminated on the basis of
appearance of homosexuality. Even if one does not make it public what their preferred gender is
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when forming intimate associations, such individuals can still be discriminated for how they
would appear to actualize this right. Therefore, one cannot discriminate against another
individual due to their appeared sexual preference, because the discriminator is still making an
unconstitutional value judgment upon someone else’s protected right to intimate association.
This is further substantiated when remembering the choice that is so important to developing
intimate associations. If one can choose their intimate partners, and another person can
stereotype another individual about who they would associate with, and consequently harm them
in some way, then the choice of the individual is being marginalized, because their choice (or
perceived choice) is the reason for their discrimination.
Throughout this chapter, I have explained in great detail why the arguments allowing for
the discrimination of those in same-sex relationships do not justify infringing the right to
intimate association. While the arguments seeking to restrict the right to intimate association are
lacking in substance, it does not mean that there are no instances in which this right can be
restricted. The limits of the protections associated to the right to intimate association when
applied to individuals in same-sex couples are reached when weighed against the right to free
speech and right to expressive association. The Court has repeatedly reiterated the importance of
the right to free speech and freedom of belief, and that the government cannot censor
individuals’ right to expressed their own beliefs. With regard to free speech, one limit upon the
right to intimate association is that other individuals are constitutionally protected in their ability
to transmit speech in opposition to same sex couples. As the first Court stated in Abrams v.
United States, it is not the Court’s nor the government’s role to decide what can be characterized
as acceptable speech or thought. That right and duty is proscribed to the people. (Abrams v.
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United States, 1919)89 If one does promote socially unacceptable views, then it is up to the
people to mobilize and actualizes their own right to free speech in order to drown out those
unpopular views. (Linder 1984, 1902) This is applicable to opposition to gay relationships.
Realistically, we can reasonably claim that there will be persons who would not accept same-sex
relationships as legitimate, and would advocate against their recognition and protection, as
almost half of the country’s electorate still opposes recognition of gay marriage. (Gallup 2014)
The right to express discriminatory views is protected, so long as it does not directly infringe
another individual’s right to intimate association.
The other limitation on the bounds of the right to intimate association when applied to
same-sex couples is the right to expressive association. As explained in Chapter Four, the right to
expressive association is rooted in the First Amendment as a facilitative right to freedom of
speech and freedom of assembly. (Board of Directors of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
1987) The right allows individuals to congregate together and impart their collective views as an
organized body, merely forming an additional way in which an individual can actualize their
right to free speech. (Thoum 2002, 646) Because it is an extension of free speech, the rights of
expressive associations allow for a level of what would appear to be discriminatory practices.
The Court has stated that if the central purpose of an expressive association’s purpose is intended
to promote a viewpoint against the rights of some other group, then that association is allowed to
exclude members of the targeted group from joining the organization. This principle was clearly
explicated in the case Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont,
in which the Maryland District Court stated that the KKK is not required to admit blacks into the
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organization, and was allowing the group to restrict the rights to Equal Protection. 90 (Invisible
Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont , 1988)The reason was that the
KKK’s expressed purpose is the devaluation of rights for African-Americans. If the government
were to force the KKK to admit blacks, the group would be forced to compromise their beliefs,
and thereby forced to suppress the right to free speech they were trying to actualize. (Invisible
Empire)
The same logic has been applied to individuals desiring same-sex relationships in the
monumental case Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, in which the Court stated that because the Boy
Scouts are a private expressive association intended on instilling values in the younger
generations of males, they can decide what values they hold central to their concept of morality.
With this liberty, the Boy Scouts have held that homosexuality and same-sex relationships are
not moral and should not be pursued of one wants to live a value-laden life. (Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 2000) There have been many who have disputed that the views opposing
homosexuality are the central purpose of the Boy Scouts. Organization such as HRC claim that
the Boy Scouts are instead intended to promote values such as community-building and
teamwork. (Windy City Times, 2000) However, the Court has affirmed that when a group claims
that the fundamental reason for their existence does have discriminatory views, and there is proof
that the group’s practices reflect those views, then they are allowed by way of the First
Amendment to discriminate against a group. This right would supersede the right to intimate
association and the protection of this right. (Hurley)
To be clear, the right to expressive association does not cover any group who makes a
claim that they stand in opposition to some group of people, and therefore are allowed to limit
90
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the rights of those individuals. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees and Rotary Club International v. Duarte
prove that an association cannot claim that their fundamental purpose is premised upon the
exclusion of some group of people and instantly receive protection. The Court said that the both
the Jaycees and the Rotary Club, which both excluded women, were not founded to express
views on male superiority. Rather, they were create for the purposes of networking and civic
engagement, which are not exclusive to men. As such, women could not be prevented from
joining the group. This line of precedents illustrates that restrictions and harms placed upon
individuals who seek to actualize their fundamental rights cannot be arbitrary. In order to
discriminate, such views must be central to actualizing the right to free speech. Otherwise, the
rights of the marginalized group of people hold more importance. (Roberts; Rotary Club)
This dynamic also explains the rights of businesses or other private actors. A business or
employment opportunity could not be restricted to only those who pursue opposite sex
relationships, because the central purpose of the business is not to impart views of opposite sex
relationship superiority. Their central purpose is to provide a service or good and generate a
profit. Most institutions or associations that would seek to restrict those in gay relationships do
not have an expressed purpose of restricting such individuals. (Roberts) Because of this, these
institutions are not constitutionally permitted to discriminate. The distinction between the central
purposes of different associations establish the brightline as to when individuals in same-sex
relationships can be discriminated against and when they cannot, and further clarifies the scope
of these protections.
To clarify, the examples referenced were of institutions exercising their right to
expressive association to discriminate against other individuals in same-sex relationships. In the
courts, these cases weighed the rights to expressive association against a minority’s right to
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Equal Protection, not their right to intimate association. Even though Equal Protection was at
issue in those cases, the logic still applies to the right to intimate association. The target of
discrimination does not need to be a group of people seeking equal rights and recognition of their
rights to Equal Protection. As long as an expressive association is seeking to restrict the rights of
some individuals, then the right that is being infringed is irrelevant. So groups that want to
infringe upon an individual’s right to intimate association must show that it is their central
purpose to restrict such individuals in order to prevent them from joining their association. As
long as that is proven, then the targeted group does not need to be targeted on the basis of
preventing equal protection, just on the basis of preventing some individual from being able to
access some established right. On the other hand, associations whose central purpose is not
premised upon discrimination against individuals in gay relationships cannot harm such
individuals through restriction or marginalization.

Strategic Avoidance: Why the Right to Intimate Association was not Pursued by
Gay Rights Activists
Throughout this thesis, I have explained at great length why pursuing a right to intimate
association would be preferable to protect gays than an Equal Protection justification. However,
if this right was is so preferred compared to Equal Protection, and was a part of the case law
during the time of many of the preeminent gay rights cases 91, then it begs the question as to why
it was not pursued by gay rights activists seeking equality through the courts. The answer is not
that the legal analysis of gays’ right to intimate association was not compelling, because these
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arguments were strongly considered and argued in Bowers v. Hardwick. (Schraub 2010, 1448)
The answer lies in the political considerations for the gay rights movement, and were the basis of
the case’s dissent. Activists had to consider a legal strategy that could both had a chance at being
effective in court and would also cast gays in a favorable light politically. Throughout the 1980s,
the concept of homosexuality as an identity was in its infancy, and did not have the support of a
substantial portion of the population in the way that the belief has nowadays. 92 Much of the
country saw gays as individuals who chose to partake in alternative forms of sexual conduct, and
not as individuals who held an identity that deviated from the concept of heterosexuality. (Pew
Research 2013) It was the goal of activists to try to change the perceptions of the wider
population that being gay should not be reduced simply to the sexual conduct between two
individuals. These strategies sought to better reflect the way many felt about their sexual
orientation: that it was a defining characteristic that shape their life and understanding of
themselves. It was not simply an explanation for the sexual conduct that went on behind closed
doors.
The goal of shifting the public’s understanding of gay rights was to humanize gay
citizens. It was to show that homosexuality did not only result in perceived deviation from
common sexual norms, but rather were born possessing a differing identity and still were good,
moral people who simply were sexually attracted to other individuals of the same-sex. (Brookey
2002) There was a focus upon the individual and their identity, and not the sexual pair, which
was a common view for the time. (Pew Research) The intention of humanizing gays was to lead
to greater social acceptance of gays within all interactions and institutions one comes in contact
92

While I was unable to find any data from the 1970s-80s, the general opinions of the U.S. populace about whether
or not homosexuality was a choice have shifted dramatically since the mid 1990s. Today, 65% of individuals believe
one’s sexual orientation is not within the individual’s control. In 1994, the same poll was given, with only 49% of
individuals believing that homosexuality was not a choice. (Pew Research)
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with throughout their life. (Anderson 2006, 104) It also served to distance gays from the
demeaning reduction of one’s identity to their sexual conduct.
It was not just the general public that needed to shift its understanding of being gay from
a choice of sexual conduct to an understanding of an individual’s identity. The courts also
considered gays to be defined by the sexual acts and choices as opposed to understanding their
homosexual status. No case greater exemplifies this view than Bowers, which found Georgia’s
bans on homosexual sodomy constitutional due to the lack of a fundamental right to engage in
non-procreative sexual conduct. (Bowers,1986) In that case, the majority only saw gays as
products of their sexual choices as opposed to their status, and as such claimed that there was no
protection of those choices. Justice Powell referred to Georgia’s ban as “uncommonly silly”, yet
found that the State of Georgia’s restriction of sexual conduct was allowed because there was no
constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy. (Bowers, 1986) Especially notable was
how the Court refused to determine whether sodomy was a form of privacy or intimate
association. They merely stated that there was no right to engage in sodomy, without any regard
for whether this conduct could be considered a protected form of liberty under Substantive Due
Process.
In terms of public opinion, The Bowers decision was highly detrimental to gay rights
advocates, as it reaffirmed the common perceptions of homosexuality. The case was a well
calculated effort by Lambda Legal try to push gay rights into the national political consciousness
and advance awareness and discourse by way of a monumental legal victory. (Murdoch and
Price, 2001) However, the Court’s opinion finding the state’s ban on homosexual sodomy
constitutional not only established a negative precedent. It also served to legitimize the view that
gays could be characterized by their conduct as opposed to their identity. Gay rights activists
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accurately predicted that this case would draw great attention across the nation. However, the
loss galvanized the opposition and served to highlight the deficiencies in the movement, thus
leading for a call to refocus on how to best win equal rights. (Anderson 2006, 94)
Legally, Bowers posed great problems to those within the gay rights movement, as it
legitimized the notion that those who partake in homosexual sodomy were criminals. With this
title, it made discrimination against such individuals much more palatable. (Anderson 2006, 93)
There were many cases decided in the following years that relied on Bowers’ analysis on the
nature of gay citizens as criminals choosing to partake in criminal behavior. This was the
justification that allowed the FBI to reject an otherwise qualified applicant who identified as
lesbian (Padula v. Webster, 1987), maintain a ban on gays from serving in the Navy (Woodward
v. U.S., 1989), and prevent anyone identifying as gay or straight from adopting children.(Appeal
in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 1986) By focusing on the identity component of sexual
orientation, activists could distance themselves from decisions like these that focused exclusively
on the conduct of individuals without recognizing the underlying, legitimate identity that
determined the motivating sexual conduct. The argument for equal protection would provide a
constitutional doctrine that could highlight this new conception of homosexuality as an identity
could unify the movement under one coherent message. The right to intimate association, on the
other hand, relied on analysis that was too close to the negative precedents established and
reinforced the conduct aspect of same-sex relationships too strongly. (Anderson 2006, 120)
After Bowers, gay rights activists sought to affirm the ideal that being gay was both not a
choice and was more than one’s choice of sexual conduct. This led to the concerted effort to
discover the “gay gene” to affirm that homosexuality was immutable and was not determined
simply through the choice of the actor. (Brookey 2002, 156) With regard to litigation strategy,
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this approach to humanize and normalize gay identity needed to be substantiated through legal
means. The best constitutional approach to achieving gay rights while fitting the new image that
activists so desired to portray was that of Equal Protection. If being gay was a mark of
immutability and was a central factor in one’s formation of their identity, then it could be
covered under the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause based on the Court’s prior rulings.
This strategy both aligned with the wider movement while being constitutionally
permissible.(Anderson 2006, 114)
The right to intimate association, on the other hand, too closely reflected the argument
that gays could be defined by their sexual conduct, which was the argument that advocates so
actively sought to fight against. The focus of the movement was to move away from the actual
relationship between individuals of the same sex, and instead characterize such individuals as
minorities possessing a new form of identity. (Thomas 1992, 1452-53) The right to intimate
association was too directly affiliated to the unacceptable conception of sexuality as merely a
product of sexual conduct. While it may not have been the best legal strategy, pushing equal
protection better aligned with the wider considerations of the movement that needed to be
considered.
The shift in rebranding the gay population proved effective through further litigation. The
Court recognized both in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas that gays should be considered
as a group of people bound together by a common identity, instead of as individuals choosing to
engage in alternative sexual conduct. (Romer; Lawrence) In each case, the Court claimed that the
state cannot justify any discrimination on gays with no rational purpose other than demonstrated
animus against individuals of the group. This is significant because of were being seen by the
Court as a group whose identity needed protecting, which is essential to earning the protections
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associated with the Equal Protection Clause. 93 While neither of these cases granted gays the
protections of a higher tier of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, which was one of the
expressed goals for the movement, they did legitimize the shift away from being characterized as
sexual deviants, and highlighted the coalition of gays as a distinct minority group.
Since the 1990s, the debate over gay rights has become more central within the political
sphere. It also has attracted much more support, as I explained earlier. This support has led to
victories through legislative means, 94 ballot referendums, 95 and Supreme Court victories, 96 most
notably in U.S. v. Windsor. As the movement has progressed and support for gay rights is much
more prevalent across all demographics, there is less need to align litigation strategy with the
platform of the social movement. There is a broad enough base of support for gay rights that the
strategy is now less important than the outcome of cases. As such, with less need to align with
the overall movement, then it makes it even more prudent to employ the right to intimate
association as the preferred constitutional theory. While the Supreme Court is supposed to
interpret the law and the constitution without concern for political leanings, and decisions should
not be more acceptable at certain times than others, the reality is that the public opinion
surrounding high-profile issues greatly influences both the way these cases are argued by the
parties involved and the way these cases are decided by the courts.
93

The only uses of the Equal Protection clause that have been applied to give higher protection has been to
individuals who identify as part of some group
94
Some legislative victories include the repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which banned gays
from openly serving in the military (2010), the recognition of orientation as a basis for pursuing hate crime charges
(2009), and state legislation that legalized gay marriage, including Rhode Island, Delaware, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New York, and Hawaii
95
Citizens of Minnesota struck down a 2012 ballot initiative to amend the state constitution to restrict marriage to
only unions between a man and a woman. The states of Maine, Maryland, and Washington all voted in affirmation
of the legalization of gay marriage.
96
The most notable court victories were last year’s U.S. v. Windsor and Hollngsworth v. Perry. However, there have
been many cases within the past couple of years that challenge bans on gay marriage, whether they be in state courts
(Garden State Equality v. Dow, Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, among others) or lower federal courts
(Bradacs v. Haley, Kitchen v. Herbert, Love v. Beshear, among others)
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The growth in support signals the readiness to choose a legal theory that is legally most
compelling. As I have explained, an argument supporting gay rights through recognition of all
individual’s right to form intimate associations much better reflects both the individual and their
choices, and allows for greater consistency and clarity of law. My goal with this thesis has been
to determine the most convincing legal theory that serves the purposes of constitutional
processes in the most honest form. Pursuing a theory predicated on the Equal Protection Clause
muddles the clarity of law, thus undermining the desire for consistency and clarity. An argument
through right to intimate association establishes a clearer precedent that coincide with past
rulings is a more coherent fashion while dictating a clear doctrine to be applied in future cases.
These purposes were not of great concern to the gay rights movement during the 1980s and
1990s, which goes to explain the emphasis placed on the political optics of the legal theory
advanced. These earlier decisions by those active in the gay rights movement to pursue Equal
Protection was not because advocating for the recognition of gay relationships as intimate
associations was inadequate.
Furthermore, the nature of the gay rights movement has adapted greatly from the late 20 th
century to today. While much attention and focus was placed upon mobilizing all gay individuals
together in order to show that they all shared a collective identity, the understanding of identity
has grown and become much more diverse. There is simply a much greater consciousness around
the many different identities that one could subscribe to, instead of the simple binary of gay or
straight. The prominence of bisexuality has increased, along with the belief that sexuality can be
fluid and ever-changing, even if the source of our sexuality is out of our control. There is a much
greater awareness about the difficulties and limiting natures of gender binaries that restrict men
and women to societal expectations based on their biological gender. Identities such as being
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transgendered 97 highlight the diversity in the way that individuals self-identify by helping to
deconstruct norms around the expectations of persons to conform their social identity to the body
they were born into.
The many different identities that people possess, along with the greater social
consciousness about the plethora of different identities and the importance of these different
identities, better coincide with a constitutional theory based around the right to intimate
association, instead of Equal Protection. Assume for the moment that both constitutional
philosophies led to the same results in terms of spreading equal rights for all individuals in or
desiring same-sex relationships. If the ends are the same, then we would look at the means used
that represent the people. When analyzing how the people are represented, the right to intimate
association better captures the nature of identities and the fluidity and individuality inherent to
them. With Equal Protection, the burden is on the minority group to clearly define many
different dimensions of their identity, such as immutability, discreteness, and the historical
discrimination against them. However, this is incredibly limiting, because it forces a group of
people to be defined under one monolithic conception of sexual orientation. This goes against
common understanding of sexuality, especially when considering the intersectionality of gender
and sexual orientation issues and identities. The diversity of individuals, their identities, and their
relationships cannot be defined by one uniform definition. It would not properly represent the
people that the Court would be trying to establish equal right for. Rather, it leads to the potential
of codifying mass mischaracterizations of large swaths of people. This could have the effect of
97

While a true comprehensive understanding of what it means to be transgendered would require much greater
analysis than just this footnote, one good definition is provided by the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
Community Center of New York, which states that transgendered “at its most basic level, is a word that applies to
someone who doesn't fit within society's standards of how a woman or a man is supposed to look or act.” For
example, one who identifies as female, yet is born as a biological man, may identify as a transgendered female. (The
Center, 2014)
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rendering a decision whose precedence could be seen as obsolete and a relic of a past time in the
coming years, which had an unclear and narrow-minded understanding of identity.
The right to intimate association, however, does not place any burden on individuals to
define themselves in any way. Instead, it simply seeks to determine whether there are meaningful
relationships between individuals that are not being protected in a way that preserves their liberty
enumerated to them by the 14th Amendment. To the point that there are meaningful relationships
between individuals of the same gender, it does not matter how those individuals identify
themselves. All that matters is that these relationships exist. This is preferable because the Court
does not have to characterize a diverse group of people through one overarching definition.
Rather, the decision of how one sees themselves is properly left up to the individual, instead of to
the government. When recognizing the tides and movements of the public independent of the
development of the law, the opportunity to avoid sweeping characterizations of people who are
keen on highlighting the subtle difference and embracing the diversity that comes from these
subtle difference better represents the exact people the Court would be awarding rights to.
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Conclusion
In search of a legal rationale to uphold gay right, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 th
Amendment is not the only way to protect and attain these rights. The right to intimate
association has the potential to provide the desired equality sought through litigation. The
purpose of extending the right to intimate association is not to suggest that an Equal Protection
claim is unable to provide the desired outcomes for those within the gay rights movement. When
considering the interests of the judicial system in conjunction with the aims of those within the
gay rights movement, the right to intimate association as a justification for a greater expansion of
gay rights better reflects the desires and needs of all of the different relevant interests.
When analyzing how judges are told to interpret laws affecting gay citizens, the right to
intimate association provides greater clarity for judges than does an argument of Equal
Protection. Effective precedents should be clear in the rationale that they rely upon, and should
consequently be easily applicable to later cases that deal with similar issues. The nature of the
right to intimate association better lends itself to this purpose than do the precedents for Equal
Protection.
Determinations about which groups receive protection under the Equal Protection Clause
are rather subjective. There are many factors that the Court is to take into account when deciding
if a group is entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny for their right to Equal Protection.
(Ackerman 1985, 726) They include whether or not a group is discrete or insular (Carolene),
whether the group has experience prejudice in the form of historical discrimination of the
political powerlessness of the group, whether or not trait being discriminated against is
immutable, and whether the trait bears relation to the government purpose in discriminating.
(Frontiero)
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Each of these different factors poses real problems of subjectivity and lack of clear
application and interpretation. They also do not necessarily represent all minority groups who
may have a claim to deserve Equal Protection, yet cannot fit within the confines established.
Discreteness of a trait, or the ability to clearly recognize a characteristic of an individual, may
have been the basis for discrimination against blacks and women, but not all groups petitioning
for Equal Protection have traits that are visually apparent. (Ackerman 1986, 729) Such does not
mean that the claim of their discrimination and need for Equal Protection are invalid. It just
means that they cannot fulfill the established, necessary factors. Insularity suffers from the same
problem, as it is not a trait that is necessarily essential to demonstrating the need to award a
certain group heightened status.
Measuring prejudice is especially difficult, as there is no clear and objective way to
understand past discrimination or to measure a group’s political power. Without a clear metric
for understanding prejudice against a group, it allows for judges to be selective in what evidence
they use, and does not provide any check upon judges to reflect the entirety of past
discrimination or political power. Furthermore, measuring historical discrimination of a group
and the political power that group now wields both reflect the prejudice faced by the petitioning
group, but still asks separate questions. There is no apparent method to weigh the historical
discrimination against the current political power of a group in a cohesive fashion that would
establish a clear understanding of a prejudice felt by a group. (Strauss 2011, 154)
Immutability and relevance of trait to discrimination each pose their own issues as factors
in Equal Protection litigation. The intention of immutability is to reflect that an individual should
not be discriminated on the basis of a characteristic they have no ability to change. (Halley 1994,
514) However, the way in which that has manifested is that the quality must either be
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biologically determined or unable to be changed over the course of a person’s life. This is
problematic because it only validates discrimination against an individual if the basis of the
discrimination is against a quality that will never be changed in the future. It does not recognize
that discrimination of a trait is bad for its own sake, regardless of how long the discriminated
person will possess that trait. Relevance of the trait in discrimination is problematic because a
policy could be directly attacking a quality about an individual and the purpose for doing so is
because of that quality. (Strauss 2011, 165)
Each of these different qualities is flawed in their own right and difficult to determine or
apply. When courts then have to take all of these factors that are difficult to interpret and
combine them together in order to form a determination about whether a class deserves
heightened status, there is no guarantee of any real precision or consistency in applying the law.
With so many different factors to consider, and no understanding of which to prioritize, it places
a high burden upon judges to adequately weigh the different factors against each other properly.
Yet without any metric for how to do so, the result is that almost any justification can be
determined for petitioning groups depending on the relative importance each judge places on
each factor.
The problems of the Equal Protection jurisprudence are elucidated when applying the
factors in coming to an understanding of how to interpret sexuality. There are problems with
each of these factors, in that they either do not reflect the hardships experienced by gays or they
are difficult to measure. Gays would not fulfill either of the first two factors necessary to find for
heightened class status: discreteness or insularity. (Ackerman 1985, 729) Yet, even though gays
may be anonymous and diffuse (the opposites of discreteness and insularity), these attributes can
be seen as harming gays more than being discrete or insular would have. (Wilkinson 1975, 980)
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Because individuals do not have to be public with their sexuality, they can choose to remain
anonymous. This fear is harmful to the individual and is directly caused because of societal
discrimination. It is questionable as to whether or not one’s sexuality is immutable, with many
arguing passionately on both sides of the debate. However, the question remains as to whether or
not it is relevant that sexuality is immutable. To the point that one is discriminated based on their
identity and chosen understanding of their sexuality, then it should not matter if their orientation
will remain fixed in the future or was determined at birth. (Strauss 2011, 163) If the
discrimination exists, then there should be recognition of such and steps should be taken to
remedy that discrimination.
The issues of measuring historical discrimination and political powerlessness are also
highly problematic when applied to gays. There is no clear way to measure the historical
discrimination faced by gays. One could look to the legislative history that served to discriminate
against gays. Yet, they would find most anti-gay laws were ratified in the 20th century. Does that
mean that gays were not discriminated against prior to the passage of these laws? (Hoffman
2003, 1255) Or does it mean that marginalization of gays was so commonplace that there was no
need to codify that discrimination, because it was simply implied? The questions are left
unanswered and are again within the purview of any presiding judge faced with Equal Protection
claims. (Wilkinson 1975, 981) Measuring the political powerlessness of gays is especially
troubling, because gays have different amounts of political influence in different areas of the
country. In the northeast and pacific northwest, for instance, gays experience a great deal of
support and wield significant political capital. However, in less tolerant regions such as the
south, there is much less acceptance of homosexuality, which translates to more prevalent
discrimination and less political power for gays in those regions. With such disparity in political
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capital throughout the country, the question then becomes how the court should take into account
these disparities, to which there is no clear answer.
Overall, the way that the Equal Protection precedents are established prevents a clear
understanding of what tier gays should be adjudicated under. The factors could be interpreted to
justify a decision under any of the levels of scrutiny. These issues prompt the need for a better
judicial philosophy that can be easily decided and establishes a clear precedent. The right to
intimate association can provide that alternative for gay rights. While there are many benefits
that are exclusive to the right to intimate association, the approach is not without some flaws.
Just like there is a level of subjectivity in Equal Protection precedents, the right to intimate
association is not immune from some subjectivity as well. In review, the Court decided in
Roberts that the right to intimate association was found as essential to the liberty endowed in the
14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Roberts) Within that precedent, the Court stated that
there were four primary factors that made up an intimate association that future Courts could use
to determine whether certain relationship should be considered intimate associations. The four
relevant factors in determining whether a relationship is an intimate association are purpose, size,
selectivity, and congeniality. The purpose of the association must align with the intended reasons
for recognizing the right in the first place. The size of the association must be small enough or
conducive to allowing individuals to have the opportunity to develop bonds with another
individual or individuals. Recognizing selectivity as a factor acknowledges the autonomy of an
individual to form their own intimate associations, and reinforces the notion that the most
meaningful relationships are those that are chosen by the individual. Congeniality is closely
related to selectivity, as intimate relationships are chosen on the basis that individuals gain real

Binder 158

benefits from being a part of them, and inherent to gaining these benefits is that there is a sense
of congeniality among those in the relationship. (Roberts)
The reliance on these factors could be vulnerable to the same criticism as Equal
Protection: that judges are basing their decisions on whether to consider a relationship as an
intimate association on the same subjectivity that proves perilous for Equal Protection. Judges
can still preference certain factors over others in determining whether a relationship should be
protected under Substantive Due Process as a fundamental right. (Roling 2012, 908) Also, there
is the question as to whether a relationship must be aligned with national tradition in order to be
worthy of protection. The precedents appear to lean towards recognizing all relationships
regardless of their historical prevalence or significance, yet without a clear dictation making this
explicitly clear, judges in future cases could reasonably choose to only protect associations that
clearly are reflected in the nation’s tradition. This is both an area of ambiguity in the law and
gives the opportunity for same sex relationships to not be recognized as a protected form of
intimate association, which would mean that those in same-sex relationships would receive no
extra judicial protection.
While there is an element of subjectivity that does exist for adjudication of the right to
intimate association similarly to that of Equal Protection, the level of subjectivity is
comparatively less than it is for Equal Protection precedents. The burdens placed of judges
through the right to intimate association are much more manageable, with fewer factors. All of
these factors are also more clearly defined for the right to intimate association. The size of a
relationship, or the simple fact that the individuals chose to enter the association, can be easily
understood, especially when compared to determining how the Equal Protection precedents are
to be understood.
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The difference in the level of subjectivity and lack of clarity between the two theories can
be attributed to what is ultimately attempting to be achieved through each theory. In order for
gays to earn suspect or quasi-suspect class status, the entire minority must be defined in a way
sufficient for the Court. Having to define an entire group of people and then use that definition to
understand whether or not those people deserve extra judicial protection of their rights is an
incredibly difficult task and lends itself to great amounts of subjectivity on the parts of judges.
Defining a group of people in a comprehensive way that both reflects their individuality as a
people but also fits within past precedents that were determined through analysis of other groups
is incredibly difficult. Defining the nature of a relationship, as is needed when understanding the
scope of the right to intimate association, is much simpler due to the nature of understanding a
relationship between two people. All that is necessary to find is whether or not that relationship
allows individuals to fulfill the liberty endowed by the 14 th Amendment, and whether the
structure of the relationship is conducive to achieving that liberty. The Court does not have to
classify a group with a definition that will endure through generations, as is necessary in Equal
Protection. The target of the judge’s interpretation is easier to comprehend and characterized in
the right to intimate association, which lends itself to greater clarity in the how decisions should
be interpreted and applied by future courts.
Another similarity between the way cases are adjudicated under the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause’s right to intimate association is that both rely on the use of
analogies to best understand the case before the Court. As an attempt to create objectivity within
Equal Protection cases, the Court began analogizing any group petitioning to protected minority
groups. (Craig v. Boren, 1976) The two that petitioning groups are most commonly compared to
are blacks and women, as those are the two groups that were used to establish strict scrutiny and
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intermediate scrutiny. The right to intimate association uses the family and marriage as the
archetypical forms of association that other relationships must demonstrate and mimic the form
and the purposes of these relationships. (Roberts)
While this could appear to cause similar problems between the two theories, this would
overlook what is actually necessary in order to draw these comparisons between the archetype
and the entity the Court is asked to adjudicate. The process of comparing a group of people to
another is both incredibly difficult and allows for misrepresentation of two different groups. How
must the Court weigh the history of discrimination of gays against blacks, when the hardships
that members of each of these groups experienced were distinctly and independently difficult for
individuals? Further, some of the factors employed by the Court are based on requiring the Court
to compare different groups in a false way. Discreteness and insularity may have been reasons
that blacks were disenfranchised, but they do not apply to gays, yet in petitioning for heightened
scrutiny, gays must try to fit themselves into a confine that is misrepresentative of the nature of
sexuality and of the hardships experienced by members of the group. (Ackerman 1985, 729)
The necessary comparisons to be drawn in the right to intimate association cases is not as
difficult to make for courts as it is in Equal Protection cases. At their root, all intimate
associations should confer roughly the same benefits, including but not limited to aiding the
development of one’s emotional faculties, experiencing the feeling of love and reciprocating that
feeling, and improving one’s outlook on elements of the world that can be stimulated through
close relationships with other individuals. (Karst 1980, 629-32) Familial or marital relationships
are used as the comparison because they illustrate a relationship where all of these benefits are
clearly derived. Measuring the benefits of a relationship and comparing them to the benefits
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derived from familial associations requires less extrapolation and sweeping generalizations
because there is less depth to the analogy.
Another difference between these two views is whom these rights apply to. The Equal
Protection Clause is only extended when a group of individuals are deemed worthy of the
protection. The right to intimate association does not require individuals to label themselves in
any way, and the rights are extended to all regardless of the way one identifies. This is important
because one does not need to prove themselves worthy of gaining judicial protection of their
rights. Furthermore, the right to intimate association is one that is provided to all without any
reservations or complications. If same-sex relationships were to be recognized as intimate
associations, then anyone would be granted the right to enter such relationships. The vast
majority of the individuals may choose to not actualize this right, but it is still available to all.
Not only is this right available to all, while Equal Protection requires proof of
deservedness of judicial protection, it better reflects the nature of sexual orientation and the
power of the individual to choose their own identity. The right to intimate association does not
require those who enter into same-sex relationships to clarify for the Court how they perceive
their own identity. This is especially important because of the increasing awareness of the
differences in the identities that people hold so central to their personhood. Some feel their
orientation is fixed in themselves, while others believe their sexuality is more fluid. Some
believe that there is fluidity in gender and gender identity, and that they should not be defined by
their biological anatomy they were born with. Because they do not want to subscribe to beliefs
about how they should act based on their bodily capabilities, they do not define themselves as
one fixed gender or orientation. The differences in these identities may appear minute, yet one’s
conception of their own identity plays a substantial role in their understanding of their worldview
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and their own place within that worldview. The right to intimate association allows individuals to
continue to explore and determine their identity for themselves. The law simply allows
individuals to pursue the relationships of their choosing without unnecessary government
intervention.
Equal Protection analysis does not allow for individuals to self-determine their identity
while also extending legal protections for gay individuals. Gays only attain judicial protection by
classifying themselves in one way. This is not necessarily reflective of how individuals see
themselves, and also limits the autonomy of individuals to cultivate their own identity and not
feel restricted. If the Court prioritizes on conception of gay identity over all others, then it
continues the practice of favoring certain identities over others. Even if there are more
protections extended, the hierarchy of who deserves rights still is perpetuated, which is one of
the aspects of discrimination that gay rights advocates are concerned with eliminating.
The right to intimate association can remedy many of the issues that have arisen
throughout gay rights litigation focusing on Equal Protection. That is not to say the theory is not
without its faults. A reexamination and strengthening of the right to intimate association opens
the door to challenge other restrictions that may also impede upon the right to intimate
association, such as polyamory. While I cannot comment in too much depth about other
independent issues that could arise, the other cases that could be argued under the right to
intimate association may have legitimacy in their own right. If a romantic relationship of three
individuals confers all of the same benefits as a two-person relationship, then the questions
remains if the government should be dictating that only two-person relationships should be
recognized. (Bedi 2013, 212)
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This example, along with many other instances of non-protected associations (incest,
bestiality, among others), is vulnerable to the issue of consent, and whether or not those in the
relationship are genuinely consenting to become a part of those relationships. If they are not,
then there is basis to not recognize the relationship, as the congeniality factor would not be
fulfilled. There may be other reasons that would justify government bans or lack of recognition
that could be developed through a more clear focus upon those issues. Additionally, while other
groups could feel emboldened by the advancement of gay rights under the right to intimate
association, the right has existed for 30 years, and there have been no prominent challenges using
the available case law. Recognition of same-sex relationships does not mean that there is more
justification to recognize these other forms of association.
The right to intimate association is vulnerable to the criticism that the protections for
those not in same-sex relationships but desire them may not be as strong as possible. I’ve
dedicated much focus upon the rights of those in same-sex relationships, and then explained how
one who desires to such relationships can’t be restricted from wanting to actualize one of their
fundamental rights. There is the potential that lower courts could divide on whether or not the
right to intimate association is solely restricted to those in same-sex relationships. If so, then the
impact of the right is significantly reduced, as any individual who seeks same-sex relationships
would not be protected and would be vulnerable to the injustices that this constitutional theory
seeks to prevent.
Even with these potential weaknesses, they do not negate the innate positive benefits that
this constitutional theory possesses, especially when compared to Equal Protection. Individuals
do not have to be defined through one, overarching definition of sexuality through a right to
intimate association, as required by the Equal Protection. The rationale to come to a decision is
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much clearer and easy for lower courts to follow, which is important because of the inevitable
challenges to discriminatory laws upon same-sex couples that will continue to arise through
lower courts. Overall, the right to intimate association is preferable for both the courts and for the
citizenry on the whole. In the late 19th century, the country was not necessarily ready for a right
to intimate association argument as justification for striking down discriminatory laws prevalent
across the nation. (Anderson 2006, 129) We have developed our understanding of gay issues
and identities significantly since that time. Our preferred legal doctrines should follow this trend,
and develop and grow in the most effective way possible for all actors affected. The right to
intimate association is the vehicle that allows this development to happen.
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